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RWMAC's Advice to Ministers on the Radioactive Waste Implications of Reprocessing |
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8. SOCIAL AND POLITICAL ISSUESAlthough this report is mainly addressed to the implications of different scenarios of reprocessing for radioactive waste management, RWMAC is conscious of the social and political issues that surround reprocessing activities. RWMAC has not undertaken an investigation of these issues, and the following comments are only intended to indicate the range of social and political considerations that form the wider context of decision-making on reprocessing. The debate over reprocessing has polarised between arguments for continuation and those which advocate shut-down. However, as this report makes clear, there appears to be little alternative to reprocessing the 7,700 tHM of committed Magnox fuel already ‘in the pipeline’, thus continuing reprocessing for several years. Moreover, waste must be processed and stored at Sellafield for a long period whatever decision is made on the ultimate management route. Consequently, there is no prospect of immediate shut down of activities. Rather, it is a question of the future of reprocessing beyond the period deemed necessary for the management of Magnox fuels. In essence, the choice lies between continuing production at Sellafield for the foreseeable future or an early end to reprocessing and a shift towards clean-up and decommissioning. Whatever view is taken of reprocessing, the fact remains that a substantial legacy of radioactive waste must be managed over the longer term. While continuing reprocessing will change the mix of the wastes which must ultimately be managed (increasing the total volume of wastes but decreasing the amount classified as HLW), cessation of reprocessing will not mean that activities at Sellafield can be shut down, a point that is sometime misperceived. Within this context, there are a number of issues to be considered. For some of these, notably employment considerations, it is possible to provide some quantitative evidence of consequences of decisions. For others, especially those where public perceptions are involved, it is only possible to provide subjective appraisals. In the light of present knowledge, the relative importance of different factors are matters of judgement and will depend on an evaluation of different perspectives on the issues. The following comments are intended to identify some of the social and political issues that must form part of any appraisal of future reprocessing at Sellafield. Justification for reprocessing. Whilst originally undertaken for military purposes, BNFL announced the end of military plutonium production in April 1995. Magnox reprocessing is thus currently undertaken because it is considered to be the appropriate treatment for this reactive fuel type. By contrast, the case for reprocessing oxide fuel in THORP was originally set up for commercial purposes, although more recently has been seriously questioned on grounds of both profitability and operational consequences (see section 2.2). However, while various statements by reprocessing overseas governments and customers have suggested a wish to cancel reprocessing orders, there had been no such cancellations as of the date of preparation of this report. Public perceptions. From a public perspective the different reprocessing scenarios discussed earlier in this report may be of less concern than the fact of reprocessing itself. Given the volumes of wastes from past activities that must be managed, the scenarios, within the ranges RWMAC has studied, indicate a relatively small effect on the overall UK inventory of ILW and LLW although potentially more substantial effects on holdings of HLW (including any unreprocessed spent fuel), uranium and plutonium. While it may be argued that storage of such materials, at least for the interim, is safe and proven technology this may not be fully understood by members of the public. In addition, a continuing commitment to reprocessing is liable to arouse concerns about plant safety, emissions from operations and the dangers of proliferation. No matter how low assessments show statistical probability of harm to be, the perception of risk, and particularly the possibility of high consequences, is a factor that must be recognised. While public concerns about risk will not disappear if reprocessing ceases, public controversy is likely to reduce since, unlike reprocessing, decommissioning and site restoration are seen as beneficial activities. Attitudes to Sellafield are likely to vary depending on proximity, familiarity, knowledge and other factors. Research has identified considerable differences of view among the local population composed of workers at the plant, the traditional farming and fishing communities and an adventitious population. Wynne et al30 have commented on the ambiguities surrounding attitudes to the plant and other studies31,32 have shown that wealth creation, rather than an understanding of the industry or its risks, is the basis on which the operation is tolerated. Beyond the local area, opposition to reprocessing relates particularly to international concerns about movement of nuclear materials and proliferation. Employment considerations. The cessation of reprocessing at Sellafield, whenever it occurs, will bring about a significant reduction in the employment on the site. Termination of Magnox reprocessing would be linked to job losses further afield as a result of closure of the Magnox power stations. It is true that significant clean-up work will remain at Sellafield for many decades whatever happens, but the numbers which can be engaged during clean-up are much smaller than when in production. It has been argued that changes of the order of several years in the end of reprocessing date, and some tens of percent in the employment levels on site, might be expected to have a significant effect on the employment, prosperity and, ultimately, to the well-being of the people of West Cumbria. It is the reprocessing activity which has been viewed by local stakeholders as the wealth-providing activity in the area. Such a perception is also reflected in the fact that there have always been efforts, by means of planning conditions, to limit the importation of spent fuel to that requiring reprocessing. It has been argued that construction of alternative storage facilities, transfer facilities and decommissioning could provide offsetting elements for several years during which time efforts could be made to promote diversification of the local economy. There is, however, a firm local view that reprocessing is the generator of wealth, and there has been very marked antagonism by local people and politicians publicised in the local press to the idea of Sellafield reverting to a storage site. Commercial implications. The THORP operation is predicated on exploitation of foreign markets for reprocessing, notably Germany and Japan. Recent events tend to underline the uncertainty surrounding the market. Considerable political difficulties are presented by the continuation of the trade in nuclear materials and wastes. There has been considerable opposition to the French transports to Japan and to Germany. There is no reason to believe the BNFL shipments will fare differently given the highly sensitive situation in both these customer countries. In addition, once shipments begin, attention will be focused on the transportation issues within the UK and its coastal waters. Of course, cessation of reprocessing does not imply that shipment will cease, since existing contracts require the return of products and wastes to customers and current Government policy would lead to any unreprocessed foreign fuel being repatriated. To conclude, RWMAC recognises the socially and politically controversial nature of continued reprocessing. Some consider that this presents a major hurdle to the achievement of consensus on radioactive waste management policy. The Committee therefore welcomes the initiative that is being undertaken through the process of BNFL’s stakeholder dialogue, although recognises that there is no guarantee of an outcome that will be acceptable to all the parties involved.
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| Page published 14 November 2000; last modified 3 November, 2002 | ||||||
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