ANNEX 5
ROSYTH
Introduction
1. Rosyth is a privatised dockyard, located on the north shore of the
Firth of Forth about 10 miles from Edinburgh, which, although used to
refuel and refit UK nuclear submarines since the late 1960s, has never
served as an operating base for nuclear powered submarines.
2. In 1987, the dockyard was contractorised, and Babcock Thorn Ltd was
awarded a contract to manage the operation of the site on a commercial
basis. In July 1994, the Babcock International Group acquired Thorn EMI's
shareholding in the dockyard and established Babcock Rosyth Defence Ltd
(BRDL) to continue the management of the dockyard. In January 1997, the
dockyard was fully privatised. The site, together with its assets, was
acquired by BRDL.
3. The Government's 1993 decision to concentrate submarine dockyard activity
at Devonport meant that the Vanguard refit facility, then under construction
at Rosyth, was never completed. All submarine refitting and refuelling
activity is due to end at Rosyth following completion of the last such
operation - which began in the autumn of 2000. In contrast to Devonport,
therefore, submarine work at the Rosyth dockyard is being run down, although
for the present, both its facilities and workforce remain in place. Rosyth
is also used to a lesser extent than Devonport for surface ship work;
the latter being the UK's primary operating base. Present plans do, however,
envisage that Rosyth could, in an emergency, support Devonport and Faslane
on submarine work. The dockyard also retains its surface ship contracts.
The privatised operator, BRDL, is actively seeking replacement business.
4. Seven nuclear submarines, which have been taken out of service, are
berthed at Rosyth. These activities are subject to "external"
MoD regulation by NNRP. Like all submarine radioactive wastes, ownership
of these deactivated submarines continues to reside with MoD. While operational
wastes produced as a result of refuelling and refitting are transferred
to BRDL for management, the reactor compartments and coolant circuits,
which constitute the major amounts of radioactive waste present in each
boat, remain MoD's responsibility to maintain. The fate of these vessels
is presently under consideration as part of the ISOLUS study.
5. The ending of regular cycles of refit and refuelling work at Rosyth
means that substantial parts of the site need to be decommissioned. Provision
for BRDL to oversee site decommissioning and remediation work was included
in the BRDL site sale agreement. For the most part, financial responsibility
for this work, and liability for the waste arisings, remains with MoD.
Radioactive waste generation
6. As at Devonport, radioactive waste in solid and liquid forms arises
from maintenance, refit and decommissioning work on nuclear submarines
and from the on-site treatment of submarine wastes.
7. Solid LLW, the bulk of which arises through the removal and replacement
of equipment and from laboratory testing, and associated wastes such as
contaminated clothing, can amount to 180 m3
per year. This is processed at the site's Active Waste Accumulation Facility
(AWAF) for eventual disposal, in drummed form, to Drigg. The AWAF is a
new facility, commissioned in 1998, for the storage of ILW and the processing
and temporary storage of LLW.
8. The annual limit on disposal of solid LLW is 200,000 MBq of beta/gamma
emitting radionuclides. Actual disposals of solid LLW have been well within
these levels. A new waste sorting table and active waste monitor are being
acquired in order to maximise the potential for minimising waste arisings
and accurately quantifying waste streams; BRDL believes that it may be
possible to reduce the number of existing drums to be consigned to Drigg
by 50 per cent.
9. Solid ILW amounting to about 25 m3
a year, comes from redundant activated metal components removed from areas
proximate to the submarine reactor compartments. This is stored within
shielded pits in AWAF.
10. Rosyth, like Devonport, also has to deal with the ion-exchange resins,
both LLW and ILW, which arise, in part, from treatment of submarine reactor
primary circuit wastes. Arisings of ILW resins are about 5 m3
per annum.
11. The Resin Catch Tanks (RCTs) witnessed by RWMAC during its last visit
are still being used although they have now been brought within the AWAF.
As at Devonport, discovery of the presence of carbon-14 has meant that
previous assumptions concerning the decay of ILW to LLW need to be revisited.
Some resins are now likely to remain ILW over much longer periods than
was previously foreseen. As a first step, the existing RCTs, already beyond
their design life, need to be replaced. BRDL intends to identify, and
then assess, the various options for implementing the longer-term storage
of the ILW resins.
12. Liquid LLW comes from submarine primary coolant, decontamination
processes, laundry facilities and the radiochemical laboratory. Some wastes
are treated at the Effluent Treatment Plant (ETP), where, after filtration,
passage through ion exchange resins, sampling and analysis, the resulting
liquid is discharged to the Forth estuary. Laundry wastes are routed through
a testing laboratory and associated holding tank before discharge. There
is a time window for such discharge - within one to four hours after high
tide. This practice was the subject of a SEPA enforcement notice requiring
six specific improvements on the part of BRDL, which have now been implemented.
There are specified limits of 5,000 and 40,000 MBq per annum respectively
for the discharge of cobalt-60 and tritium. Actual discharges in recent
years have been well within these limits. The critical group dose from
liquid discharges is estimated to be 0.004 microsieverts per year.
13. Ventilation monitoring has shown that there are virtually no gaseous
discharges from the site.
Site regulation
14. As at Devonport, Rosyth Dockyard is subject to full civilian regulation
under NIA65 and RSA63. The NIA65 site license is not held by BRDL but
resides in Rosyth Royal Dockyard Limited. NNRP Authorisation of the dockyard
was granted in 1999.
15. Under RSA93, BRDL are authorised to:
- discharge radioactive gases to the atmosphere;
- discharge liquid LLW to the Forth estuary;
- dispose of solid LLW and VLLW to Drigg.
Because of the problem with detection of carbon-14 in the wastes, no
disposals of LLW to Drigg have actually taken place since the beginning
of 1999.
Radioactive waste management policy and strategic planning
16. Policy for radioactive waste management is set out in an instruction,
issued company-wide and regularly updated, with which all employees are
required to adhere. The scope of the instruction is clearly defined -
covering the full range of waste-producing activities carried out by BRDL
and the subsequent management operations applied to those wastes. Overall
responsibilities, located at a senior level, for providing waste management
functions, and for ensuring that they are discharged in a safe manner,
are also clearly defined. The latter responsibility falls to the Health
Physics Department. A named Radiation Protection Adviser (RPA) is responsible
for ensuring that company policy is pursued, health and safety law is
observed, and the requirements of RSA93 for waste management are followed.
The RPA acts as the first point of contact with SEPA.
17. The policy is predicated on waste minimisation, early removal of
material posing a radiation hazard, establishment of work practices designed
to ensure that exposures, and potential exposures, are ALARP, and application
of BPM in use of waste management technology, including authorised disposal
routes.
18. However, BRDL's forward radioactive waste management plans appeared
to RWMAC to be less well formulated and documented. During the visit,
RWMAC posed the question of BRDL's site waste plan. The company's response
was that this was executed by means of returns made to the UK National
Radioactive Waste Inventory - the document that defines the volume of
current and anticipated civil and defence radioactive waste streams. The
Committee believes that while the Inventory is a detailed and reliable
instrument of national strategy, it does not substitute for planning at
site level. Its focus is on national facilities, such as Drigg, and issues
common to all nuclear licensed sites, such as ILW packaging, not on site-specific
waste management requirements. As will be clear from Annex 2.4, RWMAC
has strong doubts about the efficacy of MoD's arrangements for compiling
the defence wastes inventory and ensuring that returns made to the UK
Inventory are comprehensive.
Spent fuel
19. There have, as at Devonport, been problems with the containers used
for the rail transport of spent fuel to Sellafield. These difficulties
have only recently been resolved. In brief :
- in 1991, regulatory approval was withdrawn for use of Used Core Transport
Packages (UCTP);
- the NTL3M type container was used on a stop-gap basis;
- approval has now been given for the use of the Used Fuel Flask (UFF).
20. Despite these difficulties, BRDL was able to decant the spent fuel
from the site pond. This, and approval of the UFF, should mean that BRDL
will now be able to deal easily with the remaining spent fuel at Rosyth.
This comprises the fuel from HMS Swiftsure still held in two UCTP flasks
on the dockside - which will now have to be transferred to the new UFF
flasks for transfer to Sellafield when a suitable opportunity arises.
The fuel from HMS Renown, which is due to be decommissioned, has already
been sent to Sellafield (March 2001) as has that from HMS Sceptre, HMS
Spartan, and HMS Revenge.
Site decommissioning
21. Site decommissioning and remediation work is to be overseen by BRDL
under a turnkey project designated RD83.
22. At present, RD83 envisages the eventual removal of nuclear equipment
from two out of the three submarine docks. Facilities designed for refitting
and refuelling will also be decommissioned. However, any facilities necessary
for Rosyth to carry out its submarine servicing "overload" functions
would be retained. AWAF, the purpose-built ILW store, will also be retained.
On the face of it, AWAF will, therefore, be under-utilised unless new
work comes to Rosyth.
23. The decommissioning project is being planned in two stages. Stage
1 consists of radiological surveys, examination of contamination boundaries,
development of specialist decontamination techniques, and development
of the competitive tendering exercise for the subsequent stage. Stage
2 consists of managing the decommissioning and decontamination work itself.
24. Key elements of the clean-up work are to cover the 2 and 3 dock refuelling
facilities, the health physics building and its laundry, the refuelling
equipment shop, the radiochemistry laboratory, the low active discharge
line and the on-site VLLW waste disposal facility (closed in 1978).
25. BRDL intends to take account of the experience of the decommissioning
of the Jason reactor site at the Greenwich Royal Naval College. There
is a significant amount of survey material available for the Rosyth site,
so BRDL believe that they are "not starting with a completely blank
sheet". However, company staff also believe that they will need to
look at many areas in more detail, for example, the depth of ground contamination.
Work is, in effect, only just beginning.
The BRDL proposal for HMS Renown
26. Against the background of the ISOLUS project and loss of nuclear
submarine refit work to DRDL Devonport, BRDL has made an unsolicited proposal
to MoD for post-decommissioning work on HMS Renown, the decommissioned
vessel awaiting de-fuelling at Rosyth. The BRDL proposal consists, in
essence, of cutting out the boat's Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) and Primary
Shield Tank (PST), their dismantling and subsequent long-term storage
of those components classified as ILW in AWAF. The non-contaminated hull
and fittings would be available for scrap.
27. The reason given by BRDL for the initiative is that the company is
looking to find a continuing use for its workforce skills and site facilities.
Although not explicitly stated, it seems likely that BRDL is also looking
to win at least some of the main ISOLUS submarine post-decommissioning
work - logically, for the remaining defuelled and decommissioned boats
at Rosyth. In this context, RWMAC believes that acceptance of the proposal
would inevitably have important implications for the main ISOLUS programme.
28. The Renown project by itself would generate about 50 or so jobs (compared
with the loss of 1,400 jobs that would eventually occur following the
removal of refitting work). The proposal appears to have a fairly narrow
window of opportunity around the timing of the planned defuel docking
of Renown, scheduled for spring 2001. This work is to be followed by an
aircraft carrier contract. Therefore, if the proposal does not go forward
on time, Renown's docking will have to follow the normal lay-up programme
for defuelled submarines, allowing her to be defuelled and decommissioned
with the six other submarines at Rosyth. In other words, the BRDL proposal
will fall.
29. BRDL states that the 7,900 tonne (t) submarine can be taken down
by conventional physical dismantling to the 150t RPV/PST. The RPV/PST
could then be reduced to 20t of more active radioactive waste (ILW) if
further dismantling took place. This was said not to require the development
of entirely new technology. BRDL believes that there will be no significant
worker dose implications from early dismantling. At most, this could amount
to a collective dose of 0.173 manSv, or about 3.5 millisieverts per worker
(assuming a workforce of 50). The length of the work, including placing
the RPV/PSV components into AWAF, is estimated at nine months from the
time the necessary regulatory approvals are secured.
Public relations
30. A Rosyth Local Liaison Committee meets every six months. According
to BRDL, there are no local pressure groups and the company believes that
relations with the local community are good. Community representatives
have visited AWAF and have been informed that it may be used for the long-term
storage of ILW. The nearby local authorities employ an independent radiological
protection adviser to verify critical group estimates.
Main RWMAC observations
Waste storage and carbon-14
31. The AWAF building, opened in 1998, has made impressive new provision
for the storage of ILW, and the processing and temporary storage of LLW,
on the Rosyth site. Because the store was originally predicated on the
basis of an ongoing role for Rosyth in submarine maintenance and refitting,
the site has more than adequate future storage provision already built
in. It is important to remember that AWAF was built to serve the specific
needs of Rosyth; in both concept and design terms, it differs markedly
from the D151 store at Devonport.
32. Currently, part of AWAF is used as a temporary store for large numbers
of drums containing LLW as a consequence of the embargo on disposals to
Drigg. RWMAC was told that DERA-RPS, together with Rolls Royce, were investigating
the problem from the reactor design end (i.e., estimating the likely volume
of carbon-14 production per reactor core). Investigations at the "radioactive
waste end" have so far focussed on analysis of coolant and resin
wastes rather than solids, although BRDL is reviewing the contents of
the stored drums using a new active waste monitor and the results have
been used to estimate the amount of carbon-14 in historic disposals to
Drigg. The role of BRDL was described by its managers as one which "verified"
the DERA-RPS and Rolls Royce findings. The more general state of disposals
of MoD carbon-14 contaminated LLW to Drigg is discussed further in section
6, paragraphs 57-59 of the main report.
33. AWAF houses the LLW and ILW resins derived, in part, from decontamination
treatment of submarine reactor primary circuits. The RCT containers witnessed
by RWMAC during its last visit are still being used. A permanent solution
is needed for these resins since some will remain as ILW over long periods.
As a first step, the existing RCTs, already beyond their design life,
need to be replaced (or possibly refurbished). BRDL is to consider the
possible options. It needs to be emphasised, however, that because of
the concentrations of carbon-14 in some of the resins, decanting into
new or refurbished containers cannot be regarded as the permanent answer.
To achieve this, a long-term arrangement which does not depend on keeping
mobile wastes in free-standing containers needs to be determined.
34. For the LLW resins, the point at which the MODIX chelates can be
removed needs to be established (since these are not acceptable at Drigg)
as does the timescale for their conditioning (probably by cementation)
required before disposal. BRDL appears to have rejected early conditioning
of some of the resins on grounds of both ALARP and financial economy.
35. For solid LLW, RWMAC welcomes the introduction of the sorting table
which will help to ascertain the potential for compacting both present
and future wastes and contribute to the objective of reducing the number
of existing LLW drums by 50 per cent. This would be a useful step since
it would achieve savings in Drigg disposals - once they resume. This assessment
does, however, seem to cast some doubt on the adequacy of the site waste
minimisation and estimation procedures that have been pursued at Rosyth
in the past.
Wider management implications
36. Despite some advances, therefore, RWMAC was unable to conclude that
there was clear planning for the long-term management of the site's wastes.
Overall, the Committee would like to see evidence of more thought being
given to the longer-term management of Rosyth's wastes, with consideration
of how the chelate and carbon-14 problems fold-in. This will also need
to take account of site decommissioning and remediation, which is beginning
to be addressed through the RD83 decommissioning project.
37. Nor did RWMAC feel that all the relevant issues are being considered
together as a whole. A factor which may, or may not, be associated with
this is the extent of available storage in the AWAF and, as a consequence,
the absence of pressure to solve the problem. Clearly, however, the prospect
of long-term on-site storage of ILW would have to be considered side by
side with public expectations for the Rosyth site, given that its submarine
operations, and also of the employment supply associated with them, are
to diminish in the future.
38. For this reason, RWMAC believes that BRDL and MoD need to put further
thought into a comprehensive, forward-looking radioactive waste management
plan for the Rosyth site. This should include a resin management plan
and take due account of the carbon-14 problem. With the failure of the
UK's ILW repository programme, the Committee does not believe that there
is a sound case for delaying treatment of resins, but rather there needs
to be moves towards passive storage taking due account of developing NII
and SEPA thinking.
39. The Committee accepts that there are a number of uncertainties that
would need to be built into such a plan, and thus, its formulation is
not something that can be achieved tomorrow. But this is still a problem
that needs to be addressed to an early timescale - particularly now that
major nuclear elements of the site's work are being significantly reduced
in scale, as this could potentially lead to eventual loss of appropriate
knowledge and expertise.
Spent fuel
40. Few significant difficulties are any longer apparent with regard
to the management of spent fuel at Rosyth and RWMAC believes that BRDL
should be commended for effective management of the problem under taxing
circumstances. It is noted, however, that spent fuel stored in the UCTP
redundant fuel transport containers has now remained on the dockside for
an extended period.
Decommissioning
41. In the discussion that took place during the visit, there appeared
to be a certain lack of clarity about the ownership of some decommissioning
wastes between MoD and the company, although this was something that the
Ships Support Agency and BRDL believed would ultimately be resolved based
on the cut-off point in the 1997 sale agreement (since this defines the
extent of the site's post-privatisation liabilities).
42. There was also an acknowledgement that the estimates of decommissioning
waste arisings, identified for the purpose of feeding into the UK Radioactive
Waste Inventory, were at best somewhat broad, and probably also incomplete
and understated.
43. RWMAC therefore believes that a substantial amount of work will be
needed as part of RD83 to achieve full characterisation of the site. An
important issue could prove to be what, if anything, is to be done with
the main submarine basin.
44. Lastly, there was the indication that AWAF is seen as a facility
that will have a role in the long-term storage of some Rosyth decommissioning
wastes. Given the implications of the ILW operational wastes present on
the site, this would not appear to represent a significant issue, but
it would obviously be helpful if the facts, once established, could be
clearly set out for the benefit of the local community.
ISOLUS and the Renown proposal
45. The ISOLUS programme as a whole may present opportunities for BRDL.
The Company has existing facilities, including the capacity offered by
AWAF (now that production of the waste streams for which it was designed
will end in 2001), an experienced workforce, and effective local liaison
mechanisms.
46. For the present, however, RWMAC is clear that MoD should not agree
to the BRDL proposal for Renown going ahead. The Committee's reason for
taking this view is the risk that it would compromise the ISOLUS study.
This advice has already been provided to MoD in the form of a response
to the public consultation undertaken by NNRP on the Renown proposal.
The Committee's response, sent on 12 February 2001, is set out in full
in the following pages.
ANNEX 5A
HMS RENOWN DISMANTLING PROPOSAL (ENVIRONMENTAL STATEMENT) : TEXT OF THE
RWMAC RESPONSE TO NNRP
Opening summary statement
This document sets out the Radioactive Waste Management Advisory Committee's
(RWMAC's) comments on BRDL's Environmental Statement (ES) for the Renown
Dismantling Proposal upon which the Naval Nuclear Regulatory Panel (NNRP)
has invited comments.
RWMAC's view, explained more fully in what follows in this response,
is that the ES itself is generally satisfactory and indicates that there
will be no significant impact on the environment provided the work is
suitably managed. However, the Committee also wishes to draw to the attention
of MoD generally, of which NNRP is only a part, that it believes that
acceptance of the Renown proposal at this stage would be incompatible
with, and could have potentially damaging effects upon, the Ministry's
ISOLUS programme for dealing with its decommissioned nuclear submarines
more generally.
Background
The Radioactive Waste Management Advisory Committee (RWMAC) notes that
Babcock Rosyth Dockyard Limited (BRDL) has made an unsolicited proposal
to the Ministry of Defence (MoD) for the dismantling of HMS Renown, a
nuclear powered submarine berthed at Rosyth dockyard, on the Firth of
Forth, in Scotland.
The dismantling proposal includes the long term storage of parts of Renown's
nuclear reactor in a facility located within the Rosyth dockyard - which
is owned and operated by BRDL. The proposal can be seen as an alternative
to the traditional MoD policy of "afloat storage" of the hulls
of nuclear submarines for which the Navy has no further use.
Afloat storage already applies to 10 submarine hulls which are moored
under a MoD care and maintenance regime at the Rosyth and Devonport naval
bases. It takes place following the removal of nuclear fuel from the submarine,
draining of the primary coolant circuit and associated pipework, and further
physical processes to prepare the hull for a long period afloat.
The dismantling of HMS Renown by BRDL would be subject to two areas of
primary legislation and associated regulation :
- the Nuclear Installations Act 1965 (NIA65) under which the Nuclear
Installations Inspectorate (NII) regulates operations within the licensed
site at Rosyth Dockyard.
- the Radioactive Substances Act 1993 (RSA93) under which the Scottish
Environment Protection Agency (SEPA) regulates the disposal, including
discharges to the environment, of waste from premises in Scotland.
RWMAC understands that BRDL will require regulatory consents from both
NII and SEPA before it could begin the proposed dismantling work.
The dismantling work of a nuclear reactor would, normally, also be subject
to the Nuclear Reactor (Environmental Impact Assessment for Decommissioning)
Regulations 1999, (NR(EIA)99, applications under which are decided by
the Health and Safety Executive (HSE). These Regulations do not apply
to projects serving UK national defence purposes. In view, however, of
MoD policy that such exempt activities should be subject to standards
and arrangements which are "so far as is reasonably practicable,
at least as good as those required by the legislation", arrangements
have been made for the application to be assessed and decided by NNRP.
Although NNRP is part of the Navy, it acts as an independent regulator
within MoD for elements of the nuclear submarine propulsion programme
to which the civil legislation does not apply. In this role, NNRP has
to decide whether or not it should give approval to BRDL's proposal. It
is for other parts of MoD to decide whether the company should be awarded
a contract for the work.
Application of the NR(EIA)99 regulations implies that BRDL should submit
an ES identifying, describing, and assessing the environmental effects
of the project. The effects cover human beings, fauna and flora, all aspects
of the natural environment, and material assets and the cultural heritage,
all of which are specified in a Schedule to the Regulations. NR(EIA)99
also requires specified parties to be consulted on the application.
Under the special arrangements described above, BRDL has voluntarily
submitted an Environmental Statement (ES) in support of its application.
NNRP has invited the statutory consultees identified in the Regulations
to comment on the ES. It has also asked RWMAC to comment as a discretionary
consultee. NNRP has said that it will take views on the ES, received as
part of the public consultation, into account in deciding whether or not
to give consent to the Renown proposal.
It is a matter of public knowledge that RWMAC is currently carrying out
a study on MoD's radioactive waste management practices ("defence
wastes"). A key area of defence wastes management, MoD's "ISOLUS"
study on the long-term management of nuclear submarines (see section below),
overlaps with consideration of the BRDL proposal. RWMAC welcomes being
given the opportunity by NNRP to comment on BRDL's ES submission but,
in so doing, has also contemplated the Renown proposal in the wider ISOLUS
programme context.
The MoD "ISOLUS" programme
In the past1, RWMAC has criticised
MoD for having no policy for the long-term management of defuelled and
decommissioned nuclear submarines. In 1998, MoD announced a study aimed
at deciding and implementing future policy for managing the hulls, and
particularly the Reactor Pressure Vessels (RPVs), of such submarines.
This exercise is known as the ISOLUS study, standing for "Interim
Storage of Laid-Up Submarines." In essence, ISOLUS aims to secure
a consistent approach to the overall management of all existing redundant
submarine hulls, as well as the future need to deal with present in-service
submarines.
Four options were considered during the first stage of the study - continued
afloat storage, and three alternative land storage options. The latter
comprised land storage of the intact reactor compartment; dismantling
the reactor compartment into its major components for storage as unpackaged
waste; and further dismantling of the major components for storage as
packaged waste. No assumptions were made about the sites at which storage,
whether afloat or on land, would take place. At some point, the site,
or sites, would be subject to a selection process.
The first stage of the study concluded that, while afloat storage remains
an entirely safe way of storing decommissioned submarines, land storage
was the best solution for the longer-term. Accordingly, in order to progress
the option, MoD invited expressions of interest from industry for commercial
solutions for land storage. It would ultimately be for those with an interest
to indicate precisely how they would address the problem, with land storage
of intact reactor compartments taken as a benchmark for comparison. Some
15-20 companies expressed an interest in participating in this work during
the course of 2000.
ISOLUS involves a commitment to carry out public consultation, the provisions
of which incorporate the following : initial (i.e., non site-specific)
information about the study and the possible general implications; taking
public views, both before and after the process of site selection begins;
drawing on the views of experts who can be seen to be capable of representing
the public interest; and, using briefings and the Internet, to provide
regularly updated information on the progress of the project. There is
also intended to be dialogue with both the public and other stakeholders.
RWMAC's view of the BRDL Environmental Statement
RWMAC notes that the required scope and coverage of the ES is set out
in the Schedule attached to the NR(EIA)99 regulations.
In RWMAC's view, the ES appears to adequately address the requirements
of the NR(EIA)99 schedule.
The Committee believes that, subject to the maintenance of good working
practices:
- the proposal appears to be technically feasible and basically consistent
with major submarine decommissioning and lay-up work, in which BRDL
already has a great deal of experience;
- existing BRDL plant is to be used; no new development is needed.
Any work required over and above normal submarine decommissioning and
lay-up procedures, which appears to amount to the dismantling of metal
structures, in order to remove the RPV, is conventional engineering
work for which BRDL has the expertise and which has no significant impact
on the environment;
- the need for BRDL to manage radioactive wastes, including discharges,
as a result of the proposed Renown work does not appear to have any
significant adverse effect on the environment.
RWMAC notes that the proposal would be subject to BRDL making satisfactory
safety cases for the dismantling processes and storage of the resulting
wastes. These would be judged against conformance to safety principles
and criteria laid down by the NII under the provisions of NIA65.
The Committee notes that there will only be minor airborne discharges
from the cutting out and dismantling of the submarine's reactor compartment.
The Committee sees no reason to question this assessment.
RWMAC also notes that the need for additional discharges of liquid radioactive
waste is estimated to lead only to extremely low additional radiation
doses to members of the critical group of much less than one microsievert
per year.
However, the Committee notes that proposals for the disposal of radioactive
waste, including aerial and liquid discharges, will need to be considered
and authorised by the Scottish Environment Protection Agency (SEPA) under
the provisions of RSA93.
Additionally, RWMAC notes that the possibility of accidental spillage
of radioactive effluent is specifically considered and addressed in the
ES. In light of the information provided, it seems most unlikely that
an accidental release would occur and, even if it did, that its effects
could not be suitably mitigated.
Given that any radioactive releases, either aerial or liquid, would be
so low, it is difficult to see that there can be any significant radiological
impact on the environment from the proposed process. This needs to be
confirmed, however, by the regulatory scrutiny required of NII and SEPA.
There is, however, one aspect that may need to be given some further
thought in the consideration of the proposals under NIA65, and RSA93 and
also, potentially, by NNRP. The potential utilisation of the Rosyth ILW
store has, so far as RWMAC is aware, not yet been fully evaluated in the
context of any longer-term radioactive waste management and site decommissioning
and clean-up planning for the Rosyth site. As the Committee's forthcoming
report on defence wastes is likely to make clear, this assessment needs
to include the implications for long-term on-site storage of wastes contaminated
with carbon-14, a long-lived radionuclide recently (1998) identified as
a significant waste stream produced by submarine reactors. Space within
the store would also be taken up by any wastes arising from Renown and
also, potentially, any other submarines that might ultimately be dismantled
for land storage at the site. If so, this could eventually lead to additional
radioactive waste storage facilities being needed on the site.
RWMAC's view of the BRDL Renown proposal in the context of the wider
ISOLUS programme
It is easy to understand why BRDL submitted the Renown proposal. As a
result of a MoD decision in 1993, no submarine refitting work will, after
2001, be carried out at Rosyth. Unless replacement work can be found,
BRDL will have a surplus workforce, including expertise and experience
built up over many years of submarine support operations, and surplus
facilities, including a new, purpose-built, ILW store. It is natural that
the company should seek further contracts at an early a stage as possible.
Equally, in RWMAC's opinion, any view of the Renown proposal must be placed
in the wider context of the ISOLUS programme.
In its report on MoD defence wastes, RWMAC is likely to say that the
ISOLUS study needs to be seen in the context of the Government's planned
national consultation on the way forward for a policy on management of
the UK's solid radioactive wastes. This wider consultation, should, the
Committee believes, focus on all the options for the long-term management
of solid radioactive waste, both civil and military, and on the means
by which the public's views are to be sought and taken account of, rather
than on specific management proposals. The Committee has already published
its views on the importance of achieving widely-based scientific and societal
agreement if policy on radioactive waste is to be successful2,3.
Part of this requirement is the need for decision-making to be, and to
be seen to be, transparent and to avoid any suggestion that decisions
have been pre-determined, i.e. made in advance of consultation.
RWMAC believes that the ISOLUS study, for reasons of the relative simplicity
of the waste streams involved and the waste management practices likely
to be needed, can serve as a useful model for public consultation. It
is, therefore, in the national, as well as the MoD's, interests that the
ISOLUS programme should proceed in a way that reflects the need for transparency
in the information provided, full and unfettered public discussion of
the options, and decisions which can be seen to derive from public participation
in the process. Even if the eventual option for managing the submarines
was to be selected more on social, employment, or economic considerations,
the Committee believes it is essential, in particular, that radiological
factors should be fully aired and understood by both the public and other
stakeholders.
With this in mind, RWMAC believes it would be a mistake for MoD to take
up the BRDL proposal at this stage in the ISOLUS study. The reasons for
this are as follows. As part of ISOLUS, MoD has stated its commitment
to listen to public views, take expressions of interest from industry,
and then inform industry of the public view to allow it to work up detailed
proposals. MoD will then evaluate these proposals in order to decide on
the options, and the associated sites to be pursued. If, on the other
hand, MoD was to take up the BRDL proposal, it would essentially be pre-selecting
a contractor, a strategy for the work, and a site on which to initiate
the programme. This would be contrary to the stated principles of the
ISOLUS initiative.
A decision by MoD to go ahead with the Renown proposal, in the middle
of the ISOLUS initiative, would, in particular, be to undermine the principle
of public participation under which the latter is being undertaken. It
would send strong signals that decisions had, indeed, been pre-determined
and cast doubt on whether contractor competition, which is an element
of ISOLUS, was being conducted on a fair and inclusive basis. It might
also open up the possibility of a challenge to ISOLUS decisions on grounds
that either the public consultation, or the tender competition, were flawed,
or both. Any consequent legal ruling, for example if the Renown proposal
was to be called-in and decided by Ministers, or made the subject of a
public inquiry, could also prejudice the entire ISOLUS programme.
In this context, the exact timing constraints associated with the Renown
proposal also need to be contemplated. RWMAC understands that the Renown
proposal is constrained by a particular window of opportunity. In essence,
BRDL has only a limited amount of time in which to carry out the Renown
work until resources have to be switched to a surface ship refitting contract.
This in turn implies that the regulatory consents under NIA65 and RSA93
will need to be secured very rapidly. In practice, it is important for
the procedures associated with the granting of consents, including those
for public consultation, to be undertaken in full in order to obviate
the risk of legal challenge.
Hence, RWMAC's wider advice to MoD, irrespective of NNRP's consideration
of BRDL's ES, is that it should be extremely wary of pursuing the Renown
proposal at this point in time because of the potentially damaging effect
of doing so on the wider ISOLUS programme. It is not something that RWMAC
itself could support.
However, that having been said, RWMAC acknowledges that, given the expertise
and experience of the company workforce and the facilities located on
the site, both BRDL and Rosyth should be considered as potential candidates
for ultimate delivery of whatever strategic plan for the long-term management
of redundant submarines ultimately emerges from the ISOLUS process.
References
1. The Radioactive Waste Management Advisory
Committee's Review of the Ministry of Defence's Radioactive Waste Management
and Practices, Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions,
December 1997.
2. The Radioactive Waste Management Advisory Committee's
Advice to Ministers on the Interpretation and Significance of the Results
of Science Programmes into Radioactive Waste Disposal, Department of the
Environment, Transport and the Regions, April 1999.
3. Twentieth Annual Report of the Radioactive Waste Management
Advisory Committee (Chapter 3), Department of the Environment, Transport
and the Regions, November 2000.
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