RWMAC report on MoD radioactive waste practices

ANNEX 2

MoD MANAGEMENT OF DEFENCE WASTES

The issues covered in this Annex are broad in scope and, for this reason, are divided into four sub-annexes (Annex 2.1 to Annex 2.4). Four aspects of current MoD radioactive waste management are considered in the Annex. They are MoD's top level management and advisory structure, its current strategy for defence wastes in the context of wider Government policies, the system of MoD-internal Joint Service Publications (JSPs), which provide day-to-day guidance on radiation protection and radioactive waste management issues, and, lastly, the main ways in which MoD accounts for, and consults the public on, its major defence wastes.

A2.1 MoD's top level management and advisory structure for defence wastes

Government policy

2.1.1. MoD Ministers are ultimately responsible for the safe stewardship of the Ministry's radioactive wastes.

2.1.2. Defence wastes, like civil wastes, are subject to Government policies made, inter alia, to ensure protection of the public and the environment, adherence to UK and European Union law, and compliance with undertakings made by the Government in the international arena.

2.1.3. At the time of preparation of this report (March 2001), it was widely accepted that no explicit statement of Government policy on radioactive waste management existed. Some important provisions of the most recent such statement, in Cm 2919¹, have been overtaken by events, notably the collapse of the Nirex ILW disposal programme and agreement by the UK to the objectives of the OSPAR Convention on control of discharges to the marine environment. However, the Government is undertaking, or has given a commitment to undertake, public consultation on a very broad range of issues - notably on a National Strategy for the discharge of radioactivity to the environment2 and (although this has been delayed) on the long-term management of solid radioactive wastes. Both exercises are aimed at deciding policy for the longer-term, and that for solid wastes is likely to be predicated on a lengthy period of further consultation and consensus-building.

2.1.4. MoD's close involvement, as part of Government and the owner of all defence wastes, in the process of new policy formulation is not in doubt. The draft National Discharges Strategy², particularly, makes extensive reference to problems associated with the discharge of radioactive wastes from MoD privatised and contractorised sites. But in the current circumstances of an effective vacuum in overall Government policy for radioactive waste, MoD (like the civil nuclear operators) faces obvious difficulties in terms of preparing and publicising a waste management "line" of its own.

2.1.5. Policy objectives are, however, being pursued by parts of MoD in relation to specific areas of waste management and these are described in the site-specific Annexes to this report. For example, MoD's Nuclear Propulsion Integrated Project Team (IPT) is pursuing a policy to minimise arisings from the operation of nuclear submarine reactors. RWMAC firmly believes that, even if there is currently no definitive statement of Government policy on the management of radioactive wastes, a MoD strategy, supported by detailed guidance on policies and procedures for defence wastes, needs to be formulated and published (see Annex A2.2, paragraphs 1-10). MoD establishments dealing with radioactive waste, and the private sector companies that participate in defence support services, should, in addition, formulate local site policies for defence wastes management.

Good practice in radioactive waste management

2.1.6. While MoD's nuclear operations are responsible for the vast majority of the defence wastes generated, almost every MoD unit or site throughout the UK holds radioactive material of some description and has, therefore, to consider the management of radioactive waste. On this basis, MoD's control systems for radioactive materials and wastes need to be able to promulgate instructions down to individual Commanding Officers or Heads of Establishments, and to reach the managers of the contractorised and privatised sites. The system also needs to incorporate mechanisms for identifying and remediating radioactively contaminated MoD land.

2.1.7. The most MoD senior official with direct advisory responsibility for nuclear safety is the Assistant Chief Scientific Adviser (Nuclear) - ACSA(N). For radioactive materials and wastes, the officer mainly responsible appears to be the Chief Environment and Safety Officer (CESO), who is the Head of the MoD Division dealing with policy on defence safety, environment and fire issues (DSEF-Pol). The key body responsible for formulating policy and preparing advice for Ministers on these issues is the Defence Safety, Health, Environment and Fire Board (SHEF Board).

2.1.8. DSEF-Pol has responsibility for implementing Ministers' decisions on the handling of radioactive materials and wastes, and also for radiation protection. Primarily, this amounts to :

- coordinating MoD's response to new legislation affecting radioactive materials and wastes;

- promulgating policy and good practice on radioactive materials and wastes, and on radiation protection, within MoD.

2.1.9. DSEF-Pol's responsibilities include preparation and promulgation of the Joint Service Publications (JSPs), which contain advice and guidance on, inter alia, radioactive materials and wastes and radiation protection (see Annex A2.3) .

2.1.10. The CESO chairs the Radiation Protection Policy Committee (RPPC) which is the forum in which detailed preparation and promulgation of radiation protection policy is discussed, and which reports to the SHEF Board. RPPC has a permanent Radioactive Waste Working Group (RWWG) which serves as the technical forum for development of MoD policy on radioactive waste management. There is also the Radioactive Waste Information Group (RWIG), an information-gathering and dissemination working group for the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Programme (NNPP), which reports to RWWG.

2.1.11. MoD radioactive policy and practice for radioactive wastes are, therefore, formulated by the SHEF Board, agreed by Ministers, and implemented by DSEF-Pol which has at its disposal the technical expertise in RWWG and also the NNPP discussion forum represented by RWIG. These systems have been developed by MoD since the last RWMAC report, and it is clear that there has been some drive towards an integrated and more coherent structure.

2.1.12. The terms of reference of these various bodies are explicit, and the MoD structure provides a framework for advising Ministers and implementing their decisions. In practical terms, policy, such as that on radiation protection, is promulgated through the relevant JSP. But what is less clear, however, is the extent to which these decisions can be made to impact on MoD activity when it is delegated into the hands of contractors or privatised companies.

2.1.13. MoD has informed RWMAC that its defence site contractors (AWEML, DRDL, BRDL and Rolls-Royce) are members of RWWG. Membership of the Group is shortly to be reviewed. Since an important role of RWWG is to coordinate the response from both MoD itself, and its contractors, to issues of radioactive waste management, including storage and disposal, raised by UK Nirex Ltd, British Nuclear Fuels plc, and other companies operating in this field, RWMAC believes that the contractors should continue to enjoy full membership of RWWG. MoD may also wish to consider the position of Nirex.

2.1.14. On the face of it, the issues addressed by MoD top level management are generic in nature. Resolution of site-specific problems appears to rely on guidance provided by site waste management policies and plans. In other words, decisions are made at the local level. In the case of the contractorised and privatised sites, this is not surprising - it is for the companies to decide how to run the business, subject to adherence to legislation and regulatory controls, although the waste management standards achieved should be the key consideration in judging their performance. For MoD sites, it is a reasonable expectation that local policies and plans should be endorsed and informed centrally.

2.1.15. In some respects, this "good practice" function can be seen to be served, at least for the NNPP, by the activities of the Radioactive Waste Information Group (RWIG). RWIG's function is to "disseminate and gather information for the purposes of complying with MoD's radioactive waste management strategy and ensuring best practice across MoD". Inter alia, it coordinates the Naval response to issues raised by RWWG. On the face of it, it is surprising that there is no analogous "best practice" working group for the nuclear weapons programme. MoD may wish to consider whether the programme would benefit from establishing such a body.

Sources of MoD independent and expert advice

2.1.16. It is a feature of Government policy machinery for radioactive waste management, and associated issues of radiation protection and health, that there are independent sources of advice which can inform policy-making. A number of committees exist in the civil sector including RWMAC itself, the Committee on the Medical Aspects of Radiation in the Environment (COMARE), the Nuclear Safety Advisory Committee (NuSAC) and the Ionising Radiations Advisory Committee (IRAC).

2.1.17. Since the last RWMAC report, the mechanism for providing independent external advice to the Secretary of State for Defence on nuclear matters has been revised. This function now rests with the Defence Nuclear Safety Committee (DNSC), created by the amalgamation, in 1998, of the Nuclear Powered Warships Safety Committee and the Nuclear Weapons Safety Committee. DNSC has an independent chairperson. Its role includes advice on radioactive waste management aspects of MoD activities. For radiation protection, MoD and the private companies involved in defence work have access to different sources of advice.

2.1.18. RWMAC's only knowledge of DNSC derives from meetings with MoD senior officials. RWMAC's main impressions were that DNSC (as its name suggests) deals mainly with issues of nuclear safety and that it is insufficiently resourced (principally in terms of access to secretariat support) to cover all the ground implied by its terms of reference (which include radioactive waste management). In RWMAC's view, MoD needs to consider whether it is currently accessing sufficient independent expert advice on management of defence wastes.

2.1.19. The extent to which DNSC has been used in relation to significant MoD radioactive waste issues within the NNPP, such as carbon-14, tritium, and the Renown proposal, or the Pangbourne pipeline or tritium contamination at Aldermaston, in relation to the nuclear weapons programme, is not known.

2.1.20. Within the NNPP, NNRP (see Annex 3) functions as a regulator "external" to the naval management line and as a source of advice on naval nuclear safety. NNRP itself has access to external expertise under contract from AEA Technology Limited. However, RWMAC does not believe that the Panel is, as yet, a wholly independent Naval regulator (see paragraph 6.15 of the main report). RWMAC has been unable to identify any analogous MoD regulatory and assurance system for the Nuclear Weapon Programme.

2.1.21. The companies involved in privatised operations and contractorised operations as part of the NNPP and the nuclear weapons programme (i.e., DRDL, BRDL, AWEML) are, like any other defence industry company, such as Rolls-Royce, required by law to appoint Radiation Protection Advisers (RPAs) of their own. For those parts of the NNPP which have not been privatised, MoD appoints qualified service or civilian RPAs to specific sites and specific roles.

2.1.22. Outside the NNPP, MoD also has a dedicated body which acts as its corporate RPA for the remaining defence operations, both statutory and non-statutory. This is DERA-RPS (the radiation protection arm of the Defence Evaluation and Research Agency; DERA). The role of DERA-RPS was covered in detail in RWMAC's report on MoD's arrangements for dealing with its radioactively contaminated land, under which the organisation has extensive land survey, monitoring and quality assurance functions. Its radiation protection functions include the provision of radiological protection services to MoD (except for the NNPP where this function is undertaken by MoD service and civilian RPAs), dosimetry services, environmental monitoring, nuclear accident response, liaison with the regulators, and MoD staff training (including awareness of MoD's statutory responsibilities).

2.1.23. Given the arrangements for naval propulsion and nuclear weapons outlined above, a substantial part of the MoD radioactive waste inventory is outside the remit of DERA-RPS, although it has responsibility for the safe handling and documentation of very large numbers of radioactive sources used by active service units and others on MoD bases (see paragraphs 5.7-5.8 of the main report).

2.1.24. During the period of fieldwork for this report, the inclusion of RPS within the proposed privatisation of DERA was under consideration. The possible implications of such a step for the way MoD deals with its radioactively contaminated land were outlined in the Committee's report on MoD radioactively contaminated land. In the event, MoD decided that DERA-RPS should remain part of the Ministry.

A2.2 MoD strategy and planning for defence wastes

MoD strategy

2.2.1. MoD's arrangements for setting out and implementing a strategy for radioactive wastes, including provision for future planning and for fixing accountability are complex. No single statement as yet exists.

2.2.2. The absence of such a document needs to be viewed in the light of the continuous and fast-moving developments that have affected MoD since the end of the cold war, manifested in defence strategy reviews, organisational changes, cost studies, and the contractorisation and privatisation of some defence support services.

2.2.3. Implementation of Government decisions on delivery of two important elements of UK defence, provision of nuclear weapons and support for nuclear submarines, has meant that by far the greater part of those defence-related activities which give rise to radioactive wastes is carried out on MoD's behalf by the private sector. Application of civil legislation and regulation in these circumstances is an important factor in the maintenance of high management standards. For defence activities undertaken directly by MoD, where the civil legislation continues not to apply, it is MoD stated policy that "standards and arrangements will be introduced which will be, as far as is reasonably practicable, at least as good as those required by legislation". This notwithstanding, RWMAC believes that, in relation at least to RSA93, it is difficult to argue against further extension of civil statute - one exception being small radioactive sources under the control of operational service units (see paragraph 4.25 of the main report).

2.2.4. Private sector involvement also poses some difficulties for MoD in applying uniform practices to all aspects of defence wastes. This is because in order for the companies to discharge their responsibilities in the most effective way possible, they need to be given a largely free-hand in the way they manage their sites (subject to consistency with MoD's radioactive waste strategy and its responsibilities as the waste-owner). Regulation by the civil regulators, the environment agencies and the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate (NII), together with the possibility of contract incentivisation, are, therefore, the main mechanisms for ensuring that the companies deliver appropriate standards of management.

2.2.5. In 1997, RWMAC reported that it was not provided by MoD with any "formally documented strategy for the management of radioactive wastes". Currently, there is still no published strategy for defence wastes, although, in February 2000, the Committee was shown a draft strategy and took up the invitation to discuss it with MoD. RWMAC understands that the MoD Radioactive Waste Strategy document is in the process of development. In view of this, it is not appropriate, as part of this report, to go into the detailed contents of the draft statement or into RWMAC's specific comments. Instead, it would be helpful to identify the main observations made.

2.2.6. First, RWMAC welcomes MoD's commitment to produce the strategy which, the Committee believes, should, on completion, be made public.

2.2.7. Second, there is the key question of application of the civil regulatory regimes. In its response to the findings of the House of Lords Science and Technology Select Committee study into the management of nuclear waste (i.e., radioactive wastes), the Government stated that :

"……. in order to increase public confidence, Ministry of Defence nuclear wastes should in principle be brought under the civilian regulatory regime; provided that issues of national security, operational effectiveness of the armed forces and cost can be solved".

RWMAC strongly supports this commitment.

2.2.8. RWMAC suggested that in order to prepare for this, it would be sensible for MoD to put work in hand to identify the sensible boundaries for the involvement of the civil regulators. For areas where pseudo-RSA93 and MoD regulation (particularly NNRP's "external" regulation of parts of the NNPP) continue to apply, written agreements (often termed "memoranda of understanding"; MoU) between MoD and the civil regulators are needed to define the point of interface and to ensure that the necessary liaison and exchange of information takes place. Where a MoU is agreed, it should be made public and its operation regularly reviewed.

2.2.9. Third, RWMAC has suggested to MoD that the main areas of coverage of the strategy document should, in addition, include :

- a commitment to the health and safety of workers and the public and protection of the environment;

- clear and unambiguous placement of responsibility and accountability within MoD for managing the radioactive wastes in its ownership; (this placement of responsibility and the way it could be cascaded down to the working level would need to be set out more fully, perhaps as an annex to the strategy or in an associated document);

- commitment to openness and transparency in radioactive waste management, subject to legitimate considerations of national security;

- adherence to national and international radiation protection guidelines;

- development of comprehensive and clearly formulated plans for the long-term management of the MoD's radioactive waste: where this is impossible due to uncertainty concerning national policy, suitable interim objectives should be stated;

- putting in place formal review and quality assurance arrangements in respect of MoD internal regulation;

- identifying, and making provision for, management of long term liabilities associated with the clean-up and decommissioning of MoD sites;

- clearly defined arrangements for identifying defence waste arisings and preparing the MoD contribution to the UK Radioactive Waste Inventory.

2.2.10. RWMAC is not suggesting that these principles are not implemented, in practice, by MoD. Such questions are addressed in this report. But at the time the advice on the draft strategy was given, the study was at a very early stage and a major point made by the Committee was the need for MoD to identify the key objectives and priorities of its management of defence wastes for the benefit of its personnel entrusted with day-to day responsibilities in this area. It is possible that some of the recommendations of this RWMAC review could also provide a basis for elements of the strategy statement.

Planning for management of solid radioactive wastes

VLLW and LLW

2.2.11. The 1997 RWMAC report³ suggested that MoD's arrangements for dealing with solid low level radioactive wastes (LLW) were well established. In the intervening three years, serious difficulties have been encountered with carbon-14 contamination of NNPP wastes, which has prevented their consignment to the LLW disposal site at Drigg (see paragraphs 6.52-6.62 of the main report). In addition, it is likely that the future capacity of the Drigg site will come under scrutiny over forthcoming years. This sets a challenge for both the civil industry and MoD, which is being addressed by minimisation of waste arisings, adoption of treatment methods such as waste compaction, and use of alternative disposal routes, such as incineration.

2.2.12. It is clear that MoD's generation of both LLW and very low level radioactive waste (VLLW), through both operational and decommissioning activities, will extend well beyond the planned life of the Drigg disposal facility. The feasibility and desirability of eventually establishing a specific MoD disposal route for these wastes might therefore usefully be examined in the wider context of the Government's intention to consult the public on the management of the UK's solid radioactive wastes. In the short term, MoD appears unlikely to face significant difficulties in managing its LLW and VLLW.

ILW

2.2.13. RWMAC's last review of defence wastes criticised MoD for lack of liaison with UK Nirex Limited over that organisation's timetable for establishing a repository for solid intermediate level radioactive waste (ILW). The report pointed out that problems of this kind could result in "significant ILW management and storage issues arising throughout MoD if the repository were to be significantly delayed".

2.2.14. In the event, it is clear that the Government is no longer committed to an underground repository for ILW and such a facility, if it is constructed at all, is at least several decades away. This has implications for MoD's treatment and storage of ILW. This is discussed in the following paragraphs.

2.2.15. The nuclear weapons and naval propulsion programmes produce ILW in both solid and semi-solid (and therefore mobile) form. The NNPP has, as described earlier in this report, also given rise to carbon-14 contamination of waste streams for which previous assumptions of decay to LLW, and of the availability of Drigg disposal, now need to be reviewed.

2.2.16. ILW arises in significant volumes only at sites which are subject to full civil regulation under NIA65 and RSA93. Site storage of MoD's ILW is regulated by the NII, but the environment agencies are responsible for authorising its eventual disposal, which could include consignment for "permanent" (or at least very long term) storage elsewhere. Nirex is responsible for considering whether the wastes are in a form (for example, in the way they are packaged) suitable for disposal and, if so, for issuing "letters of comfort".

2.2.17. The receding timeframe for a solution to the long-term management of ILW has meant that the previous regulatory disposition against early conditioning of ILW (for example solidifying sludges via cementation) - on the grounds that it might foreclose future management options - has come under review. RWMAC believes that perceptions of the need for early conditioning and subsequent passive storage have come to the fore. This is evidenced by the attention currently being paid by the regulators to such issues. EA is developing guidance for its inspectors on ILW conditioning, while guidance by the Health and Safety Executive (HSE), for its NII inspectors, on the management of nuclear matter, which has recently been finalised, addresses similar questions.

2.2.18. A number of important issues arise in this context, although, because not all the guidance has yet been finalised (and, indeed, RWMAC has pointed out the need for both sets of inspectors to have access to consistent guidance), the Committee can, for the most part, only draw MoD's attention to them in general terms.

2.2.19. First, RWMAC believes that MoD deserves credit for its achievements, in the last three years, in developing a closer, and more meaningful, relationship with Nirex. This should pay dividends in terms of the exchange of information between MoD and Nirex concerning defence ILW streams and provision of Nirex advice on their conditioning and packaging.

2.2.20. Second, following the collapse of the Nirex repository programme, it has become clear that it will be a long time, possibly more than 50 years, before a facility may be available to receive ILW in the UK. As a result, the regulators are expecting the civil nuclear operators to plan for long periods of interim storage i.e., more than 100 years prior to disposal. This situation also has significant implications for packaging and storage of defence wastes. RWMAC believes that both the environment agencies and NII need to liaise with Government on a realistic timeframe that might be fed into the process of policy formulation. Prima facie, it would be sensible for MoD and its associated private sector companies, as well as the civil operators, to consider what difficulties such a timeframe might pose.

2.2.21. Third, RWMAC believes that any substantial hiatus before a long-term ILW management route is established raises the question of the benefits of developing operational guidance on passive storage (or passivity) for ILW over long periods. RWMAC takes the concept of passivity to be the holding of radioactive material in a passively safe form with minimal need for active control systems or human intervention. A key emphasis is on the waste form, which should be immobile, physically and chemically stable, and resistant to significant deterioration or reaction over a reasonably foreseeable storage period. Requirements for the waste's storage surroundings are also important. MoD and its private sector partners should, therefore, always have mind, as part of the planning of waste-producing projects, to the provision of the treatment methods necessary to convert the resulting wastes into passive form. The Committee believes that the regulators will also need to develop their thinking on passivity in order, in due course, to be able to assess operator performance (NII is doing so already). In RWMAC's view, passivity has obvious implications for some MoD activities, not least the ISOLUS study on redundant nuclear submarines.

2.2.22. Spent nuclear fuel from submarines (which, if it was to be declared a waste, would be classified as high level waste - HLW) in the ownership of MoD is transferred to BNFL Sellafield for storage until a long-term management route can be established.

A2.3 MoD Joint Service Publications

2.3.1. Joint Service Publications (JSPs) are formal instructions issued by MoD to its armed forces and civilian personnel (including those in MoD Agencies such as DERA) to enable them to comply with the requirements of legislation, regulation and MoD internal procedures. In the past, responsibility for producing some JSPs rested with the predecessors of NNRP (see Annex 3), as the policy and standards authority for the Royal Navy. As part of a process of rationalisation of MoD sources of advice and guidance, this responsibility transferred, for all three armed services, to DSEF-Pol.

2.3.2 In the course of the study, RWMAC was given the four JSPs relevant to the management of radioactive wastes :

- JSP 392; Radiological Protection

- JSP 375; Health and Safety

- JSP 418; Environmental Protection

- JSP 442; Accident Reporting System.

2.3.3 The JSPs are clearly written and appear to be subject to regular revision. As far as RWMAC could tell, they enjoy wide circulation. A considerable part of JSP 392 (Radiation Protection) is obviously relevant to this study. Only volume three of JSP 375 (Health and Safety) deals with protection from radiation. A sub-chapter of JSP 418 (Environmental Protection) is entitled "Radiation". JSP 442 treats accident reporting in a generic way.

2.3.4. Brief commentaries outlining the major points which struck RWMAC in relation to the first three MoD publications are given below :

JSP 392 : Instructions for Radiological Protection

2.3.5. This is a comprehensive and thorough working document setting out the means which MoD has in place for ensuring compliance, among its employees, with legislation relating to radiological protection. If all the controls detailed in the document have actually been translated into local orders and implemented in the workplace, radiation hazard should be well controlled. There are nine "focal point" authorities for radiation safety, covering all the different MoD disciplines. These authorities are responsible for implementing the requirements, tailored to local circumstances. Consistency in implementation of the instructions is ensured by DERA-RPS, which has overarching responsibility for radiological protection issues and is a single, centralised, source of advice.

2.3.6. MoD establishments are required to draw up local orders, referenced in establishment's Health and Safety policy statement, where radioactive materials are used. Copies of relevant local orders are posted in working areas.

2.3.7. A radiation safety risk assessment must be undertaken as part of the submission to HSE notifying use of equipment which poses a potential hazard. The risk assessment requirements are set out in JSP 375 with a recommendation for at least two yearly reviews (or sooner in the event of a significant change). JSP 392 contains provision for drawing up and rehearsing contingency plans in such cases. DERA-RPS carries out inspection visits at time intervals varying between one and three years, depending on potential radiation hazard.

2.3.8. DERA-RPS maintains a database of radioactive materials holdings for all ships, units and establishments (see Annex A2.1, paragraph 23). Each of these is updated annually following receipt of yearly returns by 31 March. At this point, DERA-RPS liaises with the environment agencies on the form of regulatory permission needed. It seemed likely to RWMAC that the revised database is only completely up to date for a few months of the year around April/May. While, during discussions, DERA-RPS confirmed this situation to be the case, MoD has pointed out the practical difficulties of updating the database on a more frequent basis. MoD has informed RWMAC that the Army, alone, provides well over 1,000 individual returns.

2.3.9. All pseudo-RSA93 consents are posted on public registers unless the MoD user advises DERA-RPS to the contrary.

JSP 375 : Health and Safety

2.3.10. JSP 375 is intended to provide instruction and guidance on the policy and procedures whereby MoD ensures appropriate standards of Health and Safety. Thus, compared with JSP392, it takes a much more general, overarching, view. The document is in three volumes, although only about 30 pages bear any relevance to this study.

2.3.11. The role of the Radiation Protection Policy Committee (RPPC) in the formulation and promulgation of MoD radiation protection policy is covered in relation to the storage, disposal, and transport of radioactive materials, including the health and safety standards, working methods, and training to be adopted.

2.3.12. The regulations on control of radiation exposure are described, together with arrangements for the appointment of RPAs and the legal limits on radiation dose, both for the population as a whole and for members of the armed forces occupationally exposed to radiation. The statutory whole body occupational dose limit for UK employees, as set by the current Ionising Radiations Regulations (1999), is 20 millisieverts per year. The version of JSP375 given to RWMAC (dated July 1995) states that since 1989, MoD has adopted a "lower" annual limit of 30 millisieverts for its employees. It is clear, therefore, that the present version of the JSP needs updating. But it also needs to be made clear that the 20 millisievert limit is provided explicitly in JSP392. In view of the inconsistency between the two JSPs, MoD may wish to consider whether, for JSP375, adequate arrangements are in place for ensuring regular updating. If not, it may be sensible to allocate such responsibility within MoD. (MoD has informed RWMAC that JSP375 is currently undergoing extensive revision and that a revised edition will be issued in October 2001.)

2.3.13. The range of equipment used by MoD which contains a radioactive source or is capable of producing ionising radiation is described in JSP375, although nuclear warheads and nuclear propulsion reactors are identified as being outside its scope. The requirement for a hazard assessment prior to procurement, and the mechanism for carrying it out, are both covered.

2.3.14. During its visits, RWMAC was made aware of worries that these requirements were not always put into practice. It is evident that there have been concerns within MoD that equipment has occasionally been procured without the necessary approvals identified in JSP 392 being given. This can create subsequent difficulties in, for example, the legal requirements for the storage, repair, and transport of equipment, and for associated accounting and monitoring systems.

2.3.15. Sound mechanisms are in place for the return of obsolete radiation equipment to the MoD storage depot for final disposal or equipment sale, and for notifying the possible radiological hazards to potential purchasers.

2.3.16. RWMAC believes that this JSP provides a comprehensive framework for safe working practices. In order to ensure that its provisions are always observed and put into practice, MoD should have mind as to whether the documentation enjoys the necessary wide circulation, MoD staff are trained in its requirements, and a system for auditing its use, are all in place.

JSP 418 : Environmental protection

2.3.17. The section of this JSP dealing with radiation covers non-ionising (e.g., lasers, microwaves) as well as the ionising radiation from radioactive wastes, and is generally descriptive in tone. It covers the relevant legislation and associated regulatory systems and sources of internal MoD guidance. Overall responsibility for compliance with the terms of legislation and regulation, which rests with site Commanding Officers, is clearly set out. There is considerable overlap with other JSPs and systematic cross-referencing.

2.3.18. The system by which annual returns of "site radioactive holdings" are made to DERA-RPS is made clear, as is the role of that body in providing a contact point for obtaining Noting Letters and Letters of Agreement (the key consent documents under the pseudo-RSA93 arrangements) from the environment agencies. In RWMAC's view, however, the precise status of these consents, and the point that they are designed to have identical practical effect as application of the Act itself, could be better brought out. The need for a Land Quality Assessment to be carried out on land which is designated for release from the defence estate is also covered.

2.3.19. The chapter is really a first stop for MoD personnel seeking initial guidance. There is nothing on environmental standards as such and the JSP cannot substitute for the provision of guidance on good working practices for handling radioactive materials and wastes. But as a statement of first principles, and a means of referencing other sources of guidance, it serves a useful purpose.

A2.4 Accounting for and managing defence wastes

2.4.1. This Annex considers how a number of waste streams, for which MoD has immediate responsibility, are being accounted for in terms of the defence wastes inventory, and what problems are posed for their future management.

MoD's radioactive waste inventory

2.4.2. The defence wastes inventory is, essentially, MoD's way of accounting for historic, current and future radioactive waste arisings. It has relevance for a wide range of MoD activities described in this and the following Annexes of the report. Defence wastes are also intended to form part of the UK Radioactive Waste Inventory.

2.4.3. Consideration of the defence wastes inventory needs to incorporate arisings from the naval nuclear propulsion programme (including redundant nuclear submarine hulls) and the nuclear weapons programme, radioactive sources in the use of service units, site and plant decommissioning wastes, and radioactive wastes arising from the remediation of MoD contaminated land.

2.4.4. As a result of its fieldwork for this study, RWMAC has concerns that the MoD inventory is not as complete as it might be, largely because not all possible waste arisings are being identified and full records being kept. As a result, there is a risk that the completeness of the UK Radioactive Waste Inventory might suffer. This possible "shortfall" was considered - insofar as it affects waste arisings from defence estate remediation schemes - in the RWMAC report on MoD radioactively contaminated land. The remaining issues are considered both here and in the site-related Annexes.

Military radioactive sources

2.4.5. DERA-RPS has an overseeing role for the defence wastes inventory, as it relates to those parts of MoD for which it is corporate RPA. Its functions include identifying where a pseudo-RSA93 consent is required, liaising with the regulators, and maintaining details on its database. This role takes in records of the keeping of radioactive sources used for military purposes (e.g., gun-sights, night-vision equipment, detection sources) and the management of redundant materials (such as recycling gas tritium light devices/beta lights).

2.4.6. In discussion with RWMAC, DERA-RPS suggested that the maintenance of up-to-date "Noting Letters" (equivalent to RSA93 registrations in the civil sector) by the environment agencies was not always satisfactory. RWMAC has no means of vouching for this, but the Committee's general view is that some doubts exist, in relation to the management of radioactive materials and wastes, about the efficacy of the pseudo-RSA93 voluntary regime with which MoD has agreed to comply. This provides, in principle at least, a further reason for considering the extension of RSA93 to all MoD activities, as recommended in RWMAC's 1997 report.

2.4.7. RWMAC understands that MoD is willing to consider further extension of RSA93, subject to discussion with other Government departments and agencies, and to satisfactory resolution of issues concerned with national security and the operational requirement of the armed forces. In this latter regard, a particular issue was raised by DERA-RPS in discussion with RWMAC about the Noting Letter controls over the keeping of radioactive sources. The issue concerned the keeping, and critically the movement, of such materials held by military units, and whether bringing these activities within the civil regime would constrain operational effectiveness. RWMAC believes that this is an important issue which will need to be resolved. Its resolution may well require that some key differences are maintained between the regulatory controls over the keeping of radioactive materials in the civil and defence sectors. Further, RWMAC believes that MoD should consider whether control of defence radioactive sources should fall to the central MoD assurance and regulatory body proposed in this report. For the moment, it should be stated that, in RWMAC's view, the records on mobile military sources maintained by DERA-RPS appear to be satisfactory.

Site decommissioning wastes

2.4.8. In its report on MoD radioactively contaminated land, RWMAC suggested that waste arisings from site remediation schemes were not always being included in the MoD inventory. This seemed to be associated with (but was not necessarily the result of) the use of private contractors to carry out the remediation work. As will be clear, a substantial part of MoD nuclear submarine support work has been privatised. Since the contractors undertaking the work also own the sites, responsibility for assessing the implications for the defence wastes inventory of eventual site decommissioning is one step removed from MoD.

2.4.9. RWMAC's fieldwork has raised some questions about the arrangements for ensuring that decommissioning wastes are being accounted for even in circumstances where the site or facilities in question remain in the ownership, and under the operation, of MoD. There is also the question of whether the system of Land Quality Assessments (LQAs) is always being applied to MoD operational sites.

2.4.10. Further specific points on the defence wastes inventory are made in the site visit Annexes to this report. In general, RWMAC has concerns about whether MoD's arrangements for formulating the defence wastes inventory are sufficiently robust. In the Committee's view, MoD needs to review the operation of the inventory in order to assure itself, and the Government in general, about the efficacy of its arrangements for identifying, accounting for, and reporting all radioactive waste arisings in the defence sector.

Submarine decommissioning : the ISOLUS study

2.4.11. A number of nuclear powered submarines have now been decommissioned from Royal Navy service. Following removal of the reactor fuel, the hulls have remained berthed under Navy control at Devonport and Rosyth in facilities legally categorised as decommissioning nuclear facilities. With the de-fuelling, most of the radioactive material and radiation risk is removed, although the reactor pressure vessel and associated primary circuit remains contaminated with radioactive material. Storage for comparatively short periods allows significant radioactive decay to take place and hazard to reduce further. (The predominant radionuclide is cobalt-60 which has a half life of 5.3 years, so that levels of radioactivity fall relatively quickly.) Nevertheless, some components will need to be managed as ILW in due course.

2.4.12. RWMAC's last report on defence wastes³ described in detail the maintenance regime for these berthed submarines. During the course of the fieldwork for the present report, RWMAC Members went on board three such submarines. The Committee sees no reason to alter its opinion that the present MoD regime of "afloat storage" is robust. Essentially, the submarines are being safely stored. However, the last report pointed out that, at the time, there had been no examination by MoD of the policy underpinning the practice of afloat storage. The report criticised MoD for having no policy for decommissioned submarines. It recommended that "a clear policy should be established at an early date and publicised".

2.4.13. In 1998, MoD Ministers announced that a study would be undertaken to consider options for the storage of decommissioned nuclear powered submarines. The MoD announced the outcome of the first phase of this initiative, termed the ISOLUS (Interim Storage of Laid-Up Submarines) study, in May 2000.

2.4.14. Four options were considered for the storage of decommissioned submarines - continued afloat storage (possibly at sites other than Devonport and Rosyth) and three alternative land storage options. The latter comprised land storage of the intact reactor compartment (as adopted by the US Navy); dismantling the reactor compartment into its major components for storage as unpackaged waste; and further dismantling of the major components for storage as packaged waste.

2.4.15. The study concluded that, while afloat storage remains an entirely safe way of storing decommissioned submarines, land storage was the best solution for the longer-term. Accordingly, in order to progress the option, MoD proceeded to invite expressions of interest from industry for commercial solutions for land storage. It would ultimately be for those with an interest to indicate precisely how they would address the problem, with land storage of intact reactor compartments taken as a benchmark for comparison. Some 15-20 companies expressed an interest in participating in this work during the course of 2000.

2.4.16. At the time of its initial announcement of the decision to look to future land storage, MoD indicated its commitment to proceed on the basis of full and open consultation in respect of this proposed change in policy.

2.4.17. In November 2000, the Under Secretary of State for Defence, Dr Lewis Moonie, announced further details of the proposed form of consultation. In addition to the initial invitation to submit comments up to December 2000, a further round of more detailed front-end consultation was proposed. Dr Moonie said of this:

"Taking into account the views of the public was always going to be a key part of our work, and we have been encouraging public comments from the start. Now we have decided to go further, by actively finding out what people think.

We will carry out work to determine, for instance, how much the public would like to be involved in the study, and the criteria against which we should evaluate the storage options. Techniques for doing this work in the most effective manner are currently being explored with a number of universities. We expect the use of a Citizens' Advice Panel and focus groups to feature in this process".

2.4.18. The outcome of this consultation would be passed to industry to help produce proposals.

2.4.19. Further rounds of public consultation were also said to have been scheduled for the period following the shortlisting of industry proposals, and, in due course, on the recommended storage method and site before a final decision is taken.

The Renown proposal

2.4.20. Alongside this proposed programme, BRDL, the owners of Rosyth Dockyard, made an independent proposal to dismantle the reactor compartment of HMS Renown and to store the major components on site (for further details see Annex 5). Renown is currently berthed at Rosyth, where it is currently scheduled to be decommissioned for long-term afloat storage. The BRDL offer was made, among other things, as a means of utilising facilities which would not otherwise be in use after the transfer of submarine refitting and refuelling work to Devonport and of assisting maintenance of submarine decommissioning capability at Rosyth.

2.4.21. RWMAC's views on the Renown proposal are set out in the Committee's response to NNRP as part of the consultation on the BRDL application which is reproduced as Annex 5A. At the time of preparation of this report (February 2001), MoD was considering the BRDL proposal.