RWMAC report on MoD radioactive waste practices

10. SYNOPSIS OF MAJOR POINTS CONTAINED IN THE REPORT

10.1 This section summarises the key findings of the study. Key recommendations are italicised.

General points

10.2 The complexity of MoD's structure and the rate of change to which it has been subject can make it difficult for the Ministry to respond overall as an organisation to issues raised by the management of radioactive wastes which, whilst important, are not central to its core mission. Nevertheless, given the sensitivity of the issue, MoD must ensure that it makes adequate provision for the effective management of its defence radioactive wastes.

10.3 For this reason, RWMAC continues to believe that MoD should produce and publish a clear statement of its strategy for the management of the radioactive wastes in its ownership. This would provide those who work for the Ministry with a clearer understanding of its overall aims and ambitions in dealing with defence wastes, as well as helping to make its waste policies and practices more transparent to the outside world. The Committee notes that MoD has begun preparation of a strategy statement in which it indicated an intention to produce detailed guidance on defence waste policies and practices, and hopes that these commitments are brought to fruition in line with this recommendation.

10.4 Coupled with production of these statements, MoD should develop a clear management structure for ensuring implementation of its declared strategy, policies and practices for defence wastes at the working level: current organisational structures should be reviewed with this objective in mind. It must be borne in mind that the guidance needs to apply to both MoD's own staff and the private companies with which it works. This will not be easy to achieve given the variety of players involved.

10.5 MoD should provide a clear mechanism for assuring itself that its own radioactive waste management strategy, policies and practices, as well as wider Government policies and regulatory requirements, are being delivered and that its responsibilities, as owner of the wastes, are being properly discharged.

10.6 RWMAC believes that while a range of assurance mechanisms already exist within MoD, the creation of such a centralised body would facilitate the application of a more systematised and effective form of control with clear conceptual and presentational benefits.

10.7 Thought should therefore be given to a central MoD body, possibly located within its existing Health and Safety structure, charged with delivering "assurance" for the Ministry on maintenance of good management standards and ownership responsibilities, and promulgating policies and good practice for radioactive materials and wastes. In RWMAC's view, NNRP already provides a suitable model for this in respect of much of the NNPP. Consideration should be given to extension of this model to the two other main waste-producing areas, the nuclear weapons programme and general use by the armed services of small radioactive sources.

10.8 The declared policy for the Secretary of State for Defence is that where MoD has been granted exemptions, disapplications or derogations from legislation, international treaties or protocols, Departmental standards are to be, so far as is reasonably practicable, "at least as good". The new body could, therefore, also provide, alongside its assurance role, regulatory scrutiny of MoD activities not subject to the civil provisions. In order to discharge the declared policy properly, both the assurance and regulatory functions need to be exercised independently of MoD operational lines of command.

10.9 Also, as part of its assurance strategy, MoD may wish to consider whether, currently, it is accessing sufficient independent advice on radioactive waste management. Issues of nuclear safety within MoD are already addressed by the Defence Nuclear Safety Committee.

10.10 Contractorisation and privatisation of large areas of defence work have meant that civil legislation now applies to the management of the bulk of defence wastes, and the extension of statute has brought with it the application of civil regulation to MoD nuclear operations and radioactive wastes management.

10.11 Irrespective of MoD's assurance and, where necessary, its own regulatory arrangements, RWMAC believes that, as an overriding general principle, the benefits of civil regulation in helping to maintain operational standards, and in promoting assurance and transparency, are not in doubt. Thus, there should be a presumption that civil regulation should, as far as is reasonably practicable, be applied to MoD nuclear and radioactive waste management activities. Where there is a case for not doing so, this should be clearly set down and justified.

10.12 That said, the Committee recognises that there will be some areas of defence work where extension of civil regulation will, realistically, remain inappropriate. Such areas include the operation of submarine reactors (which is specifically exempt from civil legislation) and the deployment and use of radioactive sources by active service units, to which the legislation does not apply. RWMAC can see no justification for change in these cases.

10.13 RWMAC notes that any MoD regulator, such as NNRP, will need to interface with the civil regulators. The Committee also notes the use of the "pseudo-RSA93" regulatory arrangements to help deliver the Secretary of State for Defence's commitment that all areas of MoD's management of defence wastes are covered by controls which are, so far as is reasonably practicable, "at least as good" as the civil provisions. Whilst accepting the need for such arrangements, RWMAC believes that all areas of "crossover" between civil and MoD regulation, and the operation of non-statutory control regimes by the civil regulators, should be covered by bipartite written protocols, operation of which is regularly and formally reviewed. There is evidence of progress here, which needs to be pursued to completion.

10.14 More generally, RWMAC was not made aware of any formal review of delivery of the Secretary of State's commitment. RWMAC recommends that MoD formally reviews delivery of its Secretary of State's commitment to put in place control arrangements that are, so far as is reasonably practicable, "at least as good" as the civil provisions. The review should take in all areas of radioactive materials and waste management where, for whatever reason, civil regulation does not apply.

10.15 Significant moves have been taken towards greater openness and transparency, both by MoD itself, and the private companies engaged in defence work, a trend that the Committee strongly supports. RWMAC believes that, subject only to real security considerations, openness and transparency should be taken as far as is reasonably practicable to help promote public confidence in the safety of MoD's operations.

10.16 The lack of liaison between MoD and Nirex, noted in RWMAC's last report, has been rectified and, despite collapse of the Nirex ILW repository programme, remains important because of the "letters of comfort" system which effectively dictates UK standards for radioactive waste packaging. MoD must keep abreast of developing civil regulatory thinking on radioactive waste conditioning and packaging and ensure that these developments are reflected in waste management plans for all its sites.

10.17 In respect of MoD's current "assurance" arrangements, RWMAC has concerns about whether the arrangements for formulating MoD's contributions to the UK Radioactive Waste Inventory⁴ are sufficiently robust. This appears to apply, particularly, to site decommissioning and clean-up wastes. There is also a need to ensure that adequate returns from contractorised and privatised sites are included. The Committee recommends that, as part of the overall assurance strategy, clear formal responsibility for maintaining the inventory of defence wastes and ensuring the scope and accuracy of returns to the national Inventory should be allocated within MoD on an ongoing basis.

10.18 As part of the Government's promised review of radioactive waste management policy, MoD may wish to consider whether there is a case for the operation of its own radioactive waste management facility, given the pressures that civil facilities (such as the LLW disposal site at Drigg) are likely to come under in future years, and the extent of defence waste holdings. Clearly, any proposals for such facilities would need to be formulated in an open and a consultative way in line with the principles that RWMAC has previously advocated³, and, logically, within the context of the wider Government consultation.

10.19 In respect of its arrangements for dealing with its radioactive waste liabilities, MoD should ensure that all defence sites which are, or may be, contaminated with radionuclides, are brought openly and transparently within the context of its Land Quality Assessment (LQA) programme.

The Naval Nuclear Propulsion Programme

10.20 The role of the Naval Nuclear Regulatory Panel (NNRP) has already been referenced in light of MoD's need to have appropriate assurance and, where necessary, regulatory arrangements in place. NNRP's constitution and working practices appear to be generally appropriate for what is, in practice, a very complex operational area. However, MoD should keep the responsibilities and operation of NNRP under regular review as it settles into its developing role. RWMAC believes that NNRP's control arrangements need to be progressively expanded across all NNPP activities as appears to have been originally intended. Issues such as tritium, carbon-14, the effectiveness of transport containers for spent submarine fuel, and, potentially, the long-term fate of the fuel itself, as well as other long-lived defence wastes, all point to the need for this wider role.

10.21 Waste management plans are in place for all the main NNPP sites, but their coverage, notably in respect of the need for long-term waste management, appears to vary in quality. The adequacy of NNPP site waste plans, in particular coverage of forward planning, is something that could usefully be reviewed within the context of the overall MoD radioactive waste management strategy statement. Specific responsibility might be placed within an expanded NNRP remit.

10.22 Provision for ILW storage has been improved since RWMAC's last report, with modern stores introduced at both Devonport and Rosyth. Nevertheless, where short-life storage media are still in use at NNPP sites, RWMAC recommends that MoD takes steps both to review the practice and, as the Committee believes is necessary, put in place appropriate remedial action.

10.23 The increase in tritium discharge levels sought at Devonport to support refitting operations for the new Vanguard class submarines is, in RWMAC's view, radiologically insignificant and uncontentious in safety terms. It is, however, at odds with policy and regulatory developments on radioactive waste discharges currently being considered, particularly in the Draft UK National Discharges Strategy⁵ and the Statutory Guidance to the Environment Agency on Discharges from Nuclear Sites7, on which the RWMAC has commented separately^8,11. The issue therefore suggests that there is a need for the Government to reconcile dose and activity reduction criteria in its guidance to EA. In this context, the situation at Devonport indicates the kind of difficulty likely to be encountered if this issue is not resolved.

10.24 The tritium issue brings into focus the fact that MoD should see itself, as well as to the private sector dockyard operators, to be under an obligation, in relation to proposals for the discharge of radioactivity from the NNPP sites, to ensure conformity with the concepts of BPM, BPEO and ALARA. In this context, RWMAC notes that MoD is considering how to modify the chemical constitution of submarine primary circuit coolant in order to reduce future levels of tritium generation. RWMAC believes that submarine reactor design work to review the possibility of reducing tritium generation should be carried forward vigorously by MoD.

10.25 The unsuspected presence of carbon-14 in NNPP wastes has had a major effect on disposals to Drigg and must be seen to cast serious doubts on MoD's competence as a waste consignor and the adequacy of its internal assurance arrangements. In this light, MoD must carefully scrutinise its assurance arrangements, and the need to strengthen them as proposed in this report, in order to ensure that the carbon-14 problem, and any other similar oversights in respect of characterisation of defence wastes, cannot occur again.

10.26 The recovery programme mounted to address the carbon-14 problem seems to have been professional and thorough. This view was reinforced when RWMAC spoke to BNFL managers at Drigg, but substantial volumes of carbon-14 contaminated wastes, and associated practical problems, remain. Hence, site specific plans for "store and decay" of ILW need to be reviewed, and individual site waste management strategies amended, in light of the full outcome of assessment of the carbon-14 problem.

10.27 MoD needs to be satisfied that problems with submarine spent fuel transport, involving container-licensing problems, have now been fully resolved. In RWMAC's view, the adequacy of off-site transport of spent nuclear submarine fuel is an issue in respect of which MoD itself, as well as individual site managers, needs to retain a wider overarching interest.

10.28 The long-term fate of the fuel also needs to be kept in view by MoD as UK radioactive waste policy develops. Historical arisings are currently in store at Sellafield. MoD needs to consider the options for dealing with these arisings as part of the Government's promised review of policy on the long-term management of solid radioactive wastes and in the context of views on the UK's total radioactive materials holdings.

10.29 The programme for the long-term management of obsolete submarines - ISOLUS - has been launched as a consultative process. This reflects current UK Government thinking on policy formulation for the management of radioactive wastes. RWMAC fully supports the concept of the ISOLUS programme and takes the view that it should be carried forward vigorously in accordance with its declared principles. The Committee believes that ISOLUS could represent an important trial of the way in which wider UK radioactive waste management policies might be formulated in future.

10.30 In contrast, RWMAC advised MoD, during the course of this study, that the proposal for HMS Renown to be dismantled immediately after de-fuelling, and for radioactive parts of its structure to be stored at Rosyth, would be inconsistent with the ISLOUS process. RWMAC believes that if the Renown proposal was to go ahead at this stage, it would be seen as a "decide-announce-defend" precedent, and would risk prejudicing and destabilising the ISOLUS programme. That is not to say that Rosyth should not be given full consideration as part of the eventual implementation of the ISOLUS strategy.

The Nuclear Weapons Programme

10.31 In RWMAC's view, there have been significant improvements in the standards of radioactive waste practices and operations at AWE since the Committee's last study of defence wastes was published in 1997. However, it is clear that by no means all the site's historic radioactive waste management problems have yet been resolved.

10.32 Many of the improvements were achieved during the period up until the end of March 2000, when the AWE site management contract was held by Hunting-BRAE. On 1 April 2000, the contract passed to AWEML. The first year of the new contract is very much an acclimatisation period for the new contractor, which now needs to prove itself and build on past improvements. MoD must ensure that past progress in improving radioactive waste management and site decommissioning and clean-up at AWE is carried forward and built upon by AWEML.

10.33 Based on discussions with both MoD and AWEML, RWMAC believes that the new AWE management contract arrangements can, irrespective of their primary emphasis on nuclear weapons delivery, be used to provide sufficient incentives for AWEML to achieve the high standards necessary in site radioactive waste management. Although the first year of the contract represents a period of transition, a good start has been made in the setting of clear milestones and measures that allow the contractor's performance to be assessed. However, MoD needs to be certain, by means of the incentive arrangements at its disposal, that sufficient assurance can be provided of the adequacy of AWEML's radioactive waste management and decommissioning and clean-up plans, and their implementation, bearing in mind the decision to adopt a more arms-length approach in the relationship with the contractor.

10.34 MoD must therefore ensure that it continues to give appropriate priority to radioactive waste management and site decommissioning and clean-up in setting performance targets for AWEML under the new contract arrangements.

10.35 Given the freedoms implicit in the new contract, reliance on the civil regulatory process alone may, potentially, not give the necessary forewarning of potential difficulties. For these reasons, RWMAC has recommended that the remit of a new, centralised, MoD assurance and regulatory body should encompass the nuclear weapons programme.

10.36 RWMAC welcomes AWEML's combined radioactive waste management and decommissioning plan. RWMAC believes that the draft AWEML radioactive waste management and decommissioning plan needs to be finalised and publicised as soon as possible. It is also important that AWEML should make clear how its plans differ from those of Hunting-BRAE and why.

10.37 There remains much radioactive waste on the AWE sites in non-passive storage. RWMAC would therefore like to see further progress towards passive storage of wastes and a continuing reduction in the amount of unconditioned sludges and liquid wastes held on the AWE sites. The Committee notes slippage in the implementation of some previous plans in this area. Continued progress in the minimisation of radioactive waste arisings is also important.

10.38 Better characterisation of site contamination at AWE is a clear and urgent task for AWEML, but consideration of the practical difficulties will be central to any subsequent clean-up programme. Alongside this, identification of the source, and reduction in the level, of tritium contamination at Aldermaston are also important issues.

10.39 RWMAC's main concern was not with the closure of the Pangbourne Pipeline itself (the pipeline used to discharge radioactive effluent into the Thames which has been a matter of local concern for many years), but, rather, with a lack of clarity in the manner in which the EA arrived at its decision. The Committee felt that EA documentation was substantially less than transparent, for example in respect of BPM and BPEO studies, in the way the decision was arrived at. In particular, it is unclear from the available information whether the doses from proposed new schemes, however minuscule, were adequately compared with the status quo of retaining the pipeline. The introduction of facilities to enable the reduction of off-site environmental discharges, in the wake of the decision to close the pipeline, will be a major challenge to AWEML in coming years. Development of new facilities to achieve reduction in off-site discharges in the wake of the Pangbourne Pipeline closure needs to be closely monitored by MoD, in conjunction with EA, to ensure that doses to the public are kept as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA).

10.40 The draft UK Strategy for Radioactive Discharges 2001-2020 (the National Discharges Strategy) requires that, by 2010, total beta/gamma liquid discharges from nuclear weapons activities at AWE (including tritium) should be reduced to zero. RWMAC doubts that reduction of beta/gamma liquid discharges to zero levels within the timescale proposed by the Government (2010) will be achievable, although substantial reductions should be practicable and aimed for.

Eskmeals and Kirkcudbright

10.41 There are facilities for the testing of depleted uranium (DU) projectiles at Eskmeals and Kirkcudbright. The radiological protection precautions taken, and the environmental monitoring carried out, at the Eskmeals site (which the Committee visited), were to high standards. Kirkcudbright was not visited, but on the basis of information given, the activities should lead only to localised ground contamination as hard targets are not used.

10.42 In order to allay potential public concern about use of DU, MoD should take steps to characterise fully the composition of all its DU munitions and make the results public.

10.43 In the same context, MoD should review whether it can place additional information in the public domain, preferably independently peer reviewed, to help reassure the public about the safety of operations at the Eskmeals and Kircudbright sites.

10.44 Given current public sensitivity concerning DU, both Eskmeals and Kirkcudbright should be brought formally within the Ministry's Land Quality Assessment (LQA) programme.

10.45 It is noted that if operation of the Eskmeals and Kircudbright sites is privatised, the sites will be brought within the ambit of civil regulatory control. This would help to provide additional public reassurance.