RWMAC report on MoD radioactive waste practices

6. THE NAVAL NUCLEAR PROPULSION PROGRAMME

General overview

6.1 The Royal Navy submarine flotilla is now made up exclusively of vessels powered by nuclear reactors. These vessels include the UK's nuclear deterrent capability deployed in ballistic missile-firing boats, as well as fleet submarines armed with conventional torpedoes and cruise missiles. In addition to the operations of these present generation vessels, MoD also has responsibility for dealing with the decommissioning and eventual disposal of earlier generations of nuclear-powered submarines.

6.2 The three main sites which support the operation of the nuclear submarine flotilla are Devonport on the south coast of England, Rosyth on the east coast of Scotland and Faslane on the Scottish west coast near Glasgow. Decommissioned nuclear submarines are held at Devonport and Rosyth. Vulcan NRTE, located adjacent to the Dounreay nuclear establishment on the north coast of Scotland, is involved in NNPP development work, acting as the test bed for prototype submarine nuclear reactors. There are also other designated locations where the submarines may berth as part of their routine operations. Some, now fairly minor, issues which are a legacy of past submarines support work at Chatham and Portsmouth also remain to be resolved.

6.3 Most of the nuclear submarine facilities at the Devonport dockyard site, and all of those at Rosyth, have been privatised. The major facilities at Devonport are owned and operated by Devonport Royal Dockyard Ltd (DRDL) while those at Rosyth are all owned and operated by Babcock Rosyth Defence Ltd (BRDL). Nuclear submarine work at Rosyth is set to run down as a result of a 1993 Government decision that all future nuclear submarine refitting and refuelling work would be carried out at Devonport once work scheduled at that time for Rosyth was completed. The last refitting work planned for Rosyth will be completed in 2001.

6.4 Faslane and Devonport each provide operational maintenance and support services for the operational UK nuclear submarine squadrons. These routine activities are undertaken by MoD directly. Faslane does not have the facilities to carry out the much more complicated operations associated with submarine refit and refuelling. At the time this report was being prepared, MoD announced that it was to consider the possibility of some contractorisation of operational facilities at Faslane. The RNAD Coulport site which, inter alia, undertakes the loading and unloading of the submarines' armaments, including nuclear warheads, is also operated directly by MoD, as is Vulcan NRTE (albeit with a strong contractor presence).

6.5 Fuller descriptions of the Devonport, Rosyth and Faslane sites and the impressions formed by RWMAC, as a result of the visits made, are set out in Annexes 4 to 6.

Arisings of radioactive waste from the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Programme

6.6 Operation of the Pressurised Water Reactors (PWRs), with which the UK nuclear submarine flotilla is equipped, gives rise to radioactive activation products within the primary coolant circuit. Among the longer-lived activation products, cobalt-60, tritium, and carbon-14 are the most important.

6.7 Routine maintenance, servicing and refitting of submarines produce a range of radioactive wastes, including liquid sludges, activated metal components and soft trash, all of which may be contaminated by these radionuclides. Devonport and Rosyth have to manage both ILW and low level radioactive wastes (LLW) as a result of their refitting and refuelling work. At present, Faslane is required to deal only with LLW, although ILW has been produced by past activities at the Faslane site and, if the nature of MoD support operations for the submarine flotilla were to change, it could do so again. The de-fuelling of submarines, either during refit or on decommissioning, also means that spent reactor fuel also has to be managed at Devonport and Rosyth. There are currently no plans to reprocess submarine spent fuel and its long-term storage at BNFL Sellafield is planned. The spent fuel has not, however, been declared as waste. If it was to be so declared, it would be classified as high level waste (HLW).

6.8 During the course of RWMAC's visits, there was discussion of site radioactive waste management plans, including storage facilities. The Committee's attention was also drawn to problems arising from the management of tritium, carbon-14 and spent fuel. These issues are discussed in detail in later paragraphs of this section, and in the site-specific Annexes of the report.

Formation of the Naval Nuclear Regulatory Panel

NNRP regulation

6.9 An important event since the last RWMAC review of MoD radioactive waste management practices has been the establishment of the Naval Nuclear Regulatory Panel (NNRP) in April 1999. This is a MoD regulatory body with responsibility for the safety management and regulation of the NNPP. Its current remit and activities are described in detail in Annex 3.

6.10 Before establishment of the Panel, regulation of the NNPP was dependent on a number of bodies reporting to different Naval authorities. This lacked the clear separation of day to day management functions from regulatory responsibilities which was necessary.

6.11 An important element of present NNRP regulatory procedures, dating from 1997, is adoption of the system of "Authorisation" of parts of the NNPP. Granting of a NNRP Authorisation depends on the body concerned possessing management systems that work to a satisfactory standard. It is awarded when NNRP is satisfied that the organisation concerned can demonstrate compliance with documented authorisation conditions (ACs) that are effectively identical to NII's system of site licence conditions (LCs). This arrangement is intended to deliver the Secretary of State for Defence's declared policy that where civil statute and regulation do not apply, MoD's own corresponding arrangements will, so far as is reasonably practicable, be at least as good.

6.12 For parts of the NNPP still fully under MoD operation, such as Faslane and Vulcan, where the civil legislation does not apply, NNRP exercises regulatory oversight over nuclear and radioactive waste operations. The accumulation and disposal of solid radioactive wastes, and discharges to the environment, that form part of these operations are, however, subject to formal approval by the environment agencies through the issue of Letters of Agreement under the "pseudo-RSA93" arrangements.

6.13 "Memoranda of understanding" have been, or are being, put in place to set out the respective responsibilities of NNRP side by side with NII and the environment agencies where regulatory controls interface or overlap. To reiterate the point made earlier, RWMAC believes that all areas of MoD "crossover" with the civil regulatory authorities, and all non-statutory arrangements made with them, should be the subject of clearly-stated, written agreements, that are regularly and formally reviewed to ensure their effective operation and avoid unnecessary overlap and potential confrontation.

NNRP's remit

6.14 Overall, RWMAC is persuaded of the sound logic for the establishment of NNRP and has been impressed by its achievements in the relatively short time since its formation. Certainly it removes some of the more obvious criticisms that could be levelled at previous structures. Its design appears to be appropriate for the regulation of what, in practice, is a very complex operational area. Good progress has been made in getting the organisation up and running. It now needs to prove itself. At present radioactive waste management is not high on its agenda, but this situation could well change in the future. MoD should keep the responsibilities and operation of NNRP under regular review as it settles into its developing role.

6.15 However, the Committee believes that there are still some issues associated with NNRP's reporting arrangements within the MoD hierarchy and the parameters of its work that MoD could consider. It is noted, for example, that NNRP reports to the Naval Board, through the Controller of the Navy. On the face of it, therefore, NNRP is still not fully divorced from the MoD bodies that have direct executive responsibility for the nuclear propulsion programme, and, on this basis, some doubts must remain that it is completely independent and able to deliver the full "external" regulation of areas of the NNPP, which are still the direct responsibility of MoD, that is needed.

6.16 RWMAC's view is that in order to maximise the potential for "external" regulation of the NNPP, NNRP should be fully integrated into MoD's existing Health and Safety structure, which includes the oversight arrangements for nuclear safety, radiation protection, and radioactive waste management allocated to the committee machinery serviced by the Chief Environment and Safety Officer (CESO) and DSEF-Pol (described in Annex 2).

6.17 In addition, NNRP's terms of reference restrict it to the NNPP, whereas the old style regulatory regime extended to all Royal Navy ships and establishments, including nuclear weapon aspects of the operation of RNAD Coulport. These responsibilities appear to fall to the CESO system referred to above, from which NNRP is at present effectively cut off. RWMAC believes, therefore, that MoD should also consider the benefits of bringing NNRP within a new assurance and regulatory body able to address the totality of MoD activities that give rise to radioactive wastes.

6.18 As regards the scope of NNRP regulation, both the existing circumstances, and the extent to which these could be benefit from change, need some explanation. The Glossary entry for NNRP explains why the Panel serves as both the MoD "external" regulator for parts of the NNPP outside civil legislation, and a provider, for MoD, of assurance where the legislation (NIA65 and RSA93) does make provision for the exercise of controls by NII and the environment agencies. The provision of "assurance" means that although the activity is subject to legislation, there is, nonetheless, a requirement to assure the Secretary of State for Defence that his responsibilities as the owner of the wastes are being properly discharged.

6.19 RWMAC has considered :

- whether, as "external" regulator, NNRP's functions in relation to the naval nuclear propulsion programme could, in practice, be expanded to align with its remit for all aspects of the programme;

- whether the regulatory "boundaries" of NIA65 and RSA93 in relation the programme have yet been fixed in their most logical position.

6.20 To date, the NNRP "external" Authorisation process has concentrated on submarine operation support sites, which, in two cases (Devonport and Rosyth), are already licensed by the NII. As part of its Authorisation process, NNRP examines whether site management arrangements (both MoD and private operator) are able to deliver effective operational support.

6.21 RWMAC believes consideration might usefully be given to expanding the NNRP Authorisation regime beyond site-based submarine support work into all areas of the NNPP. Critically, this would encompass reactor design and engineering, and submarine operations. Such a mechanism might, for instance, have avoided problems of the kind arising from undetected carbon-14 in submarine wastes (see section 6, paragraphs 52-62) and provide a mechanism for oversight and review of ongoing MoD work into reducing the generation of tritium in submarine propulsion systems.

6.22 There are also related, effectively "back-end", areas of the NNPP where, in RWMAC's view, further expansion of NNRP interests might also be of benefit, for example, transport to, and the storage of submarine spent fuel at, Sellafield, and the long term management of ILW at the privatised sites. It will be recalled that these radioactive materials and wastes are scheduled to remain in permanent MoD ownership over the very long periods required for their management. MoD is therefore liable both for these management costs and for the eventual cost of disposal. A means by which, in the interim, the Secretary of State for Defence could receive assurance from NNRP as to the condition and safety of these materials would appear to offer advantages.

6.23 There is also the issue of whether the civil legislation can be further applied to the submarine programme. Neither RSA93 nor NIA65 apply to operations carried out directly by MoD. In addition, "reactors in a means of transport", including submarine propulsion systems, are specifically excluded from NIA65.

6.24 Subjecting some NNPP activities at Faslane to civil legislation (and, thereby, regulation by SEPA and NII) would be unavoidable if MoD was to decide to contract-out its operations at the submarine base, a step that RWMAC understands is under consideration. Maintenance work on submarine nuclear propulsion systems would continue to be excluded from NIA65. In order to provide for civil regulation of the remaining activities, there would, on the face of it, be a need to amend legislation.

6.25 It is a separate question as to whether the civil provisions could be extended beyond shore-based activities, including to operations at sea, through removal of the NIA65 exemption referred to above. RWMAC takes the view that view that the NII cannot realistically have a role in relation to the operation of submarine reactors under Royal Navy service conditions, i.e., at sea or in the course of on-board repair work, since danger to vessels and crew might be associated with such decisions. The Committee does not, therefore, support the removal of the NIA65 exemption for reactors in a means of transport.

Other issues

6.26 RWMAC notes that NNRP's regime of Authorisation appears to have been introduced with relative ease at the privatised dockyards. In its possible extension to operational vessels and to reactor design and engineering, the extent to which functions are empowered, as opposed to being prescribed, and identification of suitable authorisees, would obviously need careful attention.

6.27 The Committee also notes that MoD has done little to publicise and explain the role of NNRP, other than its participation in Local Liaison Committees. For instance, the Panel is not mentioned on the MoD website. Neither is its Annual Report published. The Committee acknowledges that security issues may be associated with some of NNRP activities. But, with no outside knowledge of its work, there can equally be no public reassurance concerning the quality of MoD's nuclear propulsion safety standards. MoD should, therefore, give thought to provision of appropriate public information on NNRP's work.

6.28 RWMAC also notes that there appears to be no provision for independent reviews and quality assurance of NNRP work. This is a measure that MoD might consider, not least to promote public confidence.

NNPP site radioactive waste management plans

6.29 During the visits to the main nuclear submarine bases at Devonport, Rosyth and Faslane, RWMAC posed the question of site management waste plans. In RWMAC's view, there is a requirement for robust forward planning, involving estimation of the volumes of wastes likely to arise and, in turn, assessment of the implications for management routes, including the availability of storage and disposal facilities.

6.30 DRDL (Devonport) has put in place two, 10 and 30-year waste management plans. These relate only to LLW and ILW, principally the resins. Although designed to be comprehensive and robust, their application seems, for the moment, to be severely limited by fact that they were prepared before the carbon-14 problem arose (see paragraphs 6.52-6.62). Once the extent of the problem has been scoped, the assessed impact on long-term storage at Devonport will need to be built into site's future waste management planning.

6.31 Nevertheless, long-term planning for waste management at the site is designed to be independent of a national ILW management route. RWMAC is, therefore, supportive of such longer-term vision statements which it notes have also been prepared at AWE (see section 7). The carbon-14 problem may mean, however, that interim storage on the site will extend beyond the 30-year period and questions of capacity outside this timeframe need to be factored into future storage planning and development. In practical terms, however, the arrangements appear robust enough.

6.32 BRDL's (Rosyth) response was that waste management planning is executed by means of returns made to the UK National Radioactive Waste Inventory - a document that defines the volume of current and anticipated waste streams. The Committee believes that while the Inventory is a detailed and reliable instrument of national strategy, it does not substitute for planning at site level. Its focus is on national facilities, such as Drigg, and issues common to all nuclear licensed sites, such as ILW packaging, not on site-specific waste management requirements. In this regard, however, the planned ending of nuclear work at Rosyth in 2001 means that the nature of BRDL's waste streams will change significantly to those associated with site commissioning and, possibly, land storage of decommissioned submarine reactors, with regard to which, BRDL has made an unsolicited proposal to MoD (in relation to HMS Renown - see paragraph 79).

6.33 There are now no historical waste arisings stored at Faslane and operational wastes are produced at a significantly lower level than those resulting from refitting work at Devonport and Rosyth. Faslane management believes that the extent of any ground contamination is limited to the outmoded Radioactive Effluent Disposal Facility which is due to be replaced in 2003.

6.34 RWMAC was not shown any forward-looking waste management plan for the Faslane base. Logically, preparation of such a plan should have been a requirement of all NNRP Authorisations which, mirroring NII licensing, extends the safety case through the design and operation of facilities to their eventual decommissioning, and the remediation of radioactively contaminated areas of the site.

6.35 In summary, site waste management plans are in place for all the main naval sites handling radioactive waste but their coverage, notably in respect of longer-term forward planning, varies. The adequacy and compatibility of plans, in particular their forward planning aspects, could, potentially, be reviewed in the context of MoD's preparation of its radioactive waste management strategy statement. Responsibility for scrutiny of the plans on behalf of MoD might be placed within an expanded NNRP remit.

ILW storage

6.36 RWMAC's last report welcomed plans to construct new facilities for storage of ILW at both Devonport and Rosyth. These buildings are now in place - D151 (at Devonport) and the Active Waste Accumulation Facility (AWAF at Rosyth). Both facilities are, in RWMAC's view, fit for purpose. At the same time, it is interesting to note that, although intended for the long-term storage of similar waste streams, conditioned to similar forms, D151 and AWAF have adopted rather different design and storage principles. Capacity, at least on the basis of current MoD plans, would not appear to be an issue in either case. AWAF was, of course, constructed on the basis that Rosyth would have an ongoing submarine refit role and it is not, therefore, surprising that its capacity is more than adequate for the needs of the site as they are currently envisaged.

6.37 Delays in commissioning D151 meant that use of the Resin Catch Tanks (RCTs) and Magnox flasks, criticised in the last report, are still being used and stored in the open at Devonport. A substantial programme to decant ILW resins from these RCTs into Resin Storage Vessels (RSVs), designed for placement in silos within the new store, is now taking place. RWMAC understands that progress with the decanting programme is dependent on the availability of equipment also used for primary plant decontamination as part of refitting operations.

6.38 Despite the commissioning of AWAF at Rosyth, work still needs to be planned and implemented on the long-term management of the site's wastes. For example, ILW resins are still being held in the eight-year life RCTs with immobilisation plans not yet formulated (although it is accepted that deferment could produce economies of scale and optimise worker dose). First, BRDL intends to identify, and then assess, the various options for containing the ILW resins. For LLW resins, BRDL also has to address the problem of treating the chelates contained in the wastes, a factor that prevents their disposal to Drigg.

6.39 RWMAC believes that the private sector management of both the Devonport and Rosyth sites needs to consider what progress can be made to convert their ILW resins into non-mobile form for long-term storage.

6.40 Where short-life storage media are still in use at NNPP sites, RWMAC recommends that MoD takes steps both to review the practice and, as the Committee believes is necessary, put in place appropriate remedial action.

6.41 The carbon-14 issue (see section 6, paragraphs 52-62) requires a substantive review of ILW storage at all relevant sites to be carried out. Some wastes previously stored to allow decay to LLW may now remain as ILW and some wastes which otherwise meet the requirements for classification as LLW may fail Drigg disposal conditions. The extent to which there will be a need for long-term interim storage of ILW at both Devonport and Rosyth, given the presence of carbon-14 in the waste streams and the current absence of a permanent disposal route, is, therefore, an issue that has to be addressed in the context of the local community's interests in the site in each case.

6.42 Only LLW and VLLW currently arise at Faslane in the course of that base's servicing and maintenance operations and no historic wastes of any kind are held at the site. Now that the carbon-14 problem appears to be near resolution and disposals to Drigg seem likely to resume in the near future, only relatively limited volumes of solid wastes and immobilised resins will be stored on site at any one time.

Tritium

6.43 The expansion and contraction of coolant in the primary circuits of naval pressurised water reactors (PWRs), during submarine start up and shut down operations, determine that most existing classes of UK nuclear powered submarines must regularly discharge primary coolant, either to sea or, when alongside, to dedicated shore facilities, either directly or via portable tanks. This effluent contains tritium.

6.44 Later naval PWR designs sought to minimise the need for waste discharge, especially to sea. Such systems are fitted in the Vanguard Class Ballistic Missile ("Vanguard") submarines - which retain the effluent in on-board "make-up and discharge" (MUD) tanks until it can be discharged to shore facilities during de-fuelling and refit operations. Use of MUD tanks on Vanguard Class submarines (and ultimately on those of the future Astute Class) also allows for radioactive decay of the effluent, resulting in some diminution of eventual discharges of radioactivity to the environment. This reactor design change was initiated by MoD many years ago. Under MoD's contractual arrangements with DRDL for work on Vanguard, the latter is required to receive and manage the waste arisings, including the tritium-contaminated effluent, "on demand" from submarines.

6.45 There is no available technology, as part of effluent treatment processes, to remove tritium, nor, due to the chemical properties of tritium and the related risk of worker exposure as a result of its diffusion, is it practicable to store it on the Devonport site in order to permit radioactive decay to take place. For these reasons, and because the radiological impact of tritium is low, DRDL proposes, in the application for new RSA93 disposal authorisations, the discharge of the treated effluent to sea and dispersal of tritium in the marine environment. The application seeks an increase in the annual discharge limit for tritium from 120 Gigabecquerels (GBq) to 800 GBq. The increase is sought because of the volume of tritium-contaminated effluent retained on board Vanguard boats and, consequently, the amount required to be dealt with during Vanguard refits, the first of which is due to take place at Devonport in Spring 2002. Unless the authorisation is granted by EA, the discharge of effluent containing more than 120 GBq would not be lawful.

6.46 Against this background, it may reasonably be observed that a key part of the defence of the UK (that is, continued operation of the nuclear deterrent) appears to be dependent on the application of a civil regulatory regime to the activities of a private sector company on a site which it both owns and operates. This is perhaps one of the clearest illustrations of the extent to which MoD has chosen to privatise its nuclear and radioactive waste activities.

6.47 Presentationally, DRDL's application for an increase in discharge of tritium represents a problem, notably in terms of consistency with the proposed UK Strategy for Radioactive Discharges 2001-2020 (the National Discharges Strategy)⁵. The National Discharges Strategy has been formulated to underpin this country's obligations under OSPAR which envisage "progressive and substantial reductions" in discharges to the marine environment. The extent to which the need for an increase in the Devonport tritium authorisation played a part in the UK Government's negotiations at Sintra (see footnote ¹ below) is not known.

6.48 RWMAC has been invited to comment on the Devonport RSA93 application as part of EA's public consultation on the application (ending in June 2001), and will take the opportunity to do so. The Committee's preliminary position, qualified by the fact that it intends to consider the issues in greater detail as part of the public consultation, is that the radiation dose to the most exposed group of members of the public (the "critical group") at the maximum discharge levels sought by DRDL is unlikely to be significant. There are four main factors which should be taken into account against this background. Firstly, it is estimated by DRDL that, even at the maximum level of discharges it proposes, the radiation dose to the critical group will be less than one microsievert per year⁶ - less than 0.1 per cent of the prescribed annual radiation dose limit for a member of the public. It is widely accepted that annual exposure of less than one microsievert per year is equivalent to a risk to an individual within the most exposed group of less than one in 10 million per year. Secondly, the half-life of tritium is only 12 years so radioactivity will not persist in the environment for very long periods and individual and collective doses will, therefore, be limited. Thirdly, the higher levels of tritium discharge from Devonport could, in part at least, be regarded as a transfer of marine discharges both from those formerly made at Faslane and those at sea (now, as a result of the use of MUD tanks, no longer made). Lastly, RWMAC notes that the Government's proposed UK National Discharges Strategy, while stating that operators "will be expected to minimise releases of tritium to the environment", does not set out numerical targets for tritium discharges.

6.49 That having been said, RWMAC believes that, like any nuclear operator, MoD needs, in relation to proposals to discharge radioactivity to the environment, to conform to the accepted concepts, built into radiological protection, of "best practicable means" (BPM), "as low as reasonably achievable" (ALARA), and "as low as reasonably practicable" (ALARP). Acknowledgement of these principles should, for instance, be included in any MoD radioactive waste management strategy statement.

6.50 But in addition, the tritium issue at Devonport suggests that there is also a need for the Government to reconcile dose and activity reduction criteria in its guidance to EA⁷. The Devonport situation indicates the kind of difficulty likely to be encountered if this issue is not resolved.

6.51 In this light, submarine reactor research work to review the possibility of reducing tritium levels in submarine primary circuit coolant should be carried forward vigorously by MoD. Whether such work means that abatement technology could be fitted to existing submarines, as opposed to future reactor design considerations, is not something that RWMAC is in a position to consider.

Carbon-14

6.52 Prior to 1998, the documented radiological inventory of NNPP waste streams made no mention of the presence of carbon-14. These documents included the quality plans submitted by waste producers (managers at Devonport, Rosyth, Faslane, Portsmouth and Chatham) to BNFL Drigg in support of LLW disposal to that site. However the prior despatch of waste resins to AEA Technology (AEAT) Winfrith for chemical removal of chelates (organic molecules which can bond to metal ions, such as cobalt, making them more mobile in water and thus unsuitable for Drigg disposal) precipitated enquiries as to the presence of carbon-14. Specific checks then confirmed the presence of significant levels of carbon-14. It is now clear that most NNPP waste streams, some from the very beginning of the programme, are contaminated with this radionuclide.

6.53 It is difficult to be precise as to how this error in waste characterisation occurred. From discussion with MoD officials, RWMAC believes it likely that the design authority for the submarine reactor plant, Rolls Royce and Associates, was requested by MoD to produce an inventory based on radiological significance for dose rate purposes, and that, at some point, this data was used, in error, as the total radiological inventory used for waste characterisation. The situation was undoubtedly not helped by the difficulties in detecting carbon-14 in actual waste examined, since its soft beta emissions are hidden in the presence of cobalt-60, a hard energy gamma emitter. The presence of carbon-14 in NNPP wastes has significantly affected all three of the main NNPP sites, particularly Devonport and Rosyth, and, to a relatively lesser degree (because of the absence of ILW), Faslane.

6.54 Prior to discovery of carbon-14, management plans for NNPP ILW were generally based on the belief that its main radioactive constituent was cobalt-60. This radionuclide has a half-life of 5.3 years, which means that, within about 25 years, its activity would decay to about three per cent of its original level. This, in turn, suggested that the waste would decay, during the same timescale, to LLW suitable for disposal to Drigg. For this reason, the design lives of the waste packaging and waste stores could be relatively short.

6.55 The identification of carbon-14, which has a half-life of about 5,700 years, undermines any plans for decay storage. Its presence, in previously undetermined concentrations, casts into doubt the appropriate classification of the waste both now and into the future. For this reason, it has caused BNFL to place an embargo on all further disposals of NNPP wastes to Drigg. The Drigg facility itself has an overall limit on the disposal of carbon-14.

6.56 The carbon-14 problem indicates the danger of holding preconceived ideas concerning the radionuclide content of wastes. It suggests a failure of waste characterisation procedures concurrent with adoption of naval PWR plant design. While no blame can be attached to the management of the main NNPP bases, their involvement in finding a solution to the problem (since it affects site storage capacity and questions of long-term site use) is inescapable. In practice, the wastes in question must be assessed to determine the concentrations of carbon-14 present and, depending on the results, their classification as ILW or LLW. Close liaison with Drigg is necessary in order that the extent of past disposals of carbon-14, which were obviously not recorded, can be estimated and the impact on Drigg limits measured. One example of practical progress made is the review of drummed wastes at Rosyth using a newly acquired active waste monitor.

6.57 The situation had improved by the end of 2000, when RWMAC visited Drigg. Assessment by Rolls-Royce and DERA-RPS of the extent of carbon-14 already disposed of was well advanced and earlier estimates of the impact on Drigg capacity for carbon-14 (suggesting that the limit might have been exceeded) were able to be greatly reduced. AEAT Winfrith had also carried out characterisation work on Devonport waste streams. By the end of 2000, BNFL was in receipt of full information from Faslane (and also from Portsmouth) and information from Devonport, Rosyth and also Chatham was believed to be fairly imminent. A system of assessment and control of defence wastes that might be contaminated with carbon-14 was in place for each waste stream and project area.

6.58 In November 2000, RWMAC understood that the Drigg embargo on LLW was close to being lifted. Pressure on storage of drummed LLW would, therefore, be relieved. However, it appeared that there were also higher activity wastes which could never be disposed of to Drigg. While these seem likely to make up only a relatively small proportion by volume of the carbon-14 wastes as a whole, their long-term storage until a permanent management route can be established remains a problem for base management.

6.59 Thus, it is important for MoD to ensure that the exact magnitude of the carbon-14 problem is identified as soon as possible. This will enable site-specific plans for "store and decay" of ILW to be reviewed, and individual site waste management strategies to be amended, in light of the outcome of the work. While progress has been made, there are potentially substantial problems that remain to be resolved. A clear and complete resolution of this issue is therefore needed as soon as possible.

6.60 The mistake in waste characterisation seems to be a case of communications breakdown within MoD's very complex organisation - with failure to appreciate the requirements of all the elements involved in a long design and supply chain. The key issue is how such an occurrence might be avoided in future. Although a MoD radioactive waste management strategy might have helped, RWMAC believes there are clear grounds to recommend the extension of NNRP regulation to reactor design and engineering. This should ensure, in future, that MoD has an effective means of auditing the composition of radioactive wastes throughout the submarine programme.

6.61 At a wider level, RWMAC believes that MoD has to scrutinise carefully its assurance arrangements, and consider the need to strengthen them (as proposed in this report), in order to ensure that the carbon-14 problem, or any other similar oversights in respect of the characterisation of defence wastes, cannot occur again.

6.62 In summary, RWMAC believes that MoD, together with DRDL and BRDL, have mounted an effective response to the problem. Its legacy is that some wastes originally meant for disposal as LLW to Drigg must now be stored over the long-term as ILW. This has the potential to cause difficulties for individual sites and it must raise serious questions as to whether MoD can, currently at least, be regarded credibly as a waste consignor. The Ministry must, therefore, ensure that it now has the necessary assurance arrangements in place to restore such credibility for the future.

Submarine spent fuel

6.63 As indicated earlier in this report, MoD has no current plans to reprocess submarine spent nuclear fuel. Were the fuel to be declared as waste, it would need to be regarded as HLW. Purpose-designed facilities for its long-term storage exist at BNFL Sellafield. DRDL and BRDL, and, less frequently, Vulcan NRTE all carry out de-fuelling and spent fuel packaging operations on behalf of MoD. MoD retains ownership and is the legal consignor of the spent fuel for its onward transport to Sellafield. MoD is responsible for ensuring the supply of suitable transport containers and for safety and security aspects of the transportation safety case. DRDL and BRDL provide technical input.

6.64 The last RWMAC report described the difficulties experienced by Rosyth in securing regulatory approval for use of the containers needed to transport spent fuel to Sellafield. That report did not cover spent fuel issues at Devonport.

6.65 As part of the present study, RWMAC found that problems with the transport of spent fuel to Sellafield had persisted, although are currently under control. The transport of all radioactive material is subject to national regulations, based on the recommendations of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The packages containing spent fuel (known as "flasks") are, in accordance with those recommendations, subject to regulatory approval by a "competent authority" which, in the UK, is the Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions (DETR). The executive functions of the competent authority are carried out by Radioactive Materials Transport Division of DETR. The onus rests with the applicant to demonstrate that his package design complies with all relevant regulatory design requirements before a certificate of design approval is issued. Movement of DETR approved flasks to Sellafield is by means of on-site rail lines and the national rail network.

6.66 Both Devonport and Rosyth have continued to defuel submarines, since the last RWMAC report, either as part of refit work, or in relation to redundant vessels. There are no advantages, in waste management terms, in prolonged storage on dockyard sites, before transportation takes place. Storage facilities at both sites are limited, so further problems with use of containers, should they be permitted to occur, could threaten refit operations and, ultimately, submarine deployment.

6.67 By 1991, the spent fuel flask design (the Used Core Transport Package; UCTP) formerly used by MoD was no longer licensed. Until it could tender for the design and development of a replacement container, MoD acquired two NTL3M type flasks for interim use. The NTL3M flask was first approved in 1994 and may (until at least June 2003) be used. The design for a successor container eventually chosen was the Used Fuel Flask (UFF), although this has only relatively recently (November 2000) been approved.

6.68 Rosyth appears to have been less disadvantaged than Devonport during the uncertain period between RWMAC's previous and present visits since BRDL was able to use the NTL3M, at an earlier stage than DRDL, to resume transportation and thereby empty the site pond. Furthermore, Rosyth can now use the UFF to begin removal of the remaining spent fuel held in two redundant containers located on the dockside. Progress with removing spent fuel from Devonport has been slower than at Rosyth largely because construction of the Vanguard facility interrupted, for a time, use of the site's rail line. At the time of the visit in March 2000, the Devonport pond was about 90 per cent full. This allowed only a short time-window in which to begin the off-site movement of spent fuel if the dockyard refuel/refit programme was to be maintained. Since that time, RWMAC understands that some spent fuel has been transported from Devonport using the NTL3M container.

6.69 The difficulties with off-site transport of spent submarine fuel give every appearance of an issue that should never have been allowed to arise in the first place. On the face of it, primary responsibility for ensuring the efficient movement of fuel appears to rest with MoD rather than with either of the privatised operators. It is possible that protracted exchanges of information between MoD and DETR, involving the container suppliers, were a major contributor to the problem, although delays in bringing the UFF into use may also have played their part.

6.70 In RWMAC's view, the efficient off-site movement of spent fuel is an issue in respect of which MoD itself, as well as individual site management, needs to retain a wider, overarching, interest.

6.71 A view of the long-term fate of the fuel also needs to be maintained as UK radioactive waste policy develops. Historical arisings are currently in store at Sellafield. MoD will need to consider the options for dealing with these arisings as part of the Government's promised review of policy on the long-term management of solid radioactive wastes and in the context of views on the UK's total radioactive materials holdings. MoD has made clear that these options are kept under continuous review.

6.72 Lastly, the issue might be taken as additional evidence of the need for extension of NNRP oversight into non-site based NNPP support activities.

The ISOLUS study and the Renown proposal

6.73 ISOLUS stands for Interim Storage of Laid-Up Submarines. MoD's ISOLUS study addresses the process for deciding and implementing future policy for managing the hulls, and particularly the reactors, of decommissioned nuclear submarines. In essence, ISOLUS aims to secure a consistent approach to the overall management of all existing redundant submarine hulls, as well as the need to deal with in-service submarines when they are eventually decommissioned. The process of public consultation, as a core part of the ISOLUS work, is predicated on the principles of inclusivity and transparency.

6.74 In its published reports, RWMAC has endorsed the concept of widely-based consultation as an essential building block of the development of future policy in radioactive waste management³. The Committee therefore fully supports the concept of the ISOLUS consultation on the options for the long-term management of nuclear submarines and believes that the programme should be carried forward vigorously in accordance with its declared principles.

6.75 The key issues are seen by RWMAC to be :

- provision of public information concerning the ISOLUS programme and identifying the range of possible implications before the actual process of site selection begins;

- taking public views of the issues into account at appropriate stages, both before and after the process of site selection begins;

- remaining in touch with other relevant stakeholder, in addition to public, views and taking these into account as appropriate (stakeholders are seen to be groups with vested interests in the proposals, as distinct from individual members of the public);

- drawing on the views of experts who can be seen to be capable of representing the public interest;

- using briefings, and facilities such as the Internet, to provide regularly updated information on the progress of the project.

6.76 RWMAC believes that the ISOLUS work, as a transparent and inclusive process of public consultation, must not be constrained by any particular timeframe or influenced by the needs of any particular party.

6.77 ISOLUS is based on a relatively simple waste stream, uncomplicated by considerations of fissile material, where the concepts of radioactive decay, waste minimisation, the need for discharges to the environment, worker dose, passive storage and safety, and accident risk, can all, relatively easily, be assembled as information for public discussion and, hopefully, agreement. RWMAC believes, therefore, that it is in the national, as well as the MoD's, interests that the ISOLUS programme should proceed in a way that reflects the need for transparency in the information provided, full and unfettered public discussion of the options, and decisions which can be seen to derive from public participation in the process. Even if the eventual option selected were to be based more on social, employment, or economic considerations, the Committee believes it is essential, in particular, that the radiological factors should be fully aired and understood by both the public and other stakeholders.

6.78 RWMAC has noted MoD's intent, as of December 2000, to use consensus-building techniques, such as citizens' panels, focus groups and stakeholder workshops, to ascertain how the public and stakeholders view the ISOLUS options, and the issues associated with them, and then to use the views gathered to help carry the project forward. In view of its comments in preceding paragraphs, the Committee is strongly supportive of this form of consultative approach.

6.79 Alongside the main ISOLUS programme, MoD has received unsolicited proposals for early dismantling of HMS Renown, submitted by BRDL. The BRDL proposal is for this submarine alone, based on its presence in dock at Rosyth, and the availability of on-site waste storage capacity in the form of the AWAF (see paragraph 36 of this section). The Renown concept envisages de-fuelling the vessel in the usual way, followed by isolation of activated parts of the submarine structure (the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) and the primary shield tank). These components would then be stored in part of the AWAF. It was recognised, as part of the development of the ISOLUS study, that assessment of the BRDL proposals should be pursued and RWMAC understands that they are still under consideration by MoD.

6.80 The window of opportunity for carrying out work at Rosyth, based on BRDL's docking programme, is very tight - at the time this report was being prepared (in February 2001) a matter of only a few months. It appears, therefore, that decisions must be made to a short time frame. The current position is that NNRP is carrying out public consultation on the Renown project application, including an Environment Statement (ES). The ES is something that that BRDL is required to prepare, under the procedures (analogous to civil requirements) that MoD has adopted for considering the proposal, in order to assess any potential detrimental impact on the environment. RWMAC responded to NNRP in early February 2001, covering both the Environmental Statement itself and the Committee's wider concerns.

6.81 RWMAC can understand BRDL's wish to seek ways of employing its existing staff and site facilities after loss of the refitting and refuelling work to Devonport. The company has indicated that maintenance of its submarine decommissioning capability would be assisted by undertaking the work on Renown. The Committee's view is that although it would be premature to conclude that the Renown proposal could be considered as a pilot for other submarine hulls, the technical knowledge acquired might prove to be relevant for the management of the submarine flotilla as a whole. In technical terms, RWMAC can see no reason to oppose the BRDL proposal.

6.82 RWMAC also considered the terms of the ES, noting that the extent of the impact on the environment posed by the proposal would, in due course, need to be considered by the civil regulators. The Committee's initial view, which it has provided to NNRP, is that the environmental impact does not appear to be significant.

6.83 However, more important than either technical or environmental considerations, in RWMAC's view, are the major problems for the overall ISOLUS programme that might potentially arise if MoD was to accept the BRDL proposals at this stage.

6.84 In summary, the Committee's reasons for taking this view are that if MoD was to take up the BRDL proposal, it would essentially be pre-selecting a contractor, a strategy for the work, and a site on which to initiate the programme. This would then be seen as an isolated example of "decide-announce-defend" within the wider context of MoD's publicly stated commitment to consult before decisions are made. If the approach was, ultimately, to lead to the need for a legal ruling (for example, if the planning application for the Renown work was to be called-in by Ministers), on the basis of a local, non-holistic, case, it could ultimately serve to destabilise and prejudice the entire ISOLUS programme. The possible parallels with the Nirex RCF enquiry are, to RWMAC, obvious and worrying.

6.85 It is for these reasons that RWMAC has not been able to recommend acceptance of BRDL's proposals for early decommissioning of Renown, isolated as it is from a holistic plan for the whole submarine fleet, at least at the present time. The Committee does, however, fully acknowledge that BRDL and Rosyth must be considered as potential candidates for ultimate delivery of whatever strategic plan for the long-term management of redundant submarines eventually emerges from the ISOLUS process.

6.86 On 12 February 2001, RWMAC wrote to NNRP providing its response to the public consultation on the Renown proposal; a copy of the Committee's letter is at Annex 5A.

6.87 RWMAC's perception is that, notwithstanding any view that NNRP might come to as a result of the consultation, it is for other parts of MoD, possibly the Ships Support Agency, to decide whether, ultimately, early dismantling of HMS Renown should go ahead.