Current Arrangements and Requirements for the Conditioning, Packaging and Storage of Intermediate Level Radioactive Waste: Joint RWMAC/NuSAC Report

4. GOVERNMENT POLICY

4.1 This chapter introduces and discusses relevant aspects of Government policy. It does so by reference to: the 1995 White Paper "Review of Radioactive Waste Management Policy: Final Conclusions", (Cm 2919) ²; the Government's current "Managing Radioactive Waste Safely" (MRWS) consultation paper ⁵; Oslo and Paris Commission (OSPAR) commitments to reductions in radionuclide discharges to sea ⁶; and the proposed creation of the LMA ¹.

The significance of Government policy

4.2 Government policy should be a fundamental driver for the way in which radioactive waste, including ILW, is managed. It should be a key determinant of the way in which regulation functions, and of the actions of the waste producers. In short, Government policy should serve to establish a clear framework within which decisions are taken about the conditioning, packaging and storage of ILW.

The 1995 White Paper

4.3 The last comprehensive policy statement on radioactive waste management was the Cm 2919 White Paper ². This covered the management of solid radioactive wastes and the management of radioactive discharges, both liquid and gaseous.

4.4 In Cm 2919, Government concluded that deep disposal of ILW was preferable to indefinite storage, and that there was no advantage in delaying the development of a deep underground repository. However, it accepted that the Nirex underground repository would not be available for disposal of ILW until at least 2010 at the earliest. As a result, it was recognised that ILW would have to remain in interim storage for at least a further 15 years.

4.5 Against this background, paragraph 113 of Cm 2919 provided the following statement on the treatment of ILW:

"The Government believes that where the demands of safety are overriding, ILW must be treated as necessary to improve storage conditions. In addition, where early treatment of waste will secure worthwhile safety benefits, or worthwhile economic benefits without prejudicing safety, the general presumption against action which might foreclose future waste management options may be relaxed. Decisions by operators and regulators will need to have regard to all relevant factors, including the following:

(a) the need for continuing safe storage of the waste, treated and/or contained as necessary;

(b) the benefits of placing the waste in a chemically and physically stable form, so that safety may be achieved by passive means;

(c) the risk that treated waste will be incompatible with future disposal requirements and the practicability of re-working treated waste in the future;

(d) the state of storage facilities, including the benefits that would be derived from refurbishment or upgrading;

(e) the need to minimise waste degeneration, secondary waste arisings and releases to the environment;

(f) the need to minimise dependence on active safety systems, maintenance, monitoring and human intervention;

(g) the retrievability of the waste from storage."

4.6 Previous policy had been that until a disposal facility became available, ILW would remain untreated for as long as it was safe to do so. This reflected a concern that treatment might foreclose disposal options. The policy statement in Cm 2919 relaxed this presumption against early treatment in circumstances where worthwhile safety or economic benefits could be secured.

Stakeholder comments on the 1995 White Paper

4.7 The 1997 collapse of the Nirex ILW repository programme dramatically lengthened the times over which interim storage of ILW could reasonably be anticipated. It also cast question marks over the nature of policy for the longer-term and the adequacy of policy for the interim, including the conditioning, packaging and storage of ILW.

4.8 With regard to the latter, the major waste producers commented that:

"Cm 2919 does not provide sufficient clarity. In considering how to proceed, there are many different requirements which cannot all be met and some are in direct conflict ... The eventual way forward must be a balance of .. factors, but guidance or indication of priority is absent .." (BNFL)

"The principles, which underpin Government policy, are set out in Cm 2919. However, there is scope for considerable interpretation of these principles, sometimes leading to confusion and conflict. BE would welcome a clearer statement of Government policy and more detailed guidance on waste management principles ... The issue is less gaps and omissions in Government policy and much more a question of interpretation of the current broad principles." (BE)

"For the longer-term the uncertainty surrounding Government policy has introduced significant risk in the strategies for the conditioning, packaging and storage of wastes ... the reworking of wastes in the future, because of actions taken now in the absence of a clear Government policy, could result in significant costs to the public." (UKAEA)

"There is a lack of clear Government strategy for future management of radioactive waste and a programme for realisation. The current Defra consultation begins the process of addressing the lack, but it is years later than it should have been, and the planned policy development (thorough, but very slow) leaves years of uncertainty still to come" (AWE/MoD) ^*

4.9 Similar concerns were raised in comments from the regulators (see the next chapter for an explanation of the role of the regulators):

"It would be valuable if Government policy reinforced NII's focus on radioactive waste management during this (interim) period and addressed the much longer timescales that are now envisaged. It would be useful if policy could provide an indication of the Government's view of the timescale for interim storage of radioactive waste. This would encourage a greater focus on the standards required for the longer timescales." (NII)

"Even though Cm 2919 contains policy which continues to be relevant, there are now serious shortcomings due to changes in circumstances since 1995 ...... Following the RCF planning decision in March 1997, the early adoption of any permanent solution for the management of ILW has receded dramatically. At the same time there are business and safety drivers who are causing industry to address the conditioning and packaging of ILW in the short-term. We (EA) consider that, given the current circumstances where ILW is being conditioned decades ahead of the implementation of a final management decision (which is as yet unknown), policy should address the appropriate roles of, and interactions between, waste producers, Nirex, EA and NII." (EA)

4.10 RWMAC/NuSAC share stakeholder concerns about the currency and sufficiency of the policy statement contained in Cm 2919 ². The Committees consider that its uncertain status - where some parts may be extant and some superseded - is both unhelpful and unsatisfactory. The Government should therefore clarify at the earliest opportunity which parts are extant and which are not.

Government consultation: "Managing Radioactive Waste Safely"

4.11 In September 2001, the UK Government launched a programme of consultation to enable it to reassess its policy for the future management of all solid radioactive waste, including ILW. This was done through the issue of the MRWS consultation document ⁵. The primary focus of MRWS is to encourage discussion on the process that might be used to formulate policy on the long-term management of solid radioactive wastes. MRWS does, however, contain some statements of direct relevance to the conditioning, packaging and storage of ILW.

4.12 The first statement refers to a 1998 review of the storage of ILW by NII ⁷ and asserts that:

"We ... fully expect nuclear licensees to take appropriate action where necessary to ensure these stores remain safe. The presumption should be that stores will need to last for at least 50 years ... Where wastes are held in a raw untreated state, whether as a result of historical arising or current operations, these should be made passively safe, in a form that does not close down any long-term management options, as soon as is practicable". (MRWS paragraph 7.8)

If ultimately adopted as policy, this would constitute a further decisive shift towards the early treatment of ILW, with the proviso that the treatment should not foreclose any long-term management options.

4.13 The second statement is that an effective regulatory regime should achieve the following:

• give proper emphasis to safety and long-term environmental considerations;
• maintain containment of radioactivity and prevent leakage so that wastes can do no harm to people or the environment;
• provide for any necessary steps to prevent unauthorised release of radioactivity into the environment to be taken promptly;
• where waste needs to be packaged or treated to achieve passive safety, to ensure that this is done promptly;
• provide assurance that processing and storage of wastes do not prejudice future waste management options;
• provide adequate opportunities for consulting and informing the public;
• provide an appropriate balance between costs and benefits; and
• ensure transparency in setting standards and in the regulatory processes.

(MRWS paragraph 7.11)

It is not clear from MRWS whether it is intended to adopt this statement as policy and, if so, how it is to be related to the list of factors to be taken into account in reaching decisions about the treatment of wastes (as listed in Cm 2919 and quoted in paragraph 4.5 above).

4.14 Although views on a number of shorter-term waste management issues are sought in MRWS, they do not include an invitation to comment on the statements reproduced here. Nonetheless, RWMAC/NuSAC consider that it is important to do so, not least because the statements do not fully address the concerns of the waste producers and regulators as outlined above. We comment further on these concerns throughout this report.

OSPAR commitments to reductions in radionuclide discharges to sea

4.15 Two other policy developments are of direct relevance to the concerns of this joint study. The first arises from the commitments given by the UK Government at the July 1998 Ministerial meeting of the OSPAR Commission ⁶. These commitments require substantial and progressive reductions in radionuclide discharges to sea, such that by the year 2020 discharges are reduced to levels where the additional concentrations in the marine environment above historic levels, resulting from such discharges, are close to zero. The Government has subsequently consulted on a draft UK Discharge Strategy ⁸ and draft Statutory Guidance to the environment agencies ⁹ on the principles that should be applied to the regulation of radioactive discharges in light of its OSPAR commitments. However, final versions of the Strategy and Statutory Guidance have not yet been published.

4.16 BNFL commented during the course of this study that the draft Statutory Guidance is likely to lead to difficulties:

".. although current proposals pay lip service to the need for some flexibility in the treatment of legacy (wastes), the requirements for more and tighter limits with primacy given to progressive reductions rather than BPM (Best Practicable Means) and to reduce "headroom" wherever possible, is likely to lead to the development of a position in which the treatment of legacy wastes will be made much more difficult".

The potential impacts on the treatment of ILW of the Government's OSPAR commitments are considered in chapter 7.

Creation of a Liabilities Management Authority

4.17 The second additional policy development arises from the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry's announcement in November 2001 of the Government's proposal to set up the LMA ¹, to be responsible for the management of public sector civil nuclear liabilities. The Government's intention is that the LMA will have a specific remit to develop an overall UK strategy for BNFL and UKAEA liabilities, including ILW. The establishment of the LMA, and the associated transfer of assets and liabilities, will require primary legislation. A White Paper is therefore expected in June 2002, followed by the introduction of a Bill in the 2002/03 Parliamentary session. The potential relevance of the creation of the LMA to the conditioning, packaging and storage of ILW is addressed in chapter 9 of this report.

* AWE/MoD denotes a quote received from AWE in respect of its MoD ILW holdings. The 1998 UK Radioactive Waste Inventory3 shows that AWE is by far the greatest holder and forecast future generator of MoD ILW.