RWMAC's Advice to Ministers on the Restoration of the UKAEA Dounreay Nuclear Site

4. Observations on the DSRP

General approach of the Plan

4.1 The overall aim of the DSRP is progressively to decontaminate, dismantle and remediate, thereby reducing the number of facilities on the site, whilst conditioning waste to a form suitable for long-term storage or disposal. The DSRP states UKAEA's objective of decommissioning the Dounreay site "as soon as reasonably practicable in a way that is safe, secure, environmentally responsible, at minimum cost to the taxpayer, and achieves public acceptability".

4.2 In RWMAC's view, UKAEA has done well to produce a comprehensive site restoration plan to tight, externally-set, timescales. The Committee warmly welcomes the production of the plan, which it sees as providing a well thought through and coherent strategy for restoring the Dounreay site. It is also in accordance with the recommendation in the last RWMAC report on Dounreay ⁴ that UKAEA should proceed quickly to establish a comprehensive strategic plan for the management of all waste streams arising on the Dounreay site. The Plan will have to satisfy the detailed requirements of HSE and SEPA who are, it is understood, currently scrutinising it. RWMAC also welcomes UKAEA's commitment to transparency in respect of the Plan, manifest in publication on its website, and in accordance with the Authority's "open and honest" approach to radioactive waste management at Dounreay.

4.3 In terms of construction, the DSRP sets out UKAEA's proposals at a level of general strategy. Its opening section, an introduction and overview, stresses the key requirements for delivery - sufficient funds, an eventual national repository for storage or disposal of intermediate level and high level radioactive wastes (ILW and HLW), and a suitably skilled workforce. The first and second issues are covered in detail in this report. On the question of access to skilled employees for key areas of future work at Dounreay, the last RWMAC report ⁴ recommended the Government to take steps to ensure that a "permanent complement of high-calibre managers and technicians" was available to UKAEA for the future. RWMAC believes that these key work skills are now likely to be needed for project management, safety evaluation, and environmental monitoring and management.

4.4 RWMAC observes that, whilst being an important and necessary element of the Dounreay site decommissioning and clean-up process, the DSRP remains, in essence, aspirational. Suitable arrangements have to be set in place to ensure its actual delivery. More will be said of this in the following sections of this report.

4.5 Demonstration of safety will be needed during the whole course of implementation of the Plan and, at its core, will be a long-term safety case. Monitoring and environmental impact assessments will accompany safety case development. RWMAC notes that in August 1999, UKAEA Dounreay gained accreditation to ISO14001 (Environmental Management Systems). UKAEA states that ISO14001 will be employed as one means of ensuring that its safety and quality procedures for remediation of the site meet the "highest level" of quality assurance. This development is to be welcomed.

Limitations on the DSRP

4.6 An important point is the number of uncertainties and constraints to which the DSRP is subject. It is important to make clear that these uncertainties are not a result of the tight timescale to which the DSRP has been prepared, but are of a more fundamental nature. They concern, essentially, the wider political and regulatory context within which the DSRP will be implemented, rather than the physical problems that UKAEA will encounter on the ground.

4.7 There will clearly be technical uncertainties in delivery of the DSRP. A major research establishment such as Dounreay invariably gives rise to novel forms of waste that pose particular problems. But the most notable uncertainty, in RWMAC's view, stems from the preparation of the DSRP in the absence of fully-formulated and clearly-stated Government policies for the long-term management of UK radioactive wastes.

4.8 There is extensive reference in the DSRP to the last Conservative Government's policy paper, "Review of Radioactive Waste Management Policy: Final Conclusions" (Cm 2919), issued in 1995 ³. However, this is not particularly helpful since many aspects of the policy set out in Cm 2919 have been overtaken by events (e.g., collapse of the Nirex ILW repository programme, the OSPAR Sintra agreement), and it is far from clear which parts remain extant and which parts do not.

4.9 The Government has, however, stated its commitment to carry out public consultation in respect of its future solid radioactive waste management policy. In RWMAC's opinion, one of the most important reasons why a clear statement of national policy is needed is to avoid the risk of present actions by nuclear operators proving, in the course of time, to be out of line with the long term national strategy. This risk exists in the case of the DSRP.

4.10 By way of illustration, the decisions needed on major Dounreay waste streams have to be addressed in the national policy context. For example, the highly active liquor (HAL) from the reprocessing of spent PFR fuel at Dounreay is, in RWMAC's view, a significant hazard that ranks high as a potential risk. Treatment of HAL should therefore be accorded priority. But once this is carried out, no clear policy exists against which decisions on long-term management of the vitrified waste can be made. Similar considerations apply to ILW in the Dounreay Shaft. There are also a number of issues on the management of solid LLW at Dounreay that require, as a prerequisite, a clear view on the UK strategy for the longer-term management of LLW in order that optimal decisions can be taken. Lastly, there are currently no clear Government policies and standards for dealing with radioactively contaminated land, of the kind that has to be cleaned up at Dounreay.

4.11 The present deficits in Government policy therefore add substantial risk and uncertainty to the arrangements needed for DSRP implementation. There has already been an impact on formulation of the DSRP, by compelling UKAEA to set out the assumptions on which the Plan is based, and to build in flexibility. It is RWMAC's view that, if clear Government policies for the long-term management of solid radioactive wastes, control of radioactive discharges, and remediation of radioactively contaminated land are not established soon, delivery of the DSRP is likely to be seriously prejudiced. Currently, UKAEA, like other nuclear operators, is having to make decommissioning decisions without reference to statements of policy. There is a danger that this could give rise to decisions at Dounreay being taken in an incoherent and uncoordinated way, resulting in inappropriate precedents and waste of resources. This would detract from ultimate delivery of the DSRP. Moreover, untimely decisions taken at Dounreay, as at other nuclear sites, in the absence of agreed national policies, could prejudice the formulation of the policies themselves.

4.12 A further important constraint in respect of DSRP delivery is the limited extent of direct UKAEA control, and the extent to which implementation is effectively in the hands of others. These limitations apply in respect of the need to secure planning and regulatory consents, provision of finance, and, very importantly, the need to secure appropriate stakeholder, and wider public, support for specific proposals.

4.13 Implementing the DSRP will inevitably involve a number of potentially controversial planning and regulatory decisions, including, for example, the provision of a new LLW management facility and the development of new waste stores. Carrying through any of these projects could be subject to appeal, or application for judicial review. This will all take time and, potentially, applications could fail at any point along the way. Absence of clear Government policies for radioactive waste management will, for example, lead to difficulty at public inquiries where justification for development proposals is bound to be judged in that context. Many regulatory consents require issues to be resolved between the environment agencies and the NII.

4.14 UKAEA acknowledges that decisions can no longer be taken in isolation, and then announced and defended. Nor can work be taken forward in the face of substantial opposition. Instead, there is a need to seek the views of those who will be affected. The decision-making process does not, therefore, lie fully within UKAEA control.

4.15 Another area where UKAEA freedom of action over DSRP implementation is limited is its funding. UKAEA does not have any direct control over provision for its liabilities, which are deliverable in the context, and under the constraints, of wider public sector expenditure planning and control.

4.16 UKAEA has sensibly sought to make allowance for these uncertainties and constraints in constructing the DSRP. It is acknowledged that many of the above factors are outside its direct control and the DSRP is defined as a "living document" to be reviewed and updated as necessary as the work proceeds, and the implications posed by such uncertainties and constraints become clearer.

The need for a new approach

4.17 While UKAEA and, as its owner, the Government, together have responsibility for the restoration of the Dounreay site, the practical delivery of the DSRP is not in the sole control of UKAEA. The driving force that will see the Plan through to a successful and timely conclusion has to come from elsewhere. Even within UKAEA, incentives are likely to be needed for the early discharge of liabilities in order to counteract potential external pressures to extend timescales and protect local employment. Ability to carry the project forward will also depend critically on the nature of funding arrangements. For these reasons, and given the failure of past arrangements to progress decommissioning at Dounreay, RWMAC believes that a new approach, designed to resolve the issues described above, is needed.

4.18 There will clearly be potential conflicts of interest between those involved. For example, the local authority may seek to protect its electors' interests by resisting the development of new facilities on the site - which UKAEA and regulators may see to be the most effective means of dealing with radioactive wastes. Even among the regulators, NII may favour waste treatment as a precursor to storing it safely on site, whereas SEPA may resist this in order to reduce discharges from treatment processes. Transporting Dounreay's LLW for disposal at Drigg in Cumbria is one option likely to be considered that would inevitably be controversial and extend the range of parties with a legitimate interest in Dounreay beyond Scotland.

4.19 RWMAC also believes that the overall goals of hazard reduction and site restoration risk becoming lost in regulatory detail. One example is how to deal with DFR NaK coolant (see paragraphs 3.7 to 3.11). Solutions will be needed that can balance operator and regulatory interests in a sensible way.

4.20 RWMAC expressed concern in its last report ⁴ that the human and financial "dynamics" to drive the discharge of liabilities at Dounreay forward were not in position. As long as a policy framework is in place, it should be possible to establish some form of common commitment to, and responsibility for, successful delivery of the DSRP by all those with an active interest. A mechanism is, therefore, needed that can instil a sense of common purpose and responsibility for solving the problems of Dounreay and provide a suitable driving force for delivery of site restoration. It appears to RWMAC that only the Government itself is placed to establish this mechanism.

4.21 RWMAC believes that the aim of successful implementation of the DSRP would be put at risk if UKAEA was to be left to assume sole responsibility for delivery, with hands-off, and potentially conflicting, positions being taken by other players. Without an accessible forum for debating, and resolving, the issues, the only avenues left to some interested parties will be to adopt an opposing stance. The inevitable effect of this would be to inhibit progress.

Building on the DSRP and removing obstacles

4.22 Thus, while RWMAC welcomes the intent behind the DSRP and commends UKAEA on its production, the Committee stresses that the Plan must be seen as a first step, not a solution. The need for further work by UKAEA on technical aspects of restoration and the development of deliverable targets for dealing with the site facilities and waste streams is clear cut, not least in the light of past performance. What appear, hitherto, to have been less fully recognised are the need to provide for effective implementation of the DSRP, and to remove the obstacles in the way of it.

4.23 As a first step, the extent to which delivery rests on the actions of organisations other than UKAEA, and the corresponding level of risk that this implies for DSRP implementation, need to be recognised. Many key actions are beyond UKAEA control, including, critically, development of clear national policies and regulatory practices. But accountability must reside somewhere. The body which is accountable for discharging the action, and what is required of it, should always be identifiable. In the event that an action is not deliverable by means of existing arrangements, some other method of overcoming the problem must be found. In one way or another, it should be possible to discharge all DSRP-related accountabilities.

4.24 This process involves a variety of parties. RWMAC believes that more key actions lie with other parties than with UKAEA. Restoration of the site is as much the Government's responsibility as UKAEA's and the prime accountability for achieving the objectives of the DSRP must rest with the Government, as the owner of UKAEA. RWMAC concludes that UKAEA's sponsor department, DTI, in consultation with SEPA and NII, the planning regulators, and those stakeholders with an active interest in delivery of the DSRP, needs to formulate an Action Plan for the discharge of DSRP-related accountabilities. It is obvious that DTI will need to take full account of UKAEA views.

4.25 The Action Plan needs to be integrated, or at least closely associated, with the DSRP itself. While obviously predicated on the 50-60 years site restoration target, it also needs a clear focus on shorter-term requirements and challenging, but achievable, DSRP goals.

4.26 The Action Plan should first list the key actions required of the various "active interest" parties as part of DSRP implementation. A means of driving forward and monitoring the progress of discharge of DSRP-associated accountabilities is also needed. RWMAC believes that the Government has an obligation to ensure that there is a mechanism, and sufficient empowerment, to carry out the remit of site restoration. Empowerment in this context is taken to be the availability of appropriate resources, expertise, and knowledge to manage the process effectively, without dependence, at least in an undefined or unmanageable way, on the actions of others. Without such a mechanism, the DSRP risks remaining "a piece of paper".

4.27 DTI, as the UKAEA sponsoring and funding Department within UK Government, must, in RWMAC's view, therefore consider whether arrangements currently exist that are robust enough to support the discharge of accountabilities associated with the DSRP. If not, it needs to think about what new arrangements are needed. Whether these arrangements can simply be defined through the Action Plan (as long as all accountable bodies are bound by it) or whether they need to be formalised in a forum convened for that purpose, is also a matter that requires consideration.

4.28 RWMAC believes that the delivery of the DSRP will depend critically on securing:

• endorsement of the DSRP by Government (taking account of Scottish devolution) and clear allocation of responsibilities for carrying it out to an agreed timescale, within both departments and government agencies;
• commitment to future funding for the DSRP, consistent with the need for work to be planned as part of a forward strategy for waste management, plant decommissioning, and site clean-up;
• adequate arrangements for monitoring DSRP implementation and initiating corrective action as necessary;
• where disputes and obstacles to progress exist, the means to raise awareness of them to a level of decision-making appropriate to their resolution.

4.29 An important aspect is the need for the Government to provide a better basis for resource planning of UKAEA decommissioning work than has existed in the past. Financial provision for UKAEA programmes comes from the Government, through the DTI, apparently under conventional public sector funding arrangements. Thus, the rate of progress of site restoration at Dounreay will inevitably be dependent on central Government commitment to the project and the money that it is prepared to allocate to the work.

4.30 It is not clear that this commitment currently exists. In his statement on 18 July 2001, the Energy Minister, Brian Wilson, said :

"The Dounreay Site Restoration Plan sets out an ambitious vision for dealing with the challenge faced by UKAEA, and has my full support."

While this is a positive statement, RWMAC believes that what is needed in practice is for Government consideration of the DSRP, once it is finalised, with a view to formal adoption. This would enable the Plan to be carried forward to implementation under arrangements designed to make it resistant to changes in political administrations and in the tenure of individual Ministers. Without this,it will always be difficult to assess, with any certainty, the extent to which the DSRP is likely to be deliverable.

4.31 In relation to the provision of funding for DSRP implementation, RWMAC commented in its previous Dounreay report ⁴ that the high (six per cent) discount rate used, as required by the Treasury, provides less of an incentive for early decommissioning than more conventional, lower, rates. More is said of funding issues later in this report.

4.32 DSRP implementation arrangements will also require the involvement of a number of non-central government bodies - the regulators (SEPA and NII) and the Dounreay site stakeholders, including local people and community groups, local authorities, and environmental pressure groups.

4.33 In RWMAC's view, efforts are needed to instil in UKAEA and the regulators a greater sense of common purpose in relation to achieving real progress in site restoration. That is not to say that SEPA and NII's regulatory responsibilities should in any way be fettered. But the Committee believes that a clearer regulatory focus, that does not lose sight of DSRP objectives, may be required, and certainly that the use of the mechanisms for resolving disagreements (the "memoranda of understanding") between the regulators needs to be optimised.

4.34 DTI, in conjunction with UKAEA, should also consider the possible arrangements for involving the wider range of stakeholders, including the local community and the NGOs, by means of subsidiary dialogues on a case by case basis (for example, in relation to future arrangements for dealing with solid LLW, managing the risks posed by the radioactive particles found on the Dounreay site and on a local beach, etc.).

4.35 One particular issue for these stakeholders, that needs to be addressed at an early stage, is any unrealistic expectation that the Dounreay site can be returned to a condition suitable for unrestricted public use within, say, a few decades of closure, if at all. The need for a lengthy period of site maintenance and monitoring must be acknowledged. The problems posed by this issue, including that of applying institutional controls, together with other potential areas of uncertainty or disagreement "downstream" of the DSRP, could be averted by seeking early public and other stakeholder involvement in the formulation and implementation of plans. The clear statements of radioactive waste policy and regulatory practice, that RWMAC believes are needed, would facilitate such discussions by providing a template against which they can take place.

Site restoration work by UKAEA

4.36 RWMAC believes that UKAEA, as part of its DSRP implementation responsibilities, might usefully address the prioritisation of projects on the basis of assessed risk, notably in dealing with the substantial volumes of radioactive materials and non-passively stored wastes present on the site. This is not a straightforward matter, since issues such as quantifiable and accidental hazards, risks to the public and workers, etc., need to be taken into account.

4.37 Nevertheless, some form of ranking for the scheduling of work would be useful. For example, there can be little question that one of the greatest risks of a serious accident reposes in the unfinished decommissioning of the DFR, namely the circumstances of reactive NaK coolant and a remaining fuel assembly both being present. Comparisons with the risks posed by, for example, the Dounreay particles, the LLW pits, or the ILW Disposal Shaft are possible if some basic criteria, such as timeframes, the nature of the possible consequences, etc., can be factored in.

Timescales

4.38 The DSRP provides for all major restoration work at the Dounreay site to be implemented within some 50-60 years, "twice as fast as the present 100 years decommissioning programme" ¹. Within this, the Plan sets out measures that will allow the major radiological hazards to be addressed within 25-30 years. The Plan goes on to add that, on completion of these works, the site will enter a further maintenance and surveillance monitoring period, currently envisaged to extend to 300 years.

4.39 RWMAC welcomes proposals to reduce the timescales for the restoration work, having commented in its last Dounreay report ⁴:

"Some of the timeframes attached to decommissioning projects, particularly the intermediate level waste shaft, are too long. The timeframes need to be re-examined by Government and UKAEA".

4.40 The overall time required for completion of the restoration programme can represent a factor of equal, or possibly even greater, importance, in terms of an overall risk assessment, as the nature of the restoration works themselves. For example, it is theoretically possible that the upper part of the ILW Disposal Shaft could be severely damaged by a catastrophic event before the removal of waste takes place (although, in practice, this is extremely unlikely). In other words, the timeframe can, potentially, affect the overall scale of risk to the public and workers. "Analysis paralysis" is the fashionable description of these circumstances. Thus, whilst recognising the need for careful planning of individual projects, it is important to ensure that this is not over-protracted, and that decommissioning and clean-up work is able to proceed to sensible timescales, avoiding the need for unnecessary reiteration of work, and obviating the risk of loss of expertise. At the same time, as UKAEA acknowledges, the agreement of key criteria with the regulators, and the early involvement of other stakeholders, have also to be built into forward planning.

4.41 Two examples illustrate this. The first has been referred to previously. The DFR has already been closed for 24 years - it is inevitable that loss of expertise at UKAEA during the period since closure will make the deferred task of removing the remaining fuel more difficult.

4.42 In its 1999 report ⁴, RWMAC questioned the effect on public perception of the protracted (15 years) timescale adopted by UKAEA for decommissioning the ILW Disposal Shaft. The Shaft, a redundant facility which falls well short of acceptable modern standards for waste management, contains fissile material and must be considered to represent an ongoing hazard. In 1999, RWMAC commented that "it is important to secure and maintain public confidence that effective remedial action is being taken" and recommended that some of the engineering and shaft containment design work should be carried out in parallel with geotechnical and hydrogeological investigations.

4.43 The current situation appears to be that phase 2 of these investigations is due for completion at the end of 2002. The key date anticipated (and planned for) by UKAEA to commence waste retrieval from the shaft is 2014, although project planning acknowledges that the potential impact on this timeframe of uncertainties specific to work on the Shaft could mean that it might begin as late as 2027. Similarly, commencement of Shaft decommissioning work ranges between 2026 and 2037. RWMAC recognises the need for such "time-windows" in line with the concept of managing uncertainties (although it also notes that NII has pressed UKAEA to present single target date information as the only pragmatic way of monitoring progress). As in 1999, however, the Committee questions whether the long timeframes are appropriate and, particularly, whether the delay attributable to investigatory works can be justified.

4.44 A separate issue is the 300 years maintenance and monitoring period proposed by UKAEA, following completion of the main site remediation works. This timeframe suggests, rightly, that any idea of the site being returned to its pre-existing state within, say, a few decades of closure, is misguided. But it also raises issues of the totality of costs and how institutional controls can be maintained and funded for such long periods, given the uncertainty of future societal developments. RWMAC notes that while the requirements of the site restoration work are described in detail, there is little explicit justification in the DSRP of the 300 years maintenance period, or indication of the extent of the site to which it is to be applied. Thus, there would be benefits in refining this proposal, not least to remove an unnecessary uncertainty, although this is hindered by the present lack of policy on treatment of radioactively contaminated land. These issues require further consideration in respect of implementation of the DSRP and how it is to be presented to the public.

Funding

4.45 As a state-owned body, UKAEA is in the hands of Government, through the DTI, for the funding of DSRP work. The DSRP itself makes no mention of the estimated cost of either the overall Plan, or its individual programmes and projects. UKAEA's current estimate of its liabilities - that is the total cost of decommissioning plant, site restorations, and dealing with radioactive wastes - is £8.7 billion. Of this figure, £3.86 billion relates to the cost of restoring the Dounreay site ⁷.

4.46 Section 3 of the DSRP Decommissioning Plan entitled "Strategic Planning Optimisation of the Decommissioning Programme" identifies the objective of incurring minimum cost to the taxpayer, coupled to ensuring safety, good environmental management, and public acceptability. Costs can be reduced, as the DSRP indicates, by prioritising projects and managing constraints. However, simple cost minimisation alone is, in RWMAC's view, an inappropriate means of controlling work at Dounreay, particularly if discounted costs, estimated on the basis of a relatively high discount rate, are used. This remains, in the Committee's view, a recipe for deferring work, extending programmes, and permitting site hazards to remain.

4.47 The DSRP explains that the cost of waste management and decommissioning operations are considered as part of an annual bidding round, under which UKAEA produces a detailed estimate of its requirements for the next financial year, together with projections for the subsequent three years. RWMAC assumes that DTI settles UKAEA's annual expenditure limit with the Treasury, and that grant in aid is drawn down to pay the costs of agreed projects.

4.48 These arrangements have to be viewed against the background that a perennial concern of Government departments is to constrain short term spending. Against this, the successful delivery of a plan such as the DSRP rests on ensuring delivery of adequate funds over the longer-term.

4.49 For this reason, RWMAC believes that funding needs to be more fully considered as part of DSRP development, and that Government commitment to the work, and the funding that it is prepared to allocate to it, should be fully and openly declared. Otherwise, it will always remain difficult to assess, with any certainty, the timeframe against which the DSRP can be delivered, or to propose, and monitor, a realistic rate of progress against it. That said, RWMAC is aware of UKAEA's view that no current projects are being constrained by lack of funding.

4.50 In its 1999 report ⁴, RWMAC stated that "the Treasury in conjunction with DTI and the Scottish Office, and UKAEA itself, should review the discounted cash flow (DCF) rate used by UKAEA to calculate its liabilities". This is in line with Recommendation 44 of the NII/SEPA Safety Audit ⁵, which recommended that UKAEA should discuss with DTI the use of a discount rate of less than 6 per cent, with the aim of achieving earlier decommissioning where reasonably practicable. During the present study, however, RWMAC was told of HSE's current view that the six per cent DCF rate is no longer a dominant factor in determining the site decommissioning timescale.

4.51 Nevertheless, RWMAC wishes to reiterate the view, set out in its previous report ⁴, that the best interests of the taxpayer are served by the removal of radiological hazards, and the Committee again suggests that, to put this on a practical basis, the Government should review the DCF rate used for Dounreay work.