RWMAC's Annual Report for 2000-2001

Chapter 6

Management of Radioactive Wastes by the Ministry of Defence

RWMAC work for the Ministry of Defence

6.1 RWMAC's terms of reference (see Annex 1) apply only to radioactive wastes produced by civil organisations. They exclude wastes which are the result of military activities (often termed "defence wastes"). Nevertheless, RWMAC has, on the invitation of the Ministry of Defence (MoD), undertaken a number of studies of management of defence wastes since 1981. The findings of the most recent study were published in July 2001 ¹. This followed publication in August 2000, of a related study on MoD's arrangements for dealing with its radioactively contaminated land ². Work on both studies was led by RWMAC's MoD Practices Working Group, chaired by Dr Gregg Butler (see Annex 2).

Production and regulation of defence wastes

6.2 MoD is a major user of radioactive materials and produces large and diverse amounts of radioactive wastes. Most defence wastes are created as a consequence of two major initiatives - the naval nuclear propulsion programme (NNPP) and the nuclear weapons programme. Smaller amounts arise as a result of a wide range of smaller scale MoD activities involving the use of radioactive sources, for example, repair depots. Some active service units also use large number of sources, e.g., weapon night sights.

6.3 Some areas of defence work have been contracted out to the private sector or fully privatised, for example, nuclear weapons development and decommissioning (by the Atomic Weapons Establishment; AWE) and most nuclear submarine support services, including all major refitting and refuelling work. Future submarine refitting and refuelling is to be concentrated at the privately owned and operated dockyard at Devonport. A number of redundant submarines are berthed, on a care and maintenance basis under MoD management, at both Devonport dockyard and that at Rosyth (which has carried out major work in the past). Some routine submarine maintenance is undertaken at Faslane naval base, which is owned and operated by MoD, and, under similar arrangements, also at Devonport naval base.

6.4 Virtually all defence wastes remain in the permanent ownership of MoD no matter what arrangements are made for their management. Some liabilities may attach to the private sector owners of the Devonport and Rosyth dockyards in respect of the decommissioning of plant developed since privatisation of the two sites.

6.5 Although the Health and Safety at Work Acts, and the associated regulations dealing with protection from radiation (the Ionising Radiations Regulations 1999), apply to activities undertaken directly by MoD, the legislation which provides for controls to be exercised over radioactive waste management and nuclear operations in the civil sector (RSA93 and NIA65) do not. Thus, for example, nuclear submarine maintenance at the Faslane and Devonport naval bases is not covered by RSA93, nor is the use by MoD and service personnel of small sources. Additionally, there is a specific exemption from NIA65 for "nuclear reactors in a means of transport" which encompasses submarines.

6.6 The consequence of these legislative arrangements is that the civil regulators (EA and SEPA, and also NII) have statutory authority only in areas of defence work that have been put out to contract or privatised. Their remit does not extend to activities for which MoD remains directly responsible.

6.7 Nevertheless, MoD itself has made a public commitment that where any form of exemption or disapplication exists in relation to its activities, it will introduce standards and arrangements that are "so far as is reasonably practicable, at least as good as the legislation" ³. The main planks of these voluntary arrangements are :

• for those elements of the NNPP undertaken by MoD, controls are applied by the Naval Nuclear Regulatory Panel (NNRP). Although part of MoD, NNRP is sufficiently divorced from Royal Navy operations that its regulation of defence wastes and nuclear safety can reasonably be described as "external" (see Note 1 to Annex 6);
• for other areas of defence work carried out by MoD, including military deployment of large numbers of radioactive sources, the use of a system known as "pseudo-RSA93" regulation, whereby EA and SEPA apply controls that are very similar to those required by the legislation, and are designed to have identical practical effect, although without force of law.

6.8 RWMAC takes the view that, in general terms, application of the legislation and regulation to which the civil sector is subject (the "civil provisions") to defence activities delivers substantial benefits in terms of the transparency of controls and public confidence. However, RWMAC also concluded that, on grounds of the difficulties posed, extending the civil provisions to two areas of defence work would not, in practice, be justified (see paragraph 6.17). The report recommended that where MoD decided to retain disapplications and exemptions, the justification for so doing should be clearly set down and publicised.

6.9 It will be clear that the management and regulation of defence wastes is a complicated area. To assist in the understanding of this chapter, an explanatory table from the report is reproduced as Annex 6. The table sets out the various arrangements applying at the most important waste producing sites :

• the nuclear weapons programme : Aldermaston and Burghfield;
• the naval nuclear propulsion programme : the Devonport and Rosyth dockyards, the Devonport and Faslane naval bases; the Royal Naval Armaments Depot Coulport; the Naval Reactor Test Establishment Vulcan; the Rolls-Royce site at Derby (reactor design and construction);
• MoD test firing ranges : Eskmeals and Kirkcudbright (where depleted uranium (DU) munitions are, or have been, used);
• sites using small sources.

The defence wastes study

6.10 Fieldwork took place between January and November 2000 with visits to Aldermaston, Devonport, Rosyth, Faslane, Eskmeals and Drigg. In addition, meetings took place with a number of MoD bodies, including NNRP and the two MoD Integrated Project Teams (IPTs) responsible for the NNPP and the nuclear weapons programme. The major role of the IPTs is oversight and management of the contracts awarded to the private sector companies charged with practical delivery of the two programmes.

6.11 A RWMAC Working Group was formed to undertake the study and prepare a draft report. The report was then agreed by RWMAC in plenary session. MoD and the regulators were given the opportunity to comment on its factual accuracy. The report was submitted to the Minister for Defence Procurement in May 2001, and published on 24 July 2001.

6.12 The report represented a major undertaking for RWMAC in terms of time and human resources committed. Defence wastes are subject to complicated management and regulatory arrangements. The outcomes of defence reviews have required rapid and extensive management changes. The most important defence plants, notably AWE, are on a par with major nuclear sites in the civil sector. A comprehensive evaluation of the entire range of waste-producing activities was not possible. Nevertheless, the Committee believes it was able to identify the key strengths and weaknesses of MoD's top-level management and advisory structure for defence wastes, the means by which strategic issues, and related policy and practice guidance, are promulgated to working levels, and the performance of site managers in tackling waste problems.

6.13 The report made 38 specific recommendations. Together, they are too lengthy to include here, but the most significant are summarised in the following paragraphs.

Top-level MoD management systems

6.14 RWMAC concluded that, overall, defence wastes continue to be managed to standards comparable with those of the civil nuclear industry. There is, nevertheless, some scope for improvements in individual waste management practices on most sites. The Committee also concluded that MoD needs to finalise, and publicise, the statement of management strategy for defence wastes, which it has, for some time, been developing. Such a statement is needed in order to provide site managers with a clear set of overarching objectives and to explain to the public the basis for individual waste practices.

6.15 MoD has an inescapable duty to ensure that its ownership responsibilities for defence wastes are being fully and properly discharged. MoD is also bound by its commitment to put in place arrangements that are at least as good as the civil provisions. Some form of review mechanism is required to undertake regular checks on the effectiveness of MoD systems charged with meeting these obligations (a MoD term for which is "providing assurance") and with delivering MoD's strategy for radioactive waste management (once formulated).

6.16 MoD's arrangements for providing a substitute form of external regulation for areas of its activities not subject to civil provisions are most effectively developed in the case of the NNRP. In addition, the Panel provides "assurance" for MoD in areas where civil regulation does apply, notably at the Devonport and Rosyth dockyards. In RWMAC's view, there is an equal need for MoD assurance in the case of the nuclear weapons programme and the use of radioactive sources. The Committee recommended that MoD should consider the possible benefits of setting up a dedicated central body, possibly based on the NNRP model, to deliver a more systematised form of assurance and control.

Coverage of civil provisions

6.17 There are several ways, and combinations of ways, in which the civil provisions could be further applied to MoD, including extending the scope of operations put out to contract, and amending primary legislation. It is very doubtful, however, whether NII possesses the expertise or experience to regulate the operation and repair of submarine reactors, whether at sea or alongside. Similarly, RWMAC believes that it would be impractical for the environment agencies to regulate MoD's use of small sources, since many of these are kept by active service units, such as infantry battalions, and are subject to rapid and frequent movement. The Committee believes that continued MoD regulation of these activities can be justified as long as there is sufficient separation from the MoD operational line to provide for independence. The new central regulatory and assurance body proposed above would need to be established on this principle.

Interface with the civil regulators

6.18 MoD regulation of parts of the NNPP requires close co-operation with the civil regulators, notably NII, to the extent that there is a significant degree of dual regulation. Establishment of the NNRP (in 1999) marked a major change in the system of regulation for the NNPP, with the previously prescriptive regime of safety documentation being replaced by one based essentially on "empowerment". An operator is judged by NNRP to be empowered when it has access to appropriate levels of resource, expertise and knowledge to manage the activity effectively. There should be no need for recourse to external sources of expertise - the management systems are, in effect, self-contained. The key criterion of management effectiveness is adherence to a set of conditions analogous to NII site licensing conditions. When this is achieved, formal approval is given in the form of NNRP "Authorisation". The Authorisations issued in 1999 in relation to activities at Devonport and Rosyth encompassed those of the privatised dockyards.

6.19 The RWMAC report recommended that all areas of "crossover" between civil and MoD regulation, as well the operation of non-statutory control regimes by the civil regulators, should be covered by bipartite written protocols, operation of which should be regularly reviewed. Further, the Committee believes that there would be benefits in extending the range of NNRP assurance activities to encompass reactor design, so as to reduce the chances of future problems such as that of non-identification of carbon-14 in submarine waste streams (see paragraph 6.26), and to oversee the long-term storage of spent submarine reactor fuel and ILW (including the plans formulated by defence contractors for doing so). These changes would reflect MoD's ownership of defence materials and wastes. If the extension of NNRP work was to take place, interface with NII regulation in these areas would need to be covered in the protocol.

Defence wastes and the Radioactive Waste Inventory

6.20 RWMAC concluded from its site visits that there was a general problem with the scope and accuracy of the returns made in respect of defence wastes to the UK Radioactive Waste Inventory (RWI). In particular, the Committee felt that there were some defence wastes (for example, from decommissioning and clean-up activities) that were unlikely to be fully accounted for. The Committee recommended that clear formal responsibility for maintaining the inventory of defence wastes and making accurate returns to the RWI should be allocated within MoD on an ongoing basis as part of its overall assurance strategy.

Openness and transparency

6.21 The study identified an increasing commitment on the part of MoD to be as open as possible about its radioactive waste producing activities, subject to genuine considerations of security. Local Liaison Committees are established at most major sites and these generally appear to work well.

6.22 RWMAC has endorsed the concept of widely-based consultation as an essential building block of the development of future radioactive waste management policy ⁴. It therefore supports MoD's "ISOLUS" public consultation on the options for the long-term management of decommissioned nuclear submarines, which is predicated on similar principles. ISOLUS stands for Interim Storage of Laid-Up Submarines. The options for managing the waste stream under consideration in the ISOLUS study (solid ILW elements of the submarine reactor compartment) pose issues that are relatively easy for the public to understand, and can, therefore, be assembled relatively easily as information for discussion. It is therefore in the national, as well as the MoD's, interests that the ISOLUS programme should proceed in a way that reflects the need for transparency in the information provided, full and unfettered public discussion of the options, and decisions which can be seen to derive from public participation in the process.

6.23 For these reasons, RWMAC advised MoD that it was unable to support an unsolicited proposal by the private sector operator at Rosyth for the early dismantling of HMS Renown, a non-operational nuclear submarine. The Committee felt that if MoD was to take up the proposal, it would essentially be pre-selecting a contractor, a strategy, and a site on which to initiate the programme. This would be contrary to the stated principles of ISOLUS, notably those of open, inclusive public debate. It would send signals that the outcome of the study was pre-determined and cast doubt on whether it was being conducted on a fair basis. Essentially, implementing the proposal ran the risk of prejudicing the entire ISOLUS programme.

6.24 Transparency should also be a feature of civil regulatory decisions on defence activities. This is not always the case. In the report, RWMAC highlighted the EA decision to close the Pangbourne Pipeline (see paragraph 6.31), in circumstances where the dose comparisons used in the justification of the decision were far from clear.

Management of major defence waste streams

6.25 The main waste streams produced by the NNPP are, in descending order of radiotoxicity, cobalt-60, carbon-14 and tritium. Management of tritium, as a significant issue, is confined to Devonport dockyard and is described in chapter 9. Carbon-14, when it arises in NNPP wastes together with cobalt-60, a higher energy emitter, is difficult to detect. Submarine spent fuel is not classified as a waste, but there are no current plans for reprocessing and the fuel is stored at Sellafield. The nuclear weapons programme produces a more diverse range of wastes. The only radioactive waste stream found at MoD firing ranges (see paragraph 6.33) is depleted uranium (DU).

NNPP wastes

6.26 The unexpected identification of carbon-14 in a range of submarine wastes in 1998 has complicated, and serious, implications for MoD. There are limits on the disposal of carbon-14 at Drigg and BNFL placed an embargo on consignment of NNPP wastes. Although MoD, and its contractors, have taken action which has resolved much of this difficulty, there are as yet unanswered questions about the impact of the problem on plans for managing ILW at NNPP sites. Formerly, the management strategy was based on "decay-storage" of ILW, some of which, once it became LLW, could be disposed of to Drigg. Decay-storage was feasible as long as only short-lived radionuclides, such as cobalt-60, needed to be considered. The presence of carbon-14, a long-lived radionuclide (half-life of 5,700 years), is likely, therefore, to increase, by a significant degree, the period over which some defence ILW will need to be packaged and contained in store. The Committee believes that MoD's credibility as a waste consignor has inevitably been undermined. Site specific plans for decay storage of ILW need to be reviewed, and amended accordingly, in light of full assessment of the extent of the carbon-14 problem. Extension of NNRP Authorisation to reactor design activities would, the Committee believes, help to prevent the possibility of a similar problem reoccurring.

6.27 Semi-solid ILW arisings are present at the Devonport and Rosyth dockyards. RWMAC found that problems have persisted with the use of short-life storage containers at both sites. The report recommends that current arrangements should be reviewed. Remedial action, to provide more robust management methods for these wastes, needs to be taken.

6.28 In recent years, both Devonport and Rosyth dockyards have experienced difficulties moving spent fuel off-site, mainly because of the non-availability of suitable transport containers. Progress has been made since RWMAC's visits to the two sites in the first half of 2000. In RWMAC's view, the problem (which cannot be laid at the door of the contractors themselves) should not have been allowed to occur, and the report recommends that MoD needs to maintain a more effective overarching interest in this area.

Major issues at AWE

6.29 Since the last report, a new contractor, AWE Management Limited (AWEML), has been appointed to run AWE. The contract was awarded on the basis that MoD would adopt a more arms-length position on delivery of the nuclear weapons programme, with greater risk falling on the contractor. The Committee was concerned that the new arrangements could divert the contractor's attention from the need for good standards of waste management and site remediation to be maintained. As part of the study, RWMAC reviewed the system of performance measures, devised by the IPT, to provide waste management incentives. Although still evolving, these appear to provide, in the Committee's view, the potential for assurance (or otherwise) on the robustness of AWEML's waste management and decommissioning plans. But it is for MoD, as owner of the wastes, to satisfy itself that this is the case.

6.30 As at the dockyards, there are substantial arisings of unconditioned ILW sludges at Aldermaston. The study concluded that this was a problem that required ongoing attention. RWMAC supports AWEML's stated longer-term vision that wastes should not be held on site in unconditioned form for more than three months. In the context of increasing emphasis, supported by the Committee, on passive storage, the Committee would like to see the contractor maintain progress in reducing the amount of unconditioned sludges and liquid wastes at Aldermaston.

6.31 EA is requiring AWE to cease use of the Pangbourne Pipeline, built for the discharge of liquid LLW into the Thames, by 2005. Alternative technologies are being considered. RWMAC believes that the development of new facilities to achieve the required reduction in off-site discharges in the wake of the pipeline closure will be a challenging task which needs to be closely monitored by MoD, in conjunction with EA, to ensure that doses to the public are kept as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA).

6.32 The presence of tritium in groundwater on the Aldermaston site is a matter of significant public concern. To date, it has not been possible for UKAEA to identify its precise source (or sources). In RWMAC's view, UKAEA needs to mount a convincing demonstration that the nature of site radioactive contamination of all kinds is understood, and that plans are in place to achieve, where practicable, significant reductions in its levels, including the presence of tritium.

Depleted uranium

6.33 Test firing of DU projectiles at MoD's Eskmeals firing range has not taken place since 1995, although firing continues at its site at Kirkcudbright. RWMAC found that waste management, radiological protection, and environmental monitoring were carried out to high standards at Eskmeals, the site visited.

6.34 There has been considerable media coverage of the possible health effects from exposure to DU in the environment as a result of its use in projectiles. This issue is outside RWMAC's remit. The Committee recommended, however, that MoD should take steps to characterise fully the composition of all its DU munitions and make the results public. MoD should also consider whether additional information could be placed in the public domain to help reassure the public of the safety of DU test firing in the UK.

References

¹ The Radioactive Waste Management Advisory Committee's Advice to Ministers on the Ministry of Defence's Radioactive Waste Management Practices, Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, July 2001.

² The Radioactive Waste Management Advisory Committee's Advice to Ministers on the Ministry of Defence's Arrangements for Dealing with Radioactively Contaminated Land, Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions, August 2000.

³ Statement by the Secretary of State for Defence, Geoffrey Hoon MP, on 7 July 2000.

⁴ The Radioactive Waste Management Advisory Committee's Advice to Ministers on the Process for Formulation of Future Policy for the Long Term Management of UK Solid Radioactive Waste, Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, September 2001.