Hunting Hearings - Minutes of Proceedings
DEPARTMENT FOR ENVIRONMENT, FOOD AND RURAL AFFAIRS
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS
at a
PUBLIC HEARING
on
HUNTING WITH DOGS
held in the
Boothroyd Room, Portcullis House, Westminster, SW1
on
Tuesday 10 September 2002
SESSION A
DAY 2
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Rt Hon Alun Michael, MP, in the Chair
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(From the Shorthand Notes of:
W B GURNEY & SONS LLP
Westminster House
7 Millbank
London, SW1P 3JA)
In attendance:
MR DOUGLAS BATCHELOR, Campaign for the Protection of Hunted Animals.
DR ARTHUR LINDLEY, Campaign for the Protection of Hunted Animals.
MR JOHN ROLLS, Campaign for the Protection of Hunted Animals.
BARONESS GOLDING, Middle Way Group.
MR PETER LUFF, MP, Middle Way Group.
MR LEMBIT OPIK, MP, Middle Way Group.
MR SIMON HART, Countryside Alliance.
MR JOHN JACKSON, Countryside Alliance.
MR RICHARD LISSACK, QC, Countryside Alliance.
MR BERNARD BENNETT-DIVER, Defra
MR CHRISTOPHER BRAUN, Defra.
MR NIGEL LEFTON, Legal Directorate, Defra.
MR DAVID PRITCHARD, Defra
MR NICHOLAS ROBSON, Defra
DR PETER ROBERTSON, Defra.
DR MATT HEYDON
THE CHAIRMAN: Good morning. I am very pleased to welcome everybody to the second day of the hearings of evidence in relation to hunting with dogs.
Before I go any further, can I ask everybody to examine their mobile phones and make sure they are switched off, so that we do not have any further disturbance, which we did yesterday despite the warning at the beginning of the meeting.
Could I recap on what I said at the beginning of the hearing yesterday. The purpose of these three days is to hear evidence on the principles of preventing cruelty while recognising the utility and how those principles can be applied in practice. This forms an important part of the ongoing process of consultation and discussion which I announced to the House of Commons on 21 March.
The panel on my right comprises representatives of the Campaign for the Protection of Hunted Animals, the Countryside Alliances' Campaign for Hunting, and the Middle Way Group. We will hear evidence again today from a number of expert witnesses, who will tell us about their conclusions and then respond to questions from the panel.
Yesterday we heard evidence on the principle of utility, essentially seeking help on the question of what is needful in the countryside; does hunting serve useful purposes? The theme of today's sessions is the issue of cruelty and the principle of avoiding suffering. Each of the expert witnesses have produced a short paper which will be available outside the door at the end of the relevant session.
Can I again offer an invitation to people who are here as members of the public to make any comments they wish to do by recording them on the comment sheet provided in your information pack. I have given an undertaking that I will read all comments provided after the hearings have concluded.
We also asked everybody who is involved to observe the normal parliamentary conventions. Firstly, that we do not have comments, either from members of the public or from members of the panel or witnesses. We seek to hear what each individual has to say with respect. I have discussed with the representatives of the three groups the way in which questioning will go. Helpfully, I think we have a common view, and there will be an attempt to avoid long questions, to avoid leading questions and to avoid contentious questions. It is possible to encourage discussion and exploring of the issues and to be challenging without polarising the discussions. Polarisation is something we want to leave outside of the playground. With no more ado, can we move forward.
I am very pleased to welcome to this first session - where we are going to be covering the topic of defining cruelty, suffering and compromising animal welfare - three people: Professor David Morton, who is Head of the Centre for Biomedical Ethics, and Director of the Biomedical Services Union of Birmingham University; the Reverend Professor Andrew Linzey, Member of the Faculty of Theology at Oxford University, who holds the B Jarrett Senior Research Fellowship for Ethics, Theology and Animal Welfare at Blackfriars Hall; and Professor John Webster, Professor of Animal Husbandry at Bristol University, who has undertaken work on stress psychology, animal behaviour and animal welfare. Can I ask Professor David Morton to open.
PROFESSOR MORTON: I come to it from a slightly different perspective. I am a laboratory animal vet, and I have been doing that for 30 years, and so have been looking after the welfare of laboratory animals for that time. That has probably involved hundreds of thousands of different animals and many different species. In that area we are particularly concerned about fear over everything else, because that is what I commonly see in animals that I care for; but there is also pain, anxiety and mental distress, and those together can be incorporated as something we might refer to as "animal suffering".
We were asked to define cruelty. Cruelty in my mind might be to knowingly cause animals to suffer. In animal research that is offset by the benefits that we think may come from animal research. It is up to other parts of this meeting to decide what the benefits are, I think, to balance off any harms that are caused.
We do have a concept of avoidable suffering and that is, we see some suffering as being necessary to achieve the end; but if you do more than that you are causing suffering that is not necessary or, I would term, is avoidable. That is coming into more European laws, because it is a useful concept. That is something which looks at the alternatives. If you can achieve an end by causing less suffering using one way rather than another, then a humane society I think is one which would choose that which causes least suffering.
The definition of suffering is one that is a generic term, it covers mental distress, which encompasses fear, anxiety and so on. There are some helpful international regulations defining that. In most of the laws that control research there is often some reference to suffering and its definition. The OECD, for example, says that if something is likely to cause suffering in humans it should be assumed to cause suffering in animals. I believe that is a humane approach for a civilised society.
When does suffering occur in the context of what we are talking about today? I think it can occur in terms of the chase, because an animal has various responses to a threat. It can try to run away; it may try and hide - those are the two common ones; but if it is unable to escape the predators or pursuers then there is going to come a time when that fear or anxiety which started when it tried to escape in the first place will probably turn to fear and even to terror. With a fox that is being holed up and its normal escape routes have been blocked, a trapped animal may well be having thoughts that we consider to be reflecting those of fear. I want to say, I think self-awareness - an animal being aware of itself and its situation - is not unique to humans. It is better developed in humans, but I do not believe that animals do not have it at all. They have to cope environmentally with a range of situations, and that is the way in which they can do it.
There is also the pain that is caused by an animal not being killed instantaneously. The killing of a fox or hare may be quick but it is not instantaneous. When an animal is shot and wounded and not killed instantaneously then that too can be painful. An animal may recover slowly, quickly or, indeed, may die in considerable pain, depending where it has been hit.
There is another principle and that is of critical anthropomorphism, which is really what the OECD definition was referring to. It seems to me it is unlikely that humans are very different from animals. I want to give two pieces of evidence for that.
One is that there is an overwhelming similarity in our anatomies and physiology and the way we respond to drugs, which suggests that foxes, dogs, humans and, indeed, rats and other mammals respond very, very similarly and have the same apparatus to respond in that way. With Darwinian evolution you would expect that to be the case.
The second point is, our research on animals has shown that when we develop drugs for suffering in humans, for example to relieve fear, anxiety or pain, they work extremely well in humans; indeed, those drugs then go on to be used in veterinary practice and work extremely well in veterinary practice. If you like, it is a two-way street. If we are saying animals can be good models for humans and those drugs developed in animals work well with humans, then it is only right that we should reverse that and say that it is likely animals have similar experiences to humans as well.
Finally, there is the precautionary principle which would state that if we are unsure about something then we should err on the side of causing less harm rather than more harm. When we do not know whether animals suffer or not in a particular situation then it is probably better to avoid that situation and assume that they do, rather than assume that they do not. If we assume they do not suffer and it turns out they do, then we have caused more harm that could have been avoided.
That is probably all I want to say at the moment.
THE CHAIRMAN: That is very helpful. Thank you very much indeed. Can I turn to Professor Andrew Linzey.
REVEREND PROFESSOR LINZEY: Good morning. We know the putative justifications. We are told that the sport is popular and has existed for 500 years or more; that it is a wholesome amusement, and a commendable employment; that those who participate are by no means intentionally cruel; that it is actually of benefit to the animals themselves, who enjoy the opportunity to demonstrate their physical prowess; The training and breeding of dogs, not to mention their future, will be at stake; That if we ban this sport we shall be logically required to give up other sports, such as horse racing. That it is class interest, not true morality, which motivates the objectors; That it is subversive fanatics which propose the ban, and especially that such paltry considerations of cruelty are "unworthy of the legislature of a great nation".
The sport in question is, of course, bull baiting. The arguments I have just cited are taken directly from parliamentary debates in 1800 and 1802. We know the arguments because, 200 years later, they are (with only minor modifications) the same arguments used to defend hunting with dogs. It took 35 years and ten parliamentary bills before bull baiting was finally abolished in 1835.
It is important to understand that the sensitivity to bulls, cocks, foxes and the rest has strong rational foundations. It arises inter alia from an awareness that there are considerations that are purely only relevant to animals and also to some vulnerable human subjects.
For example, animals cannot give or withhold their consent. They cannot represent or verbalise their own interests. Animals, strictly speaking, are morally innocent. Animals are almost entirely vulnerable and defenceless in relation to human beings.
The key point to note is that these considerations make the infliction of suffering and death upon animals not easier but harder to justify. Animals cannot merit or justify suffering. When examined impartially we can see that they reinforce the case for treating animals with special moral solicitude.
Hunting offends two almost universally accepted moral principles. The first is that it is intrinsically wrong to deliberately inflict suffering on the sentient mammal for purposes other than its own individual benefit, for example, in a veterinary operation. There is ample scientific evidence in peer review journals that mammals experience not just physical pain but the whole gamut of suffering - prolonged stress, terror, shock anxiety, fear, foreboding, trauma, and that only to a greater or lesser degree than we do ourselves.
The second principle is that it is intrinsically wrong to deliberately cause suffering for the purposes of amusement, recreation or in the name of sport. It is sometimes argued that not all hunters enjoy the pursuit of their quarry, and that may well be true: but that hunters are involved in the collective activity that has the definite and deliberate aim of harrying a living creature to its death (which in the process causes suffering) is, I contend, indisputable.
It is sometimes argued that hunters simply imitate the cruelties of nature; but this view is, I think, simply based on a misunderstanding of the nature of moral actions. Animals are not moral agents and are, therefore, not responsible for their actions; whereas human beings are both.
There is a fundamental distinction between the accidental or non-intentional harming of animals or humans, for example by an earthquake, and the deliberate intentional infliction of harm by moral agents.
Since morality concerns both motivation as well as consequences, I have to say that there is something especially abhorrent about the enjoyment, directly or indirectly, of suffering to sentient creatures. Not only is such enjoyment a reprehensible moral trait in itself, but it is also potentially or actually socially harmful. There is now an accumulating amount of evidence linking violence and abuse of animals to other forms of violence and abuse.
As one recent authoritative work maintains: "Violence directed against animals is often a coercion device and an early indicator of violence that may escalate in range and severity against other victims".
This does not mean that all hunters, any more than any animal abusers, will necessarily go on to perpetuate anti-social behaviour - but that there is a link between one form of violence and another is increasingly difficult to deny. A world in which cruelty to animals goes unchecked is bound to be a less safe world for human beings.
We are in a mess when it comes to our treatment of animals. Much that we now do to them is ethically objectionable. Reasonable, people may reasonably disagree about where we should draw the line, but cruelty - and especially the making of cruelty as sport - is the absolute bottom line.
It is not for the Burns Committee - who did not examine, after all, the moral issues - but it is for Parliament to decide in 2002 (no less than it did in 1835) what moral limits a civilised society should observe.
Finally, I have to say this. The cruelty involved in hunting, I contend, is in a moral class of its own - a class of always morally impermissible acts towards those least able to defend themselves. It cannot be reformed or made moral, any more than rape, torture or child abuse can be made moral or humane. All the amelioration in the world cannot remove this fundamental moral offence. There may be political fudges, but there can be no moral middle way.
THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much. Professor John Webster, please.
PROFESSOR WEBSTER: I have a Powerpoint presentation of my brief address.
I have been asked to define cruelty, suffering and compromising animal welfare, and the principles apply to all sentient animals. In order to do that it is, first of all, necessary to define welfare. Welfare is conventionally defined by the physical and mental state of the sentient animal as it copes with the stresses of life.
When the animal is both fit and happy, welfare is good; when the animal has difficulty in coping, welfare is compromised; when the animal fails to cope, welfare is bad; and when the animal is dead it is no longer a welfare problem.
The next inescapable fact of life is that, within the farmed environment of the British countryside, man has dominion over all other sentient life forms, whether we like it or not and, therefore, must assume responsibility for all sentient creatures, not just at the point of death but, in fact, throughout their lives. To give expression to that responsibility, we have a responsibility to promote the sustained fitness and psychological well-being, i.e. good welfare, for most of the animals (not just the quarry species), most of the time.
The next objective, of course, is to minimise the extent and duration of suffering by any means. That includes death by a human hand, or death by disease or any other hand. That responsibility, therefore, must consider all the following elements: the provision of suitable habitat; seeking to ensure a healthy population with a low prevalence of disease; and also the principle of least suffering in the matter of population control.
That leads me to my definition of suffering. It is, first of all, important to make the point that stress and suffering are not synonymous. Stress is a fact of life for all of us, as is suffering. Suffering is defined by the difficulty or failure in coping with the stresses of life, and these may be analysed into the physical elements of suffering - hunger, thirst, pain, malaise, (the sense of being ill) and exhaustion; and mental suffering - such as fear, anxiety and helplessness. All of these must be considered.
Because zero suffering is not an option for any of us, in reviewing this we must also have some measure of severity of suffering. It is absolutely proper that we should consider individuals. It is equally proper that we should consider populations of individuals. The severity of suffering for an individual must be measured by the intensity of suffering and its duration. How one multiplies these two element is debatable, but one must consider both.
In the case of population it is the intensity of duration for the individuals multiplied by the incidence of suffering in the population. These are definitions which I think should be used later when we come to specific hunting practices.
Cruelty, therefore, by law is defined as "to cause unnecessary suffering by doing, or omitting to do, any act". This, in law, does not apply to all sentient animal species but, in justice, it should. It is defined by our actions or neglect to any sentient animal. It is not just what we do, but the things we leave undone. It is also (and this is most important) defined by the sentience of the animal itself, not by its utility or attraction to man. That is to say, our responsibility to promote good welfare, and the principle of least suffering applies equally to the fox, dog or rat in a moral sense.
The application of this principle of least suffering is, therefore, that one should seek to minimise (and one cannot eliminate death and, therefore, the suffering associated with death) acute suffering at the time immediately prior to death; extended suffering, for example during a long hunt (fear and exhaustion in the rather longer period prior to death); and, equally important, and in the sense of duration more important, the chronic suffering from hunger, disease etc throughout the life of the species.
Therefore, the questions we will discuss under specific hunting practices later in the day (I believe in rational analysis) must address these issues: do the specific hunting practices involve more suffering than alternative methods for population control, which of course include neglect and just letting the animals die, for not just quarry species but - first of all, obviously the quarry species, those that are hunted and killed - also the quarry animals that are not killed, maybe have escaped, and those who have escaped and are wounded; and, equally, for other life in the countryside which may be affected by the population of the quarry species, i.e. ground-nesting birds.
It is my position that all these factors must be considered within a proper evaluation of suffering and cruelty. It follows from this that I believe it is actually not wrong but morally inadequate to consider hunting with dogs only in terms of the method used to kill the quarry species, but that the whole policy should be based on the principle of respect for all sentient life at all times.
THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much indeed. We have had the contributions from our three witnesses. Can we therefore start with questions.
MR JACKSON: If Professor Webster is right in saying that zero suffering is not an option for any of us, and Professor Morton, in his version of the precautionary principle, says one should not carry out those actions which might cause animals to suffer, it suggests very strongly that one can do absolutely no form of wildlife banishment which involves the maintenance or reduction of the population by the killing of animals.
Leading on, so far as the precaution principle is concerned, which started in the world of the environment, surely it would be absolutely wrong to apply it in a way which itself caused irreversible damage, ie the destruction of hundreds of packs of hounds, and the destruction for many rural communities of something which is socially and culturally viable, important and (we heard yesterday from one witness in his judgment) frightfully reflected.
THE CHAIRMAN: Can I make the point that some questions may be directed to individual experts, some may be addressed generally; if it is addressed to an individual expert then we will invite the others to comment as well, so it is a discussion involving all of us rather than simply cross-examination of witnesses. Were you directing that generally?
MR JACKSON: Yes, we would like to hear the panel discuss it.
PROFESSOR WEBSTER: The point I am making (and I am not going to get involved with the welfare of hound packs because if they are dead that is the end of their part) is that doing nothing is not an option. Therefore, we cannot consider the killing of the quarry species in isolation; we have to consider it in context with alternative methods of population control - and neglect runs the risk of being the cruellest of all forms of population control.
REVEREND PROFESSOR LINZEY: I do not have any comment to make.
PROFESSOR MORTON: I think in a sense you are right. When you are looking at harms and benefits you have to take the broader issues into account to know we are not dissenting from that at all. My concern is that I think chasing an animal is going to cause fear and mental distress on the part of that animal, and I do not see that that is at all avoidable.
I think that shooting itself has its downside, and sometimes that can go wrong. The question is: can we ensure that shooting is made more efficient and more effective so that, in fact, we do get clean kills. I understand there are figures from some Scottish estates which looked at over five years of shooting foxes and found that 99 per cent were shot with the first shot, 95 per cent with the second shot, and the remaining I am not sure what happened to.
It does seem to me this is where the debate is lying about where we cause least harm in order to achieve a certain end. I think with hunting with hounds there is a certain harm, which is the fear of the chase which we cannot get away from. I think with shooting there is the option of training people so that it is done more efficiently, more effectively. In my view, that may be a preferable option for some species.
I think there are other options, for example for mink, where we might trap them. For deer, again, stalking may be better. For foxes shooting may be better. I think I concur with the Burns Report, who considered that lamping and shooting with a rifle might be preferable to hunting.
MR JACKSON: You refer to the fear of the chase. You also talk in the introductory paragraph of your paper and use the word "might", which suggests that, in fact, there is a significant lack of evidence.
Have you got any hard evidence at all that the chase itself causes the pursued animal to experience fear?
PROFESSOR MORTON: I think this is where the nub of animal welfare gets tough. What we are looking at is how animals think, and how do we tell that? In humans we ask them. We have a problem with babies; we have a problem with children who do not talk; and then we infer suffering from their behaviour. In the same way we infer that from animals' behaviour. If they show an escape response or a fear response then I am prepared to go down that road and say that is good evidence in my view that the animal is experiencing fear. After all, that is why it is trying to run away and escape from what it sees as a threat.
MR HART: You mentioned trapping and referred to your concerns over animals trapped underground. Yesterday we were discussing trapping as an alternative method to hunting. Are your concerns general as far as the trapping of wild animals as a method of control is concerned?
PROFESSOR MORTON: No, I think I would like to differentiate between the verb "to be trapped" underground when a fox goes to somewhere that it knows and cannot escape because it has been blocked up and then terriers are put down to try and get the fox to bolt, kill the cubs or what-have-you. I think there is an issue.
Then there is the box trapping of something like mink. I have seen that done because I was a fur farm inspector for several years. There it seems to me that the animals will go into that trap quite voluntarily and stay there until they are shot or until they are killed in some way or another.
MR JACKSON: It might be helpful if Professor Webster could comment on the question of fear of the chase.
PROFESSOR WEBSTER: I would rather do that in the next session on the basis of evidence. In the absence of the evidence my comments would not have the same weight.
MR ROLLS: If I could ask Professor Morton first. You establish in your first paragraph the principle of precaution, and you also say that it is recognised in international law in principle. Are you saying therefore that, in your estimation, there is sufficient evidence to justify an immediate action to ban deer, fox, hare and mink hunting with dogs if this principle is used?
PROFESSOR MORTON: Yes.
REVEREND PROFESSOR LINZEY: I do not fundamentally disagree at all with Professor Morton's analysis. I would slightly disagree about over his definition of cruelty because I think the problem with knowingly doing something is philosophically problematic. Otherwise, I agree entirely with his analysis. I think there is every reasonable grounds for supposing that animals, when they are pursued over long distances for prolonged periods of time, experience fear. I do not think this is contentious in any way whatsoever. I think there is a great deal of evidence to support that.
PROFESSOR WEBSTER: The simple answer is, no. I would add, I am not here to seek to preserve the status quo. My objective is to seek constructive ways to improve the quality of life for all sentient life in the countryside throughout much, if not all, of their lives.
REVEREND PROFESSOR LINZEY: May I ask a question of Professor Webster. In your book Animal Welfare you say that: "The genetic similarity between the dog and the fox is so close that we must assume that they have a similar capacity to suffer fear, pain and exhaustion. It is thus no more or less cruel to hunt the fox than it would be to hunt a dog".
Also, in relation to deer hunting you say: "The prolonged chase of an individual deer is usually unnecessary and will undoubtedly cause the animal to suffer. It is, therefore, unnecessarily cruel, and if the deer were a domestic animal it would be criminal.
"As I write, the National Trust are agonising, once again, as to whether they should permit deer hunting on their property. This involves setting up a working party to ascertain whether it is cruel. Of course it is cruel!"
I am not quite sure how these statements can be reconciled with the statement I just heard from you.
PROFESSOR WEBSTER: First of all, I agree with myself, as I usually do!
The second point is, I made the equation between the dog and the fox already today but I included the rat within the equation, which is essential; and we accept that we have to have population control.
Thirdly, I am not here to defend the status quo. In section 2 I will address those elements of deer hunting which I do believe are causing unnecessary suffering, which I believe could be modified.
PROFESSOR MORTON: Could I just come back briefly. My rather monosyllabic comment probably deserves to be broadened out.
There is some evidence which shows that heart rate goes up and various hormone levels go up in animals which are chased, and they do not go up as high if the animal takes exercise by hunting for itself. We are talking about a quantitative difference.
It does seem to me that all the physiology and behaviour results you get in the world will not answer the question of whether an animal experiences fear or not. I have this sort of dread of going into a hospital and the doctor saying to me, "Well, Morton, you're not in pain, your enzyme levels aren't high enough". I am saying, "Yes, I am". It seems to me that we are in a similar situation there.
Because foxes are very different in some ways to humans, in that they cannot talk to us, all we can do, as with babies and children, is infer from their behaviour what they are actually feeling.
DR LINDLEY: Professor Webster, I think you say we have a moral responsibility to all wild animals - those that are under our influence and those that are not. Whereas Professor Linzey, I think, was suggesting that there is a moral difference. Where we have a moral responsibility is to those animals who, by our actions, we adversely affect; but we do not have the same moral responsibility for the others.
I am concerned, if we do have this moral responsibility for everything, that all the garden birds in autumn should be killed because otherwise they are going to suffer during the winter. I am struggling to understand the difference between those.
REVEREND PROFESSOR LINZEY: I agree with Professor Webster, at least with what he said in his book, that our prior obligation is to leave wild animals well alone. I do not accept we have an obligation to police nature. We have an obligation, I think, to leave them alone as far as possible, except when our own previous interferences cause problems. We have an obligation to leave them alone and to disrupt their lives as little as possible.
I would make a wider moral point, if I may, and hope that this might be heard. We have exploited wild animals for so long, we have taken so much from them (if you forgive what may be regarded as a morally quaint notion) I do think we should exercise moral generosity to animals, at the very least to remove those intrusions which definitely cause suffering.
How we see ourselves in the world is at the very heart of this. I just simply make the case for moral generosity. We have taken so much from animals we can afford to remove, at the very least, those intrusions of the natural world that, on any reasonable analysis, cause suffering.
PROFESSOR MORTON: I have no comment to make.
MR OPIK: Firstly, with Professor Webster and Professor Stephen Harris in the same university you must have very interesting staffroom discussions!
Secondly, I was hoping to ask one question of Professor Morton. You will presumably be aware of Susan Greenfield, a neuroscientist, who says: "Animals probably do not express anxiety or experience anxiety because there is an adaptive value to not experiencing anxiety about the future because, rather than worrying, they should be running away". What is your view?
PROFESSOR MORTON: There is a definition of anxiety which states that it is fear of the unknown, whereas fear is something of the known and we have not been using it in that way.
I think there is a natural arousal of animals when they perceive a threat, and they then respond to that threat by running away. I think we could call that anxiety.
Indeed, there are models in animal research where animals are made anxious and they have developed drugs such as Valium which work well in humans to help people with anxiety and panic. On that basis I would say it is a two-way street, that animals do - but might call it arousal rather than anxiety.
There is a second point which is quite interesting. If a fox is caught in a trap and a wolf appears on the horizon, what does that animal feel? Does it look into the future and say, "I'd better get the hell out of here because otherwise I'm going to be eaten by the wolf"? Or what does it do? In a way one can look at the behaviour of these animals, and if the animal does escape then what happens is that it goes off and it will probably go somewhere to retreat and hide in a cave, or something like that; then it goes to the front of the cave to look out. If you look at animals, they often like to get to a place where they can observe other things. If you say, "What is going on in their mind? Why do they go to the front of the cave and not to the back of the cave? Is it because they see that as a way of getting escaping more threats?" I believe animals are self-reliant and can look into the future to a limited extent.
MR OPIK: I want to ask a few questions of Professor Linzey. Let us remember that this section is not about whether we ban animals or not, it is about definition. That is really what I would like to pursue.
It seems, Professor Linzey, that at the heart of your evidence is the bullet point which covers your definition of the two moral principles at the heart of this. One is that it is wrong to inflict suffering on the sentient being for purposes other than its own individual benefit. Secondly, that it is intrinsically wrong to deliberately cause suffering for the purposes of amusement, recreation or in the name of sport. Would you agree that those really form the core of the position you have outlined; that those are the two principles?
REVEREND PROFESSOR LINZEY: Those are the two principles I would advance. I think they are minimal principles. If I may say so, principles do not arrive out of nothing; they arrive out of the context of moral reasoning. I have also tried to give some rational basis for coming to those conclusions. One of the weaknesses, if I may say so, of the Burns Report is that it comes too quickly to issues of animal welfare without understanding the history and sociology of the movement of animal protection and how those principles emerged. Therefore, without that slice, one is at a profound disadvantage at trying to understand why there is a moral issue at all.
MR OPIK: First of all, I am sure you would agree that not everyone would necessarily take those principles on board. Let us examine what happens if one does.
What would be your view towards the ownership of cats according to those two principles?
REVEREND PROFESSOR LINZEY: I have two cats, as it so happens. I have not chosen them; they chose me. They were neglected and abandoned and, yes, I have two cats and I look after them.
MR OPIK: Those cats, as you know, could cause unnecessary suffering in your garden. Hundreds of millions of animals are killed by cats. Pursuing your own principles, is it not the case that you could reduce the suffering in the countryside by not having cats?
REVEREND PROFESSOR LINZEY: I think that is based on mental confusion. Let me try and explain why.
If I go into my garden and catch a bird and kill it and eat it I am morally responsible. I have an obligation not to do so. I do not have to live on birds. I have freedom, therefore I am morally culpable. It is a volitional act that is subject to censure. A cat is not a moral agent and I am not responsible for it, unless I have trained it to do so (and in the case of my two cats I can assure you I have trained them to do nothing). A cat is not a moral agent, there is not freedom and, therefore, it is not morally responsible. Therefore, imputing blame or moral innocence is inappropriate.
It is therefore inappropriate, as an analogy for the entire hunting debate, to talk about the actions of non-moral beings as a basis for guiding the actions of moral beings.
MR OPIK: This is an interesting response. These two principles are quite clear. I am not sure why you feel that you are not deliberately, say, conflicting suffering on sentient beings, in other words the animals in your garden, by having cats. We know that cats pursue animals in the garden. There is no absolute reason why any of us need to have cats.
REVEREND PROFESSOR LINZEY: I do not think I am morally responsible for the activity of my cats. I do not think that nature constitutes a moral paradigm. To put it crudely, bunny rabbits do not have wedding ceremonies, but that is no reason why we should not.
I am not persuaded that natural analogies are appropriate for the superior species. Neither am I persuaded that we have a moral obligation to police nature.
MR OPIK: Thank you for that. I think I have made my point and you have made yours. We can draw our conclusion.
Lastly, whatever you think about the ownership of cats, where do you stand, for example, on competition angling and shooting? I am seeking to understand the definition and not trying to embark on a long debate about this.
THE CHAIRMAN: To be absolutely clear - I am not going to rule the question out but I would make the point that the issue that these hearings are about is absolutely hunting with dogs and not angling.
MR OPIK: Once again, I am just trying to understand, by this definition, would it be necessary to not pursue competition angling and shooting - by those two principles?
REVEREND PROFESSOR LINZEY: Two issues -----
MR OPIK: I was looking for a yes or no, actually!
REVEREND PROFESSOR LINZEY: I will give you the answer you want - and then let me explain. I am opposed to angling for sport. However, I do accept that in the case of fish, the case that they can suffer is less strong then in the case of mammals. I am not an expert in this field, I simply look at the literature, which certainly suggests that fish, most or some fish, feel pain and fear but whether they suffer, in the sense of experiencing gamut of suffering - anxiety, shock, trauma and so on - is somewhat more contentious.
Yes, I am against angling for sport. Clearly, it could not be banned until it was the view of the population as a whole, or at least the majority of it. I do think that it is morally problematic to go angling for sport. However, I have to accept the caveat that the case is less strong in the case of fish than in the case of mammals.
MR OPIK: And for shooting?
REVEREND PROFESSOR LINZEY: Shooting requires some focussing on. The aim of shooting I take to be to destroy - as far as possible, almost instantaneously – or at least - that should be its aim. The aim is not to wound. It is possible to have a clean kill, as it is called - an unfortunate phrase but it has power. It is possible to render the bird almost entirely instantaneously dead. Shooting is not subject to the problem of the pain and fear of the chase. I do accept, of course, that some animals are wounded. The important thing morally is the aim of shooting is instantaneous destruction. Whereas in hunting that cannot be the case. Unless you give hounds rubber teeth and stop the animals from running away, there is an inevitable element of cruelty.
THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much. I allowed the question because I do not want to rule any exploration of these issues, but I do want to repeat that this is a hearing of the issue of hunting with dogs and not of other issues, although it may illuminate the way we look at hunting with dogs.
I also said, although questions may be clearly focussed on one witness, I shall ask the other witnesses whether they wish to comment. Can I do that on this issue. Professor Morton?
PROFESSOR WEBSTER: No.
PROFESSOR MORTON: No, I do not think so.
THE CHAIRMAN: Can I go to John?
MR JACKSON: To continue with Professor Linzey, if we may, Minister, Professor Webster explained to us what he meant when he said that zero suffering was not an option and he also said very clearly that doing nothing was not an option. You, Professor Linzey, say that it is intrinsically wrong to inflict deliberate suffering on a sentient being for purposes other than its own individual benefit. That implies, does it not, that so far as the management of wild animals by human beings is concerned, killing by whatsoever means is ruled out?
THE REVEREND PROFESSOR LINZEY: No, it does not. I have not committed myself to that principle. I am sorry if that was your reading. The principles that I have advanced in this paper specifically relate to suffering; not all killing involves suffering. Indeed, not all killing involves pain. Indeed, under law animals are required to be rendered insensible to pain before slaughter. You cannot say all killing, willy-nilly, involves suffering. My position in this paper is solely focused on suffering. I entirely accept that killing is a moral question that needs to be looked at and assessed, but that is not the question I address in my paper.
MR JACKSON: To be very practical about it, are you actually saying that what Professor Webster has said in relation to the management of wild animals is wrong?
THE REVEREND PROFESSOR LINZEY: I am sorry, I do not want to appear choosy, but could you amplify that?
THE CHAIRMAN: Can you try the question again, John?
MR JACKSON: What I was trying to tease out is if, in respect of the management of wild animals, zero suffering is not an option, including doing nothing, I asked you the question, if having regards to your view of the duty on humans to animals, does it follow that therefore you could not kill wild animals in the course of managing them? Your answer to that gives rise, I think, to the perfectly legitimate question: are you saying that Professor Webster is wrong when he says that when killing wild animals for the purpose of management, zero suffering is not an option?
THE REVEREND PROFESSOR LINZEY: I am doing my very best to focus on the question, I promise you, and I am not trying to be obtuse or opaque, I assure you. Zero suffering, if I understand the concept at all, Professor Webster, has advanced is not possible for either animals or human beings. That does not, however, justify deliberate acts of cruelty to any human being or unnecessary killing. It is like saying life is painful, therefore we can justify more pain. Help me here, perhaps I have not got the argument. Morality concerns what moral agents do. I am not responsible for what lions do when they kill gazelles.
PROFESSOR WEBSTER: If I may just restate what I said, I believe that the management of life in the new British countryside should be based upon the principle of least suffering throughout life. I think the Reverend Linzey would probably agree with that.
THE REVEREND PROFESSOR LINZEY: Yes, I would, except I do not believe that we have some kind of overarching obligation to police nature, to arrange it so that it causes, as it were, from our point of view, least suffering. I think human beings are directly and logically responsible for what human beings do. I do not feel an obligation to interfere when a lion is about to disembowel a gazelle. I do not like it, it offends my sensibilities, but I do not feel a sense of moral obligation to intervene, nor would I.
THE CHAIRMAN: Can we just pursue this a little bit, because I am not sure whether I have understood the question that John was posing. If we move away from the example of a lion and a gazelle and look at a different example - for instance we were discussing utility yesterday. If it is accepted that the management of, let us say, a deer herd requires a certain amount of culling of numbers in order, the argument would be (a), on the one hand, so that they do not cause too much nuisance and, on the other hand, to allow the general health of the herd - that is the utility issue we were discussing yesterday - if it is accepted that that is something reasonable, that is an interference in one sense. Would you like to use that example, perhaps, in answering John's question?
THE REVEREND PROFESSOR LINZEY: That phrase "general health" would need to be unpacked, I think. Beauty, like pests, is in the eye of the beholder. General health is also in the eye of the human beholder. The problem with all utilitarian calculus is - who is going to decide the calculus?. General health. Forgive me, Minister, I am not being opaque but if you are saying: "Here is a diseased animal", directly within your purview, is it a morally preferable option, even allowing investors in the situation, to shoot it rather than let it go on suffering?” then I think there is a very strong case for that. However, general health is something that would need to be eked out a great deal more. One of the deficiencies of the Burns Report is that it speaks in these moral generalities without getting down to specifics.
MR JACKSON: If I could pursue this, because it is touching on the relationship between human beings and animals, particularly wild animals. Of course there was an interesting discussion yesterday about habitat and utility. It became clear and everybody, I think, agreed, that habitat - particularly in a country like ours - is occupied by human beings as well as wild animals, and human beings will relate to those wild animals, particularly if they believe they will cause them damage in a way which reflects their particular interests. Are you saying that is wrong - morally wrong?
THE REVEREND PROFESSOR LINZEY: To preserve habitat per se?
MR JACKSON: No, for human beings, sharing habitat with wild animals which they perceive to be causing them damage, to react to that in a way which suits their interests?
THE CHAIRMAN: It is a rather long question, and I am not sure I understand it. I do not want to be unfair to our witnesses.
THE REVEREND PROFESSOR LINZEY: Let me try to clarify. No, I do not think there is anything morally praiseworthy about preserving the species or the habitat of the species one wants to hunt for sport - if that is the point you are trying to make. My point is that even in utilitarian terms the infliction of suffering upon sentient creatures does require strong moral justification.
PROFESSOR MORTON: Can I just make a comment? As somebody who was brought up in the countryside, I think that humans have to live by the side of animals, there is a interdependence there and we have to be careful what we do. When we have labelling of certain species of animals as pests or vermin it does remind me of certain wars between humans when you label one side derogatorily compared to the other. I think we have got to beware of that, because foxes, for example, can be blamed for doing things that they might not have done or, indeed, that other animals might do in the same situation. I think there are rogue foxes and I think they have to be killed. So I think there is an issue there of saying: "There are times when diseased animals have to be killed and rogue animals have to be killed, for some reason or another" and I would like that to be done in the best possible way - the way that causes least suffering.
However, if you want to control populations - and there is a debate there about whether we should do it - I am rather saddened that we have not gone down the road too far of looking at the use of contraceptive baits, as they have done in Melbourne. Indeed, we know that baiting foxes in northern Europe with rabies vaccine has worked extremely well. We know that in Melbourne where they have put down some of the contraceptive baits that controlled the fox population. That is a very humane way of controlling the population that does not involve a lot of suffering on behalf of the animals being chased or, indeed, their dependents. I may be wrong and this may have come up yesterday or it may be coming up tomorrow, but I would like to see it debated. It is the next session, is it? Okay. I am sorry, I am jumping the gun.
THE CHAIRMAN: Professor Webster, would you like to add anything?
PROFESSOR WEBSTER: Only one example: that if, for example, it could be shown, and it has not been shown, that the hunting community through their stewardship of the environment was significantly reducing the prevalence of mange in the fox population, then I believe irrespective of the moral status of the humans involved the overall welfare of the fox population would be radically improved.
THE REVEREND PROFESSOR LINZEY: Can I just add to that, I am not aware of any evidence of that.
PROFESSOR WEBSTER: I did not say there was.
DR LINDLEY: Chairman, I think we would like to bring you back to the issues where the contention is - the guiding principles. Professor Morton has specifically mentioned, and stressed I think, the importance of fear in his presentation. Professor Webster also mentioned fear and anxiety, but did also include a reference in his submission to the concept of coping, and if an animal can cope then it is not a problem. Is that really saying that if an animal experiences fear but can cope with it, then that is not a problem and we do not have to worry about it? If you are chased by a bull in a field and you can cope with it by running and getting out of the gate, that is not a problem. Is that the suggestion?
PROFESSOR WEBSTER: Constructive fear is a very effective mechanism for survival. The zebra that escapes from the lion or maintains a discreet distance from the lion is doing the same thing as we would do staying on the pavement when a fast car is in the street. We are aware of our fear of the lion and can take constructive action. Suffering occurs when that mechanism no longer works. I do not want to get ahead of myself, but if the evidence is that only ten per cent of those foxes roused are killed above ground, that means the fox has a ten-to-one expectation that it is going to get away. I will come back to that later.
DR LINLEY: As you say, we will come back to that in another session. So it may be an effective mechanism for achieving survival, but what we are talking about, I thought, here was whether it causes distress and suffering. It may be effective ----
PROFESSOR WEBSTER: My argument is the difference between stress and suffering. Fear is an absolutely vital mechanism for a sentient animal, in the nature of survival. That is a stress. The animal begins to suffer when it becomes aware that its coping mechanisms are failing - it is having difficulty in coping or failing to cope. At that point, I believe fear moves to suffering.
THE CHAIRMAN: That is the point at which the bull starts to catch up with you?
PROFESSOR WEBSTER: When the bull starts to catch up or one has run to the point of exhaustion and no longer run.
DR LINDLEY: I think Professor Morton made a much more clear point about fear at all stages, and I would like him to respond.
PROFESSOR MORTON: I think there is a situation here where the animal experiences fear and tries to escape, but then as the hunt goes on the animal realises it is losing the battle and cannot escape. I am saying what do we think it is feeling at that point? John was talking about a ten-to-one chance, but a fox does not know it has a ten-to-one chance; as far as it is concerned it has a one-to-one chance at that point.
PROFESSOR WEBSTER: If it has had prior experience.
PROFESSOR MORTON: Maybe, maybe not.
PROFESSOR WEBSTER: By definition, most foxes will have had a prior experience.
PROFESSOR MORTON: Let me finish the point. When the animal then is losing the battle and is being caught up, I am suggesting that fear encourages it to run even harder and it is still losing and, at some point, it may be caught by the lead hound and at that point, presumably, it knows it is not going to escape. There must come a point where it can see that it is not going to be able to escape.
There is another dimension of fear where it goes to earth, and it is then holed up there and cannot escape. I think that, too, must turn, if you like, from fear to terror when it realises it cannot escape and is being pestered by the dogs or by the terriers being put down to flush it out. This can go on for several minutes, if not hours, as I understand it. It can take between half-an-hour and three hours for this to happen, That is a long duration in terms of intensity and duration. So I think fear is probably one of the biggest issues here. The point at which it is caught and killed is very quick; it is not instantaneous. We would not accept it for farm animals in an abattoir but it is relatively quick.
THE CHAIRMAN: May I ask if Professor Webster wants to come back on that?
PROFESSOR WEBSTER: Not again.
THE REVEREND PROFESSOR LINZEY: May I ask Professor Webster a question? If I understood you right, Professor Webster, you said that "most have prior experience of being hunted"?
PROFESSOR WEBSTER: If there is a ten-to-one chance of getting away, not all but a majority of animals will have escaped a considerable number of times. That is arithmetic.
THE REVEREND PROFESSOR LINZEY: Absolutely. But in your book you say that: "Unpleasant memories of previous hunts may also induce a chronic sense of anxiety". So, in other words, the experience of being hunted twice, three times, four times, five times, six times, can induce, according to you, "chronic anxiety"?
PROFESSOR WEBSTER: If the duration of the hunt has proceeded to the point of suffering on several occasions and the animal has not been killed, on those rare occasions it could happen. The fox that is roused but not hunted, I would imagine (it is difficult to say be sure) is exactly equivalent to a zebra or an impala who moves away at speed from a predator and then just simply returns to his normal grazing behaviour.
THE REVEREND PROFESSOR LINZEY: You do speak here of a "chronic sense of anxiety".
PROFESSOR WEBSTER: That can happen, yes.
MR BATCHELOR: Just to pursue this point to the absolute, Professor Morton said that in effect by observing the behaviour of animals you can interpret what is going on from the animal's point of view, and in some countries, based on that, things have been incorporated in legislation to take account of that. This question is in two parts, really. Partly it is this business of taking things into account in legislation, based on our interpretation of the behaviour of the animal and, secondly, perhaps more to Professor Linzey, in terms of if humans can interpret the behaviour of animals, does that not place firmly on them the duty of care?
PROFESSOR MORTON: I think what I said was that there are some pieces of legislation with this link between the suffering of humans and the suffering of animals, saying that if it causes suffering in humans then it should be assumed to cause suffering in animals until proved otherwise. That is the basis of legislation. A lot of animal welfare science is based not only on physiological measurements of what is going on in the blood but, also, is based on their behaviour. This is why I think behaviour, at the end of the day - what an animal chooses to do out of all the choices it has to make - is extremely important. It is a very good indicator of how an animal feels. It is probably a far truer reflection of how that animal feels about the situation than measuring any blood hormone or blood enzyme level.
MR BATCHELOR: Then there were Professor Linzey's comments on that same point, from the point of view that if you can infer from the behaviour what is happening to the animal, what obligation does that place on the sentient person, who has, if you like, caused the behaviour in the first place?
THE REVEREND PROFESSOR LINZEY: I think there are two issues. Firstly, in relation to legislation, if you ask the question where do you draw the line, it seems to me the lines have already been drawn and therefore we do not need to be overly sophisticated when it comes to definitions of what should be permissible. If, as Professor Webster says, hunting deer is equivalent to hunting a pony, and if hunting a fox is like hunting a dog, the question you must ask is why do those laws relating to domestic animals not also apply to wild animals? In other words, the definition of cruelty is already there in law. You have to ask why should hunting be exempt? In other words, you do not need to be sophisticated about this, it is simply a question of applying the law that is already established. That is the first point.
The second point is about the moral issue. Some people often say "Well, Andrew, why do you get upset about people enjoying suffering? It is of no direct interest to the animal concerned. It is of no interest to them whether or not a human being is gaining pleasure from it." My answer to that is "No, that is absolutely right, it is of no interest to the animal concerned. But it should be morally and legislatively of interest to us". Let me give you an example: there are some people who think that smacking children is right in certain limited circumstances and some people think it is wrong. However, I think both points of view would agree that a father who enjoys smacking his children, who sought opportunities to do it, who relished the opportunity to smack his children and enjoyed it and encouraged others to do so was committing a morally horrendous act. I have a similar concern about taking pleasure in causing suffering to animals No, it does not directly concern the animal concerned, but it does affect us.
From a moral point of view the issue is not just about suffering of animals, it is about the nature of our humanity, which is why, I am afraid, I began my presentation this morning with the rather naughty example of bull-baiting, because those people opposed to bull-baiting consistently maintained "Yes, it is hurting the bull but it is hurting us". I want to flag up that issue, morally, as one worthy of concern.
MR LUFF: I want to go back to the question of definitions. I think we are all guilty of using the words very loosely. "Cruelty, pain, stress, distress, suffering". "Cruelty", I think, is quite straightforward. This is a question to all three, and I will come back to Professor Morton on some detailed issues. Cruelty is when humans inflict suffering on animals. That is a human action.
PROFESSOR WEBSTER: Unnecessary suffering.
MR LUFF: The other issues are what the animals do. Am I right in saying that pain is the central warning mechanism very often, to any animal - human or otherwise - and we have got quite a lot of scientific work about pain. We know quite a lot about pain. "Stress" is a survival mechanism and stress, also, is a type of fear as well, in some circumstances: an animal knows something is dangerous - the fox who fears the wolf, to which Professor Morton spoke - and we are beginning to get evidence about stress. We know about stress. Bateson was beginning that process. We have not got a huge amount but we have got some on stress.
I think it is common ground that animals experience pain and stress. What gets more contentious, if I am right, is this question of "distress" or fear of the future. Am I right that that is a mental state of mind about which we have labels of anthromorphic judgments about animals? I have been struck by the fact that Professor Morton has been saying "may", "might" and "probably" a lot in his evidence about future fear and distress. Am I right in saying there is not much science on that issue?
PROFESSOR MORTON: Can I respond to that? I think you are right there is a lot of knowledge of pain and about the experience of pain in humans and animals, and it is very coincident. So that, for example, drugs that were used in humans would be used in animals and so forth. Stress, I think, you have got to be careful about. I would define this in two ways: I think there is bad stress - which I happen to spell "dys", just like dyspepsia, bad digestion - where we respond unconsciously and that is the point perhaps where we cannot cope physiologically and we can see that in farm animals if they are not looked after well and we see it, too, perhaps to a limited extent in the Bateson report where animals were hunted to the point of getting very high levels of enzymes and hormones and so on, and we do not know whether those animals would have recovered or not because they were shot at the end of it. We have a little bit of evidence on the hunted stag.
It is like our response to starvation; it is like our response to low temperatures. It is not about pain, it is a different sort of environmental stress. Then I want to go on to mental distress ("di" this time), which is where I think that this debate homes in on. It is about how an animal responds mentally to a situation. That is where the element of suffering comes in. Just before I go on, I want you to, if you like, have the idea that an animal is not simply a mechanism where it sees pain and nothing else. An animal that is in pain may well be in mental distress in certain situations. So it is a holistic approach for the whole animal. To me this debate is about fear which is about what I think up here (pointing to head) - what the animals are thinking up here. On that we can never be absolutely sure. That is why I am using the words "may" and "might. I happen to believe the balance of evidence is on the fact that they do, because of their behaviour. Their behaviour shows to me that they are experiencing these mental distressful states.
Then "suffering". Just to pick up on Andrew Linzey's point, I think fish can suffer when a hook goes through their tongue, probably, but they do not dwell on that, they may not remember that, they may not go on and think about the consequences of that in the future. At the other end of the extreme, we think enormously about the consequences of having a bad back and not being able to go to work, and those sorts of things, which I do not think animals do. In between the two, who knows where mammals are? I think there is some evidence about the fox going into the cave and looking outwards which suggests to me these animals do think about the future but not as much, perhaps, as humans.
MR LUFF: Can I pursue this?
THE CHAIRMAN: I will ask Professor Webster to respond.
PROFESSOR WEBSTER: First of all, to repeat my very precise definition of "suffering", suffering occurs when an animal has extreme difficulty in coping with stress or fails to cope with stress. To take that further, you raise the question of anxiety about the future. There is almost no evidence on that in wild animals, for obvious reasons. However, with farmed animals there is evidence of anxiety leading to hopelessness, because suffering is not only defined by the severity of the stress but it is defined by the relative inability of an animal to do anything about it. For a hen in a battery cage or a sow in a gestation stall there is clear evidence that they progress through anxiety to a sense of hopelessness, not only by virtue of the severity of the stress but by their inability to do anything about it. That has profound implications for the management of wildlife.
MR LUFF: Those chickens do not know what is going to happen five seconds later. They have no anticipation.
PROFESSOR WEBSTER: They have lost hope. They no longer care. There is evidence for that. Strong evidence for that.
THE REVEREND PROFESSOR LINZEY: If I can say something briefly? I think there are two issues here. The first is what we can or cannot reasonably suppose about animals. The second concerns the moral significance of what we can reasonably suppose. Because an infant cannot articulate to us "Daddy, I am suffering", we do not tend to take them very seriously into account - or at least we have not done so historically. The same is also true with animals. What I was trying to suggest in my paper is that the ball is in the other court, if you like, that it is not just a question of us owing them the benefit of the doubt, it is that there is something especially pathetic, especially morally arousing about creatures - humans or animals - that cannot fully represent themselves, cannot fully vocalise their predicament.
Let us take, for example, the question of rationality. Suppose it is the case that animals cannot reason like human beings. I am prepared to accept it. It does not follow, however, that because they cannot reason their suffering is of less moral significance actually quite the reverse For example, when Terry Waite was imprisoned he wrote novels in his head. In other words, intellectual capacity can sometimes soften the experience of suffering. Animals, on the other hand, simply experience the raw terror of not knowing what is happening to them or why. In other words, it is not clear to me that the doubts, if there are any doubts ( and, actually, mounts up in favour of awarding animals special moral solicitude, in the same way we should give a small child the benefit of doubt.
MR LUFF: Can I just ask two scientific questions which flow from those answers. Behaviour is, surely, not an indicator of how an animal feels, it is an indication of what behaviour patterns have adapted value. Can we derive from behaviour any judgment about the animal's moral state or mental state?
PROFESSOR MORTON: Yes, I think you can. I think its behaviour reflects what it is experiencing. So when it runs away it says that it is anticipating some sort of threat. We can go further than that. There is a lot of work going on now on what animals prefer or do not prefer. So if you give the chicken, shall we say, the choice of a battery cage or a bigger environment they may well choose the bigger environment rather than the battery cage. It is preference testing. It is fraught with scientific difficulty but it is starting to ask the animal, through its behaviour, how it feels about certain things: what situations it avoids, what situations it prefers to be in.
I want to say one more thing quickly, and that is that we sometimes anthromorphise the wrong way. We use our senses to perceive threats, animals perceive threats through different senses, particularly smell and sound - which we as humans, are very deficient.. So sometimes we have to take those into account, and it may mean that situations we find non-threatening an animal would because it is in proximity of the smell of dogs which it would prefer not to be.
THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much.
MR HART: Minister, just a quick question for Professor Morton. You used an expression describing the practice of hunting an animal and it realising it is losing the battle, which presumably is part of the chase element. There are two things I want to clear up on available evidence. Is there evidence which you know of which can help us in relation to how that animal actually knows what the result of that chase period may be? We seem to be talking quite a lot about husbanded animals and domestic animals and very little about wild animals. One of the things which came through very strongly yesterday, we felt, from Lord Burn's comments is that there really was no hard, conclusive evidence with regard to how animals reacted from the fear of stress they may have suffered during the chase element of the hunt. Yet what I would like to hear if possible is the actual evidence on which you are basing your comments - if, indeed, it exists. That is not intended to be a catch.
PROFESSOR MORTON: No, no. The evidence, as I know it, is that there is some work done in foxes which have radio-telemeters placed in them which measure heart rate. The measurements were taken when they either foraged or they were exposed to various threats, one of which was a dog and the heart rate went up a lot higher than when the animal was hunting on its own. That could have been because it was having to run faster and because it is running faster and exercising more so it has a higher heart rate. On the other hand, it could be that it was the fear of being chased that was causing that higher heart rate. Its body temperature went up as well. So that is the only, if you like, hard scientific data.
However, I believe behavioural data is also hard. I do not think that simply measuring a certain level of a hormone or an enzyme in the blood is any more hard data than animal behaviour. So I am somebody who says to people who measure hormones "Fine, that is good, supportive evidence, but it is how the animal behaves which convinces me". I do not want people to go away thinking behaviour is soft data.
MR HART: I am not disputing that. All I am asking you is what is that evidence? Where is it? I am not aware of it and I do not think even Lord Burns is aware of that evidence.
PROFESSOR MORTON: The evidence is an animal runs, and runs faster and tries to escape and is doing all these escape mechanisms. That behaviour is the evidence.
MR HART: That is, in some way, different to all of the other aspects of natural reaction of wild animals we have heard elsewhere today?
PROFESSOR MORTON: No, that is part of their natural reaction. That natural reaction is an escape reaction, and it is an escape from a stress or a threat.
MR HART: So it boils back to the issue of hunting and whether it is a good or a bad thing, but we are still talking about matters of opinion.
PROFESSOR MORTON: Whether hunting is a good or a bad thing is, if you like, for people other than this particular session to decide. What I am saying is that animals undoubtedly suffer mental distress when they are chased by a threat that they cannot escape.
MR JACKSON: What evidence is there for that?
PROFESSOR MORTON: The evidence for that is partly based on the work I was telling you about that animals just run away and then they try and hide and go to earth. What more evidence do you want?
MR JACKSON: How is that evidence of mental distress? Could we, perhaps, -----
THE CHAIRMAN: John, would you let me chair this? I would ask all three groups to allow me to do that.
PROFESSOR WEBSTER: Minister, curiously, some of the most convincing scientific evidence relates to fish. Work at the University of Utrecht is going on where they study both the physiological and behavioural responses of fish to sensations which we would interpret as pain - ie electric shock in the roof of their mouth - and sensations which we could interpret as both pain and fear, and that is being hooked and pulled. Both produce profound physiological responses and both have been shown to produce profound aversion in fish - that is they might smell or have some other indication. They are showing symptoms that if they occurred in a mammal we would describe as pain and fear. That is evidence, not opinion.
THE CHAIRMAN: Professor Linzey, do you want to reply?
THE REVEREND PROFESSOR LINZEY: I am sure it is meant for the very best of motives but I think the quest for absolute certainty, not just scientific agreement but demonstrable proof, is a false trail, both in relation to human suffering and animal suffering.
DR LINDLEY: Just as a supplementary to that, I wonder whether the panel want to comment, since Professor Morton mentioned behavioural data, on the fact that Professor Bateson in his study on stag hunting actually spent, I think, according to his own records, 267 hours collecting scientifically organised behavioural data. From that, which was presented to the National Trust and the Burns Inquiry, he concluded, on that basis of that evidence, that deer did suffer during the chase.
PROFESSOR WEBSTER: I do not want to get too far into deer, but very quickly the evidence from both the Bateson and Harris reports is that deer experience extreme exhaustion. I would interpret that as suffering from exhaustion at the end of the chase. Putting my own interpretation on that, I would say that the exhaustion leads to the fear that they cannot escape.
DR LINDLEY: That, as I understand it, relates to the physiological evidence.
PROFESSOR WEBSTER: No, the second sentence is that there is evidence for exhaustion. I am interpreting that exhaustion as causing the fear that they can no longer cope. I am putting my own interpretation on that last bit.
THE CHAIRMAN: Can I draw this session to a close? Can I remind everybody, as I said yesterday, that none of these sessions in themselves can cover the whole of the issue, nor reach conclusions. The whole point in dividing this up into separate sessions is to try to separate out the different issues which undoubtedly will be brought together at the end of the day.
Can I thank our three witnesses for the way in which they have made their contribution. It is always difficult to get it quite right in terms of these sessions but I think that by allowing, if you like, the progression of questions and, also, some discussion amongst the witnesses, actually we gained a considerable amount from the process. So thank you very much indeed to the three of you for participating in that discussions. Thank you.
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19 May, 2005
Page published: 10 December, 2002