Avian influenza (bird flu): Impact on the countryside

Current situation

Photo of British countrysideIn the current situation there is no need for people to reduce their visits to the countryside. There is, at present, no need for any additional restrictions on recreational or sporting activities, including the use of rights of way or walking on land with a right of access, unless they are on infected premises or subject to restriction notices. We would, however, expect organisers to adopt good biosecurity measures. There is current Defra biosecurity guidance for all owners of livestock and anybody who comes into contact with or visits premises with farm animals.

Introduction

During an outbreak of Avian Influenza (AI) the countryside will not be closed down as it was during the outbreak of Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) in 2001. The situation will be very different for the following reasons:

  • Avian influenza is a very different virus to FMD. It is less contagious, its survival time is shorter and it does not independently travel long distances through the air. Therefore it is not expected to spread over such a wide area as FMD did or to be as difficult to contain;
  • The lessons of the 2001 FMD outbreak have been identified in a series of independent reports and have been widely implemented. We have new and up-to-date contingency plans which are risk-based, proportionate and flexible. In particular, we would dispose of culled birds through incineration, rendering and burial in licensed landfill. We would not dispose of carcasses through on-farm pyres;
  • Our plans now also include flexible contingency arrangements that address the risks of damage and disruption to rural communities, economies and the environment. Our policy response is therefore able to reflect potential impacts on countryside, access and recreation, tourism, other rural businesses, biodiversity and the wellbeing of those who live and/or work in the countryside;
  • The legal powers for avian influenza differ in key respects from the FMD legislation that applied in 2001, being more proportionate to the risks involved, eg powers to close footpaths are far more restricted.

Access to land

During an avian influenza outbreak there is little need to restrict access to land by closing footpaths or other land to which there is a right of access. We would only take legal powers to close land in the immediate vicinity (i.e. a maximum of 3km) of an infected premises and only then if justified by the veterinary risk of disease spread. Local Authorities do not have any additional powers to close land.

If an outbreak were to be in an intensive indoor unit, no closure of any land or any other restriction is likely to be needed. If there were an outbreak in free-range holdings or in the wild bird population it would not usually be necessary or practical to close land, though we would need to take account of any special factors that might apply in individual cases. For example, if disease were found in a nature reserve, decisions on whether land was closed within 10km of that finding might depend on factors such as the presence of defined paths for visitors and the degree of contamination of those paths. Our working precedent is last summer’s outbreak of Newcastle Disease which required no land closures other than the suspension of one stretch of footpath which directly crossed the infected site. In an avian influenza outbreak, there may well be public pressure to close access to land, especially where an infected wild bird were found, but we would seek to strike a balance between addressing legitimate public concern and ensuring our response was proportionate to the risk. If access to land does need to be restricted, we are working with Natural England to ensure that clear and up-to-date information is provided as to where those areas are.

Visiting the countryside

There should therefore, be no need for people to stop visiting the countryside. Our Contingency plan for Avian Influenza(and other animal diseases) includes a protocol which makes clear that there should be a presumption in favour of maintaining public access. It also makes clear that any decision to close land over which there is a public right of way, or where there is public open space or access to open country, should be taken only when it is clearly necessary to do so and after having carefully considered:

  • the requirement for disease control;
  • the economic value of the rights of way network and other countryside access and the likely impact of closure on visitors to the countryside and the businesses that depend on them.

The vast majority of visitor attractions in rural areas would be unaffected. Defra and the Department for Culture, Media and Sport are working with Visit Britain and other tourism and heritage organisations such as the National Trust, to ensure that the public would be given accurate and balanced advice about access to the countryside and rural visitor sites in the event of an avian influenza outbreak and that this message is also put across in advance of an outbreak.

Economic impact

The economic impact of an avian influenza outbreak will therefore be principally felt by the poultry and ancillary industries (pigs can also be susceptible to certain strains of avian influenza and could be controlled on premises with infected birds). During an outbreak, national controls on poultry movements would be put in place and we would require birds to be housed or otherwise isolated from wild birds. Depending crucially on the scale and geographical spread of disease, this could create economic pressures on a fast-moving industry, but we are working with the industry to ensure that movements can continue to take place under general or specific licenses. We have also negotiated provisions permitting organic and free-range status to be retained in certain circumstances in the event of a housing requirement.

Clearly the export market will be severely restricted and domestic poultry and egg consumption would be likely to experience a temporary downturn. We will continue to work closely with the Food Standards Agency and Department of Health to ensure that consumers receive appropriate advice on the safety of poultry meat and eggs.

Shooting

If a Wild Bird Monitoring Area is declared, no hunting of wild birds would be  allowed except under licence. No gatherings of poultry or other captive birds would be allowed. No release of game birds would be allowed. Hunting or otherwise taking birds from the wild would be banned in the Wild Bird Monitoring Area except under licence.  The situation with respect to shooting would vary according to the type of avian influenza. Since additional rules may be imposed through declarations, anyone wishing to shoot should check guidance for the specific outbreak.  However during an incident of H5N1 in wild birds a Wild Bird Monitoring Area would normally be declared and this prohibits shooting, except under licence. A general licence may be issued to allow these activities subject to conditions.

In the Monitoring Area, a ban on the release of wild birds and bird gatherings would apply. Limited shooting and trapping of wild birds in these Areas may be allowed under general licence subject to conditions.

Food Standards Agency advice on the meat from such birds remains that, as with poultry meat, it poses no risk to health when properly cooked.

Also see the The British Association for Shooting and Conservation website and the National Gamekeepers’ Organisation website.

Falconry and Pigeon Racing

For more information please go to Bird fairs, markets, shows and other gatherings.

Combating stress

Reflecting clear lessons from the FMD outbreak of 2001, our contingency plans include the immediate notification of an experts group on rural stress. The current Rural Stress Action Plan Working Group would fulfil that role. Depending on the type of emergency, there are established organisations well placed to provide specialist support. This is especially the case for the farming industry where, under the banner of Farming Help, the Rural Stress Information Network, Farm Crisis Network, ARC-Addington Fund, Royal Agricultural Benevolent Institution and the Samaritans promote confidential help for all in the farming community. Those organisations would be well placed to lead on the delivery of emergency support to the industry, should it be needed.

The Rural Stress Action Plan has already helped fund many initiatives, with £300,000 per annum being committed by Defra until 2008. Initiatives include the development of regional support networks and the production of Farming Help publicity to raise awareness of the help available and the contact details of the relevant support organisations. Farming Help also provides a confidential helpline for those suffering stress.

Precautions that can be taken now

At present, most poultry keepers do not need to restrict access to land where their flocks roam. However, it is always sensible biosecurity practice (and recommended both as a precaution against avian influenza and other more common poultry diseases such as salmonella, campylobacter and bronchitis) that poultry keepers should limit access to their flocks, particularly to buildings and enclosures where they are kept in large numbers. Only essential visitors should have access to these areas and they should make sure that they carry out biosecurity procedures both before and after contact with birds and wear protective clothing so that disease is not spread indirectly through contaminated clothing, footwear and any vehicles where birds have been confined in small areas.

It is unlikely that contamination can be spread by walkers using fields where free-range poultry are kept, although basic precautions such as cleaning footwear should be undertaken. Visitors should not give food to any farm animals or birds or leave food anywhere where they may get access to it. We would also advise the public to avoid contact with bird faeces and ill or dead birds and, in case of any contact, to take simple hygienic measures i.e. wash any contaminated skin, clothing or footwear with soap and water. Further biosecurity advice...

Further information

 

Page last modified: June 5, 2008 16:53