Department for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs

Financial Management and Policy Review of the
Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution

5. Alternative Arrangements for Discharging the Commission's Functions

5.1 We considered the following options:

5.2 We first asked interviewees whether there were features of the Commission which made it unique, which contributed to the high quality of the final product, and which it would be vital for any replacement body to retain. Four key factors emerged:

(i) it is a committee of experts, all prominent in their own field, who come to the Commission with an open mind, without representing particular constituencies or causes. They bring intellectual ability to bear on a wide range of problems in which they may have no specific expertise, but are willing to learn from each other and to be persuaded to different points of view;

(ii) it is independent from government and from specific interest groups and is perceived by all observers to be so. Whilst financed by DETR, and with a Secretariat staffed in the main from DETR, it has successfully held the Department at arm's length and has never felt obliged to follow the Department's line;

(iii) it has a long institutional memory, and is able to return to specific themes or concepts from time to time to press for their adoption;

(iv) it is able to take a long term view of issues and does not have to enter the immediate political fray nor engage in politically expedient tactical behaviour.

5.3 We then considered each of the alternative options against the unique features described above.

Ad hoc committees set up to deal with specific issues
5.4 Ad hoc committees could be set up to respond to particular needs, and could draw members from those with expertise on the issue in question. This would avoid any danger that studies might from time to time be undertaken to keep the Commission in business rather than because they are genuinely necessary. It would be welcome to those who see advantage in expert committees as opposed to a committee of experts. There could also be some financial saving if the committees were run with reduced secretarial input.

5.5 Set against these are several significant disadvantages. Chapter 2 stated that one of the Commission's roles was to bring into political focus issues which might otherwise be ignored or which were not easily identifiable from within government. Committees would tend to be set up only when issues had reached crisis point, so that the focus would be on fire-fighting, with a consequent loss of the longer term forward look. A further disadvantage would be loss of the long term institutional memory, and the added value given to reports by revisiting themes, issues, and methods of approach. Loss of expertise among secretariat staff would also be a likely consequence.

Other environmental advisory bodies
5.6 The early 1990s saw a number of important changes in the political environment following the Rio Earth Summit. There was a perceived need for a more participative political process that would engage individuals, business and environmental organisations in discussing how to move forward the environmental agenda. One outcome of this was the setting up of a number of new advisory bodies, with different membership compositions and remits. These included the Round Table on Sustainable Development, the Government Panel on Sustainable Development, and the Advisory Committee on Business and the Environment. Following the 1997 election, two further bodies were formed - the Sustainable Development Education Panel and the Trade Union and Sustainable Development Advisory Committee - and subsequently a new Commission for Integrated Transport was announced, following publication in 1998 of the White Paper 'A New Deal for Transport: Better for Everyone'. Most recently, in May 1999, the Government made known its intention to set up a new Commission on Sustainable Development whose main responsibility will be to monitor progress on sustainable development and to build consensus on action to accelerate its achievement.

5.7 One recurring observation by interviewees was that the present plethora of environmental advisory bodies seems to lack any coherent overall framework, and there was widespread concern about the risk of duplicating effort. In this report we do not explore in detail the rationale for other bodies. We have confined our attention to considering in this chapter whether any of the other bodies which currently exist could credibly take over the Royal Commission's functions, and in Chapter 6 the effectiveness of the inter-relationship of the existing bodies.

The Round Table
5.8 The body's purpose is

to help identify the agenda and priorities for sustainable development;
to develop new areas of consensus on difficult areas of sustainable development and, where this is not possible, to clarify and reduce difference;
to provide advice and recommendations on actions to achieve sustainable development;
to help evaluate progress towards objectives; and
to inform and involve others, building wider support for emerging consensus.

5.9 The Round Table was set up as a forum for discussion on major issues of sustainable development, with a broad cross section of representatives from sectors such as industry, environmental groups, consumer groups, academia, and government, including local government. It is not science driven, but looks at broader issues of societal relevance. Its purpose is to help develop consensus, to help opinions on environmental issues to evolve and move forward.

5.10 The Round Table and the Commission have a significantly different ethos and purpose. Reports from the Round Table represent a consensus rather than radical approach to issues; and they tend to have a shorter term focus, and to concentrate on practical recommendations for government and government bodies, which can be implemented within the medium term. They do not fulfil the enlightenment function - changing the vocabulary and interpretation frames of policy makers - to the same degree as those from the Commission. Round Table members are not necessarily experts in their field, and are present as 'stakeholders' representing their constituent organisations, rather than individuals. They are unlikely to have the same freedom to adopt positions and concepts which might be at odds with those organisations, which we have argued above is crucial to the Commission's credibility.

The Panel on Sustainable Development
5.11 The Panel was set up to report directly to the Prime Minister on sustainable development issues across all government departments. Its remit is

to keep in view general sustainability issues at home and abroad;
to identify major problems and opportunities likely to arise
to monitor progress, and
to consider questions of priority.

5.12 The Panel meets four or five times a year. Members are appointed as individuals rather than representatives. The Panel seeks to uncover issues across the whole landscape of sustainable development which others can then look at in depth. One interviewee described the Panel as 'poking at issues' in a way which is useful but superficial. No one felt the Panel could credibly take on the in-depth inquiries undertaken by the Royal Commission.

The Commission on Sustainable Development
5.13 Following commencement of this Review, the Government announced that the Round Table and the Panel would be subsumed into a new Commission for Sustainable development. The intention is that like the Round Table this will be a consensus building body. For the reasons set out in 5.10 above, we think it unlikely that the new Commission could take on the role of the Royal Commission

The Advisory Committee on Business and the Environment
5.14 Its remit is

to provide for dialogue between government and business on environmental issues, both of immediate topical interest and of a longer term nature;
in liaison with other organisations to help mobilise the business community in demonstrating good environmental practice and management, building on existing initiatives and activities;
to provide a link with and focus attention on, international business initiatives on the environment.

5.15 This body's primary focus is on the interface between government and business - a quite different focus from the Royal Commission. One of ACBE's strengths is to provide government with a specifically business view of environmental issues and proposals. We have already stated that independence from capture by specific groups is vital to the Commission's credibility. We see no scope for ACBE to take over the Commission's role, though we consider that there could be mutual benefit in closer contact and working between the two bodies and we return to this in a later section.

The Trade Unions and Sustainable Development Advisory Committee
5.16 Arguments against merging the Commission with ACBE apply equally to a merger with TUSDAC, as do our comments concerning the benefits of closer working.

The Sustainable Development Education Panel
5.17 This body was set up to consider issues surrounding environmental education, and therefore has a narrower focus than the Royal Commission. Its work is likely to be highly relevant to aspects of the Commission's role, and there may be scope for working together on dissemination of the Commission's outputs, but a merger between the two would not, in our view, be practical or produce any specific benefits.

The Commission for Integrated Transport
5.18 Proposals for the new Commission were included in the Government's White Paper "A New Deal for Transport: Better for Everyone" and it started work in July 1999. It will advise specifically on transport issues, and will not have a sufficiently broad remit to take on the Commission's work.

Parliamentary Select Committees
5.19 These committees are primarily driven by immediate relevance in the political sphere, and by accountability issues, and their inquiries are generally more rapid and less in-depth than Commission studies which are primarily knowledge driven. While there are clear advantages in links between the select committees and the Commission in terms of raising the profile of the Royal Commission, avoiding any duplication of effort and keeping in touch with the political agenda, we do not see any possibility of the select committees replacing the Commission's role.

Natural Environment Research Council
5.20 The Natural Environment Research Council (NERC) would have the science based academic credentials to carry out the Commission's work, and could access other disciplines through sister research councils. It has the advantage of closer contact with the research world both in the UK and abroad, and so could help to overcome criticism of UK-centricity. It could respond more flexibly and in a shorter time scale to requests for immediate advice or comment on scientific issues.

5.21 But NERC's remit is to provide government with expert views and evidence on scientific matters; it has little experience of applying an economic and ethical dimension to its work, and in practice has always stopped short of producing specific recommendations for government on action to take. Incorporating the latter, even using the Commission's broad brush techniques, would involve a steep learning curve for the Council and require a radical rethink in its approach.

5.22 There seemed to us to be a disadvantage for NERC in asking it to adjust its own role to take on the Commission's work, and some disbenefits for the Commission's functions resulting from loss of accumulated expertise. The main advantage of this change - better access to current national and international research - could be provided for the Commission in other ways, namely through closer co-operation with NERC.

The Environment Agency
5.23 There were strong views for and against this option. A small number of those we spoke to believed that the Agency had sufficient staff with appropriate academic credentials to bring a multi-disciplinary approach to complex environmental problems. They believed that now the difficulties of the set up period had passed, the Agency would be well placed to undertake longer term studies of environmental issues and could even improve on the Commission's achievements by bringing a stronger grasp of practical reality to its findings and recommendations.

5.24 Those opposed to the option did so on the grounds that as a regulator, the Agency was not sufficiently independent from government to undertake the Commission's role, and that it was likely to be constrained in its thinking by the limits of its current work and experience. Some thought the Agency did not have access to the same level of academic ability as currently available at the Commission, and so was less likely to be able to think outside the boxes of normal discourse. The Agency itself believed that the Commission's role would sit uneasily with its regulatory functions, although it, and others, considered that closer liaison between the two would be helpful.

5.25 We agree with the Agency that these two roles are not easily compatible, and with those who felt that the credibility of reports was likely to be called into doubt because of concerns over independence from government. However, we think the Agency may have a role in undertaking studies on specific environmental issues - rather than the more widely ranging reports which are the Commission's forte. We do not recommend any form of merger, but are able to note that closer working between the two bodies is already being pursued through joint meetings and that further work on this is planned. Joint membership of the Commission and Agency Board provides another way of encouraging dialogue and information exchange between the bodies.

The National Academies
5.26 This option was raised by a couple of interviewees on the grounds that National Academies have access to appropriate levels of academic expertise, and are seen as independent of government. But, the bodies concerned (the Royal Society, the British Academy, and Royal Academy of Engineering and the medical Royal Colleges) have not successfully established a tradition of working together to provide multi-disciplinary reports for which the Commission is valued.

Involvement of the private sector
5.27 It is difficult to see what benefits might emerge from transferring the Commission's functions to the private sector, or who might be willing to take this on. No one we spoke to could recommend an existing candidate, and there were no expressions of interest in forming a new private body. If someone did come forward, government could provide funding, but such an arrangement is likely to cost considerably more than at present. The level of remuneration currently paid to Commission members is low compared with their daily charges for consultancy work. Most are prepared to accept this on the basis that their contribution is made for the public good. But they are unlikely to take the same approach if working for a private contractor (who may make a profit out of their efforts) and are likely to require payment at full consultancy rate. It is also doubtful whether many of the current members would make time available for a private sector Commission, even if paid at an appropriate rate. We do not believe this option to be viable.

5.28 A variation on this theme would be to contract out some or all of the Secretariat operations, and we examine the possibilities in more detail in Chapter 11.

5.29 Conclusion: We considered alternative methods of securing the kind of advice currently provided by the Commission. We conclude that transfer of the Commission's functions to another public sector body, including other environmental advisory bodies, or to a private sector organisation would not offer any significant improvement on current arrangements, and could have detrimental consequences.

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Published 19 April 2000 / Updated 11 May 2000
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