PETS: The Kennedy Report - summary of recommendations
A SUMMARY OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE REPORT BY THE ADVISORY GROUP ON QUARANTINE TO THE RT HON NICK BROWN MP, MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE, FISHERIES AND FOOD
FOREWORD BY PROFESSOR IAN KENNEDY
Quarantine and Rabies
A Reappraisal
It is my honour to submit this Report on behalf of the Advisory Group on Quarantine.
As someone who has never owned a pet (if goldfish do not count) for the past 30 years, I came to the issue of quarantine against rabies under a veil of ignorance. It was not long before I realised that it is a subject which excites very strong feelings. We have all seen the warnings against rabies as we enter Great Britain. We have grown up with a sense of horror of it and relief that it is not found in Great Britain. Equally, we have heard the stories of those who feel stranded abroad because they are unwilling to put their pets through the system of quarantine, or who, having entered Great Britain, sorely miss their pet while it is confined in quarantine premises.
The last review of quarantine was over a quarter of a century ago. Things have moved on, not least developments in the scientific understanding of and response to rabies. It is still a horrific disease in animal or man. But now there are effective vaccines and, in the European Union at least, the incidence of rabies in wildlife, and thus in domestic pets, is falling rapidly. A re-examination was, therefore, in order. In this re-examination, we have proceeded with caution. We have been guided by what philosophers call "the precautionary principle". Our hope is that, in our Report, we provide not only a state of the art review of scientific developments but also a template for policy which can commend itself both to the British Government and throughout the EU.
The central concern of the Advisory Group, as in many areas of public policy making, was with risk. We had to decide whether replacing quarantine with some other system would pose an increased risk that humans could be exposed to infection with, and contract, rabies. We encountered a difficulty right at the outset. We had no real way of knowing how effective quarantine actually is. Given that there was abundant anecdotal evidence of smuggling animals into Great Britain, it could well be the overall decline in the incidence of rabies in European wildlife, or just good luck, that had kept these islands free of rabies since the 1920s. Another of the challenges we faced was the need to separate real risk from perceived risk. Rabies has entered the psyche of the British in a way which others do not always understand. It was our task to try to get at the facts and put the risk into a proper perspective. Then, we had to let the facts and the evidence guide us to our conclusions.
I was extremely fortunate in the membership of the Group. We had to cover a range of technical issues from the wavelengths of microchips, to the potency of vaccines, to the aerosol transmission of rabies by bats, not forgetting the intricacies of European law and the cost per square metre of renting space in a number of ports. This is the challenge of being involved in public policy making: the distillation of facts and then the drawing of conclusions and recommendations. The members of the Group rose to that challenge. I sat back with amazed admiration.
We were an extremely friendly and harmonious Group. I constantly imposed impossible deadlines, yet no-one complained. I cannot express my gratitude too strongly. We were supported by our helpful team from MAFF and I record here my thanks also to them.
THE ADVISORY GROUP ON QUARANTINE - MEMBERSHIP
Chairman
Professor Ian Kennedy
Professor of Health Law, Ethics and Policy at the School of Public Policy, University College London.
Members
Dr Michel Aubert
Director of the Laboratoire d'études sur rage et la pathologie des animaux sauvage, Centre National d’Études Vétérinaires et Alimentaires, Nancy, France.
Dr Barbara Bannister
Consultant in Infectious and Tropical Diseases at the Royal Free Hospital, London.
Mr Paul DeVile
Small animal veterinary practitioner in Eastbourne. Past president of the British Veterinary Association and the British Small Animal Veterinary Association.
Dr Chris Dye
Senior Epidemiologist at the World Health Organisation, Geneva, Switzerland (on secondment from the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine).
Dr Andrew Higgins
Scientific Director and Chief Executive of the Animal Health Trust, Newmarket.
Professor Oswald Jarrett
Professor of Comparative Virology, University of Glasgow.
Professor Herbert Sewell
Professor of Immunology at the University Hospital Medical School, Queen’s Medical Centre, Nottingham University.
Sir Joseph Smith
Retired Director of the Public Health Laboratory Service.
Observers
Dr Judith Hilton Senior Medical Officer,Department of Health
Mr John Verrinder HM Treasury
Secretariat
Mr Andrew Beech, Secretary
Mr John Pollitt, Veterinary Adviser
Mrs Renate Lowres, Assistant Secretary
Miss Amina Rasool, Administration
We would like to emphasise that all the Group members were appointed by virtue of their individual expertise and that they do not necessarily represent the views of any organisation with which they are associated.
TERMS OF REFERENCE
The terms of reference we were given for this review were:
To assess the risk of introduction of rabies into the United Kingdom under the current policy of quarantine for pet animals and under alternative policies, particularly the five set out below. The assessment should advise on, and take full account of the practical aspects of enforcement of the policies in determining the risk posed by each. The assessment should also consider and advise on the costs and benefits of each of the policies, and of the risk of introducing other animal diseases transmissible to humans.
The alternative policies to be assessed are:
Option (a): maintain the existing policy whereby imported animals are housed in secure quarantine facilities for six months;
Option (b): reduce the length of time animals are required to spend in quarantine;
Options (c) and (d): allow in animals for which reliable alternative assurances can be obtained, in particular those from EU Member States and certain rabies-free countries, through restrictions based on identification, vaccination, blood testing, certification and a system of checks after entry. In option (c) checks would be made at the point of entry, in option (d) these checks would be made away from the point of entry in approved reception centres. Where these assurances cannot be met, animals would be quarantined as now;
Options (e) and (f): give up quarantine altogether. Under option (e) imported animals only would be subject to pre-entry vaccination. Under option (f) all domestic cats and dogs would be vaccinated. Farm livestock and foxes in affected areas would be vaccinated were the disease to be introduced.
SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS
The Proposed New System
Recommendation 1
1.1 Our analysis has shown that there would be only a marginal increase in the already very small risk of importing rabies were cats and dogs resident in Great Britain to be allowed to travel to other European Union (EU) or European Economic Area (EEA) Member States or rabies-free islands and to return to Great Britain without having to undergo quarantine. Furthermore, the increased risk is statistical in nature and must be seen in the context of continuing scientific development in the understanding of and response to rabies. Accordingly, we have concluded that the requirement that cats and dogs travelling to and from these countries be subject to quarantine should be abandoned. In its place, we propose a system which requires that each animal would have to meet certain requirements in respect of identification, vaccination against rabies, blood testing and treatment against specified parasites. All of these requirements would be attested to by a duly authorised certificate which would have to be presented at the point of entry.
1.2 Our analysis has also shown that risk increases with the proportion of animals whose documentation is not checked; hence the need for checking. We believe that the most suitable place for carrying out such checks, in order to provide assurance that they are being carried out on the highest possible proportion of animals, is at the port of entry.
1.3 We therefore recommend that certain cats and dogs that are resident in Great Britain be exempt from quarantine on return from another EU or EEA Member State or a rabies-free island. Such cats and dogs would be those that are certified as:
electronically identifiable, having had an acceptable type of microchip implanted;
vaccinated against rabies at or over three months of age using an inactivated and adjuvanted vaccine approved by the authorities of an EU Member State;
having had a blood test, following vaccination against rabies, carried out at least six months before the re-entry of the animal to Great Britain;
having been treated no more than 24 hours before return to Great Britain with a preparation licensed for the treatment of ticks and with an anthelmintic preparation that is authorised in an EU Member State, for the removal of Echinococcus multilocularis.
1.4 In order to qualify for exemption, the blood test must have been performed in a laboratory approved by the British authorities, and must show a rabies antibody titre equal to or greater than 0.5 IU/ml (international units per millilitre). If the animal is imported more than twelve months after the vaccination that preceded the blood test, it must subsequently have been revaccinated annually, or at such greater intervals as are in accordance with the conditions of authorisation of the vaccine. Animals should be checked at the port of entry on arrival in Great Britain from outside the British Isles, and their identification and health certificate confirmed to be in order.
1.5 In cases where the animal has not been revaccinated at intervals in accordance with the conditions of authorisation of the vaccine, it must be revaccinated and a blood test taken at least six months before entry. The blood test must have been carried out in a laboratory approved by the British authorities, and must have confirmed the presence of a rabies antibody titre equal to or greater than 0.5 IU/ml. (See paragraph 10.6.1. of the Full Report.)
Recommendation 2
2. We have reached the same conclusions as regards cats and dogs that have been resident in an EU or EEA Member State or a rabies-free island for at least six months and which meet the same conditions for identification, vaccination, blood testing and general health as would apply to British resident animals returning to Great Britain. We recommend that cats and dogs which have been resident for at least six months in one or more EU or EEA Member State (except the Republic of Ireland), or a rabies-free island, which:
a) meet the conditions set out in Recommendation 1; and
b) have been checked on entry to Great Britain from outside the British Isles and their identification and health certificate confirmed to be in order;
should be permitted entry into Great Britain, without having to be subject to quarantine. (See paragraph 10.6.1. of the Full Report.)
Recommendation 3
Rabies-free island
3. In implementing this system it is necessary to define a rabies-free island. We considered the definitions set by the World Health Organisation (WHO) and the Office International des Epizooties (OIE). The latter, because it takes account both of the absence of rabies and the ability of the territory concerned to regulate and to certify the treatment and movement of animals, is preferable. We therefore recommend that the definition of rabies-free islands used by the OIE should be adopted. (See paragraph 10.6.1. of the Full Report.)
Recommendation 4
British Isles
4. The British Isles have been a single rabies-free area for many decades. Provided that equivalent rabies control policies continue to apply throughout the British Isles, we recommend that, in recognition of the special status of Northern Ireland, the Republic of Ireland, the Isle of Man and the Channel Islands in current British legislation, animals resident in these Islands, Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland should continue to have unrestricted access to Great Britain. (See paragraph 10.6.1. of the Full Report.)
Recommendation 5
North America
5. In carrying out our risk assessment we sought to take some account of the import of cats and dogs from North America. We recognised that, for practical reasons, the numbers which might be imported, even if the current system of quarantine were disapplied, would probably remain low. We found that if the number of animals imported were to be no more than double the current number (given that they would be travelling by air), there would only be a very small increase in risk were such animals to be exempted from quarantine. We recognise, however, that rabies is endemic in wildlife in North America, such that the risk would significantly increase if the numbers of imported animals increased greatly. We recommend that the Minister commission a further study of the numbers of cats and dogs which might be brought into Great Britain from North America if the current quarantine system were not applied and carry out a risk assessment in the light of the results of such a study. (See paragraph 10.6.1. of the Full Report.)
Recommendation 6
6. The risk of importing rabies increases to what we consider would be an unacceptable level when animals fail to meet the conditions laid down under the proposed new system, or when they are imported from countries with an incidence of rabies greater than in those countries specified earlier. We recommend that all imported cats and dogs, from countries other than qualifying countries, should remain subject to six months quarantine on arrival in, or return to, Great Britain. (See paragraph 10.6.1. of the Full Report.)
Blood Tests
Recommendation 7
International standard
7. We recommend that the Minister (in conjunction with the European Commission) seek to resolve the lack of agreement within the scientific community concerning the most suitable method of assaying rabies antibody levels by requesting the WHO and the OIE jointly to sponsor discussions between laboratories carrying out serological testing for rabies, with a view to establishing an agreement as to the most suitable test and to setting up a reference laboratory. We recommend, further, that, if agreement cannot be reached, the Minister should decide which serological testing standard and method, or methods, to adopt, on the basis of the most recent scientific opinion, prior to the introduction of the proposed new system. (See paragraph 7.13.1. of the Full Report.)
Recommendation 8
Laboratory approval
8. If it is not possible to reach international agreement as to the most suitable test, and to establish a reference laboratory, before the new system that we have proposed is introduced, it will be necessary to approve laboratories which may carry out the necessary testing of sera. We recommend that, in the absence of an internationally recognised reference laboratory, laboratories be accredited to perform serological tests according to a quality procedure specified and operated by the British authorities. We recommend, further, that laboratories be invited to apply for accreditation, to be awarded following inspection and approval of the testing protocol by a nominated reference laboratory. We also recommend that continuation of accreditation should be made dependent on achieving a satisfactory standard in periodic tests of samples of known antibody levels. (See paragraph 7.13.3.of the Full Report.)
Recommendation 9
ELISA
9. The existing blood tests depend on the use of live virus. Thus expensive containment facilities are necessary in which to carry them out. The use of an enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA) for rabies antibody, of which a number currently exist, could reduce the expense and time taken for blood tests. We recommend that the Minister investigate existing work into the validation of rabies ELISAs. We recommend that, if necessary, the Minister should consider providing funds for the development and validation of alternative ELISAs. Once a validated ELISA is available and accepted by the international community, it could replace existing serological tests, thereby both simplifying the laboratory procedure for testing, and removing the need for live virus in carrying out tests. (See paragraph 7.13.3. of the Full Report.)
Identification of Cats and Dogs
Recommendation 10
10. One means of identifying animals is by the use of a tattoo. Although the removal of a tattoo is difficult, some of the tattooed characteristics can be changed by further tattooing. In some animals the tattoo can fade over time, and old tattoos can become unreadable. We recommend that, because of its drawbacks, tattooing should not be considered a reliable means of positively identifying a cat or dog. (See paragraph 8.4.1. of the Full Report.)
Recommendation 11
11. An alternative means of identification is by microchip, implanted in the animal, and read by a microchip reader. We found that there are a number of different standards for microchips in commercial use. The International Standards Organisation has agreed standards for microchips (ISO standard 11784) and readers (ISO standard 11785). Other widely used formats in Europe were not chosen by ISO. They are recommended, however, in an annex to the ISO standard that suggests readers should be able to decode such microchips. We understand that there is an industry agreement to manufacture readers to incorporate these other formats for a further 30 years. We consider that the ISO standards provide a basis for a common format of microchip and that the maintenance of a capability to use existing microchips for 30 years is sufficiently long. We recommend, therefore, that microchips used for electronic identification to facilitate the international movement of those cats and dogs exempted from quarantine should conform to the ISO standard 11784 or to Annex A to ISO standard 11785. It is important that all microchips should have a unique number. We recommend, therefore, that the importation of mammals implanted with microchips manufactured to contain a number of the customer’s choice be prohibited. (See paragraph 8.4.5. of the Full Report.)
Health Certificates
Recommendation 12
12. We consider that it is possible and desirable to certify all of the requirements for exemption from quarantine on a single sheet of paper, to be signed by a veterinary surgeon. We recommend that health certificates that must accompany animals to be brought into Great Britain should be in accordance with the OIE and the Royal College of Veterinary Surgeons (RCVS) guidelines for certification. Thus the certificate should be:
a) issued by the competent veterinary authorities of the country in which the animal has been resident.
b) printed on a single sheet of paper;
c) marked with a unique identification number;
d) completed by an official veterinarian;
e) signed and stamped in an ink that does not readily photocopy, i.e. other than black. (See paragraph 9.5.2. of the Full Report.)
We also recommend that the health certificate be used to certify compliance with the provisions of Recommendation 1. (See paragraph 9.5.3. of the Full Report.).
Recommendation 13
Database
13. While not essential for the operation of the proposed new system, it would help to reduce the possibility of fraud if those checking the documentation of animals arriving in Great Britain could have access to a database showing certificates which have been issued, and in respect of which animals. We recommend that the Minister investigate the possibility of introducing such a system and, if feasible, should seek to reach agreement with the appropriate authorities in the qualifying countries, whereby the British authorities are provided by electronic transfer with details of health certificates, including in respect of each certificate, its serial number, the animal's microchip number and a description of the animal. This information could then be made available at a computer terminal at the British entry point, so as to be cross-referred to the information on the certificate presented. Having examined the animal movements system (ANIMO), however, we do not believe that this system is practical for this purpose. (See paragraph 9.5.4. of the Full Report.)
Recommendation 14
Further measures to reduce risk
14. We recommend that the Minister examine measures to reduce further the slight risk that the virus could be imported in those cases in which the health certificate, on its face, appears to be in order. These measures could include the electronic transfer of certificates’ details between Animal Health's as set out above in Recommendation 13, replacement of paper certificates with electronic records using smart card technology, and ultimately, perhaps, the development of simple, rapid diagnostic tests for rabies (that do not currently exist), so that accurate diagnosis of rabies infection could quickly be made at the point of arrival. (See paragraph 9.5.5. of the Full Report.)
Implementation
Recommendation 15
15. We were concerned that any new system should neither inconvenience the travelling animal owner by not being fully ready at the time of its introduction, nor should it increase the risk of importing rabies by being inefficient. We recommend that changes to the present system should not be introduced until an administrative and operational infrastructure is in place. We recommend that a sufficiently long period be allowed before introduction of the proposed new system, for example three years, to allow, inter alia, for enforcement staff to be recruited and trained, the public to be properly informed, computer systems to be put in place, and for sites at ports to be rented and (possibly) buildings constructed. We recommend, furthermore, that whenever the proposed new system is put into force, it be introduced on a date outside the peak holiday period. We recommend additionally that, once it is put into force, appropriate monitoring systems be put in place to ensure that operational problems are identified and resolved. (See paragraph 10.4.11. of the Full Report.)
Recommendation 16
Ports of entry
16. We anticipate that the majority of animals entering Great Britain will do so by sea or rail. There are a limited number of points of entry for users of such services. We recommend that restrictions be placed on the number of ports and airports through which animals may be imported. We recommend that the import of animals exempt from quarantine should be permitted through any port that has a scheduled passenger service to Continental Europe or Scandinavia. The list of such ports may, of course, change from time to time and would need to be kept up to date. (See paragraph 11.5.1 and 11.5.3. of the Full Report.)
Recommendation 17
Entry by air
17. The numbers of animals entering Great Britain by air is expected to be very small. Thus, we do not believe that it would be cost effective to provide facilities for checking animals at each airport with a scheduled service to a qualifying country. We recommend that as regards animals exempt from quarantine which are imported by air, their import be restricted to certain major airports. We recommend that animals exempt from quarantine which are imported on private aircraft or vessels should be required to be imported through one of the permitted ports or airports. (See paragraph 11.5.4. of the Full Report.)
Recommendation 18
Separate lane for entry
18. We considered the most convenient means of ensuring that the greatest possible proportion of animals are checked at the point of entry, thereby reducing the risk of importing rabies. We recommend that, on arrival by vehicle at the port of entry (or at the Channel Tunnel terminal at Calais), the animal owner should be required to enter a separate lane so that the animal(s) can be checked. This lane and associated premises would be manned by dedicated personnel, either from the Agriculture Departments, or under contract to them. We recommend that similar arrangements, again with dedicated premises, be made for foot passengers at ports, for passengers arriving by train and for those arriving at airports. The process on entry would involve checking the health certificate and reading the microchip. (See paragraphs 11.8.1 and 11.8.2. of the Full Report.)
Recommendation 19
Failure to meet conditions
19. The risk of importing rabies increases when animals fail to meet the conditions that would be required under the proposed new system. We recommend that any cat or dog presented at a checkpoint which does not meet the conditions set out in Recommendations 1 or 2, should either be placed in quarantine for six months, or until it can be demonstrated that it does meet the required conditions, or be required to be re-exported. (See paragraph 10.6.1. of the Full Report.)
Recommendation 20
Certificate of lawful entry
20. One of the advantages of the current system of quarantine is that any animal entering the country, other than through the quarantine system, can be assumed by all, especially members of the public, to be doing so illegally. Under the proposed new system it would not be possible to assume that an animal being imported is necessarily an illegal import. We were concerned that measures should be taken to allow legal imports to be more easily distinguished by officials and public from illegal ones. We recommend that on satisfactory completion of the check at the point of entry, the animal owner be issued with a certificate to confirm that the animal is being imported legally. We recommend that the certificate be accompanied by a windscreen sticker for those travelling by car. (See paragraph 11.8.4. of the Full Report.)
Recommendation 21
Powers of stop and search
21. It will be necessary for enforcement officers to be able to detain and search vehicles which they have reason to suspect may contain an illegal import. We recommend that appropriate measures be taken to give personnel manning points of entry the necessary authority to stop and search vehicles that they have reason to suspect may be carrying illegally imported animals, and to detain any animals found. This could be achieved by designating enforcement personnel, (including those under contract to Agriculture Departments), as inspectors under the Animal Health Act 1981. (See paragraph 11.8.8. of the Full Report.)
Recommendation 22
Microchip readers
22. It is essential that enforcement officers have the necessary equipment. We recommend that the Minister ensure that personnel operating the system have microchip readers that can detect and decode microchips of all systems currently in use in the qualifying countries. (See paragraph 8.4.2. of the Full Report.)
Recommendation 23
Failure to locate or read microchip
23. As has been said, the risk of importing rabies increases when animals fail to meet the conditions that would be required under the proposed new system. Thus, if a microchip cannot be read, the animal’s identity must be considered suspect, and all other paperwork relating to that animal also considered suspect. We recommend that if, at any stage of the import procedure, the enforcement officer is unable to locate or read an animal’s microchip, the certificate must be regarded as invalid and the animal denied entry. (See paragraph 8.4.7. of the Full Report.)
Recommendation 24
Monitoring system
24. We recommend that, because a number of the implementation measures depend on our best estimate of the numbers of animals likely to be imported, the Minister keep the new system under review. We recommend, in particular, that the numbers of animals being imported through each port, the time of day and the time of year of entry, all be monitored to see whether enforcement is deployed efficiently. Furthermore, we recommend that the degree of compliance with the new system be monitored. (See paragraph 11.11.1. of the Full Report.)
Recommendation 25
Animals subject to quarantine
25. We see no reason to alter the arrangements that currently apply to the import of an animal into quarantine. Restrictions exist as regards the British ports through which animals may currently be imported under the existing quarantine system. We recommend that, in respect of those animals entering Great Britain that would not qualify for exemption from quarantine, these arrangements should continue. (See paragraph 11.5.2. of the Full Report.)
Recommendation 26
Import licences
26. We were concerned that Agriculture Departments issue import licences to authorised carriers in respect of animals going into quarantine, but do not check to discover what happens to those licences that do not appear to be used. Whilst many used licences are returned to the issuing Department, this is not a requirement imposed upon authorised carriers. We recommend that the system of import licences should continue to operate in respect of those animals that are not exempt from quarantine, but that closer attention should be paid to ensuring that licences which are issued are recovered, even if not used. (See paragraph 11.6.2. of the Full Report.)
A Harmonised EU System
Recommendation 27
27.1 An important element of EU law is the principle of proportionality. It refers to the need for any Member State to justify any national law which, prima facie, appears to deviate from EU law, by showing that it is proportionally necessary to meet some particular national need or avoid some risk or danger. One example is any law of a Member State aimed at protecting the health of its citizens and animals which might otherwise be threatened by practices of the other Member States. The system of quarantine is seen by some as disproportionate to the risk posed by rabies within the EU. The question arises whether what we propose, involving checks on animals at points of entry, is proportionate to the risk of introducing rabies. We conclude, on the basis of our risk assessment, that it is.
27.2 To take account of the EU dimension, however, we propose that our recommendations be taken forward in the following manner:
a) that the Minister introduce the new system specifically and explicitly as a transitional system;
b) that the Minister simultaneously seek to promote a harmonised EU system of controls against rabies which will reflect the concerns and meet the needs identified in our recommendations. (See paragraph 10.5.5. of the Full Report.)
Recommendation 28
28. We recognise that, in any harmonised EU system, reliance on a system of checks at points of entry may not be acceptable to all Member States. We recommend that, until rabies has been effectively eradicated from the EU and appropriate EU-wide measures put in place in respect of animals to be imported from third countries where rabies is endemic (including the candidate countries of eastern Europe), the Minister should, if necessary, seek a derogation from a harmonised EU system to allow checks to take place at British points of entry. (See paragraph 10.5.7. of the Full Report.)
Recommendation 29
29. We recommend, further, that in any EU harmonised system, adequate controls be put in place against importing rabies from countries outside the EU, including those in eastern Europe, which are candidates to join the EU. We recommend that such controls involve a period in quarantine for rabies-susceptible mammals arriving from rabies-endemic countries. We recommend that the views of the European Commission’s Scientific Veterinary Committee (ScVC) proposing a period of only four months for quarantine should not be adopted as the basis for the development of a harmonised policy, until a thorough assessment of the risk of introducing rabies posed by stipulating such a period has been carried out, given the relatively high proportion of animals that can incubate the disease for more than four months. (See paragraph 10.5.8. of the Full Report.)
Rabies Controls in Species Other than Domestic Cats and Dogs
Recommendation 30
30. We have found no evidence that species other than members of the Orders Carnivora and Chiroptera have been responsible for initiating or maintaining rabies. We believe, therefore, that to maintain quarantine for such other species from within the qualifying countries is unjustified. We recommend that the system of rabies quarantine, for non-carnivores from qualifying countries be discontinued. We recommend that the import of such animals be allowed, if they are accompanied by a health certificate giving sufficient assurance that the animal concerned has been resident in one or more qualifying countries for at least six months and has not been resident on a premises that has had a case of rabies within 30 days of the certificate being issued. We recommend that all animals exempt from quarantine should be subject to the same restricted list of possible ports of entry into Great Britain, and to the same procedures on arrival as cats and dogs. We recommend, however, that non-carnivores imported from other countries should continue to be subject to six months quarantine. We recommend that the Minister monitor the progress of scientific research and keep under review the possibility of further relaxing quarantine rules with respect to non-carnivores. (See paragraphs 11.8.5 and 13.7.4. of the Full Report.)
Recommendation 31
Bats
31. Bats of all types, on the other hand, have been identified as capable of being infected with rabies, or rabies-related viruses, in most continents of the world, including Europe. The extent and nature of these infections are still unknown. We recommend that, in accordance with the recommendation of the ScVC, imported bats from all countries be subject to quarantine for life until scientific knowledge is more complete. (See paragraph 13.7.5. of the Full Report.)
Recommendation 32
Carnivores (other than cats and dogs)
32. We recommend that carnivores (other than cats and dogs) imported from anywhere outside the British Isles should be subject to quarantine for six months. We recognise, however, that, were it not for the absence of any authorised vaccine or blood test suitable for such animals, there may be a case for allowing such animals from qualifying countries that also meet the various conditions applicable to cats and dogs, to enter Great Britain without undergoing quarantine. We recommend that the Minister keep this situation under review. (See paragraph 13.7.6. of the Full Report.)
Recommendation 33
Carnivores from zoos and research establishments
33. We recommend that the Minister give further consideration to allowing the import without quarantine of carnivores that have been held in zoological collections or research establishments from non-qualifying countries with a low incidence of rabies to equivalent collections or establishments in Great Britain. (See paragraph 13.7.7. of the Full Report.)
Animal Diseases Exotic to Great Britain
Recommendation 34
34. We were asked to assess the risk that exotic diseases could be imported by animals currently required to undergo quarantine. Such an assessment could potentially include all the animal diseases that are exotic to Great Britain. The scope of this undertaking was beyond our resources. We looked only at the commonest of such diseases and focused on those that were of potential danger to humans. That said, we do not underestimate the importance of an assessment being made of other potential disease risks. We recommend that the Minister assess the risk of introducing diseases other than rabies posed by the import of all species of animals currently subject to the quarantine regulations from all qualifying countries. Priority should be given to assessing this risk from the import of cats and dogs. (See paragraph 14.4.3. of the Full Report.)
Recommendation 35
Echinococcus multilocularis
35. One of the diseases we considered was infection with Echinococcus multilocularis which is present in Continental Europe but not in Great Britain. Because E. multilocularis can produce serious disease in humans, we recommend that efforts should be made to ensure that it does not become established in Great Britain. To this end, we recommend that all imported cats, dogs and foxes should be treated with praziquantel, or some other preparation that is effective against this parasite no more than 24 hours before entry into or return to Great Britain. We further recommend that this should be certified on the health certificate accompanying the animal. (See paragraph 14.4.4. of the Full Report.)
Recommendation 36
Rhipicephalus sanguineus
36. There are various skin parasites that act as vectors for disease in cats and dogs. Of these, a tick, Rhipicephalus sanguineus, has been identified as a vector for several diseases that could become established in Great Britain. We recommend that all imported cats and dogs be treated with preparations licensed for the treatment of ticks no more than 24 hours before entry into or return to Great Britain. We further recommend that this be certified on the health certificate accompanying the animal. (See paragraph 14.4.5. of the Full Report.)
Other matters
Recommendation 37
37. Although various strains of rabies can be distinguished on the basis of genetic and immunological studies, all strains of rabies have characteristics in common, including common antigens that separate them from other Lyssaviruses. At present, this results in existing vaccines protecting against all known strains of the virus, but not necessarily against all other Lyssaviruses. We recommend that epidemiological surveillance of the rabies virus be maintained by the OIE and the WHO in order to detect at an early stage any changes that may indicate the need to update the composition of rabies vaccines. We also recommend that the Minister should keep the development of scientific knowledge in this area under review.(See paragraph 7.5.7. of the Full Report.)
Recommendation 38
38. Animals which are carriers of rabies have been recorded, but the evidence available suggests that this state is rare, and that the likelihood of carrier animals playing a significant role in the spread of disease is low. Continued research into this phenomenon would assist in establishing the true extent and impact of carrier animals. Any such animal would nevertheless present a potential risk to humans. We recommend that consideration be given to how research into the existence and prevalence of carrier status in animals can be carried forward. We also recommend research into how rabies-infected animals might be distinguished from vaccinated animals. (See paragraphs 5.10.4 and 7.5.6. of the Full Report.)
Recommendation 39
39. In the absence of rabies in Great Britain, there is no need for any system of prophylaxis to be administered to humans bitten by cats and dogs. Were the disease to become established in a wildlife population, this situation might change, although we noted the infrequency of human cases of rabies, even in countries where the fox-adapted strain is endemic. We recommend that, while a system for recording dog bites in humans in Great Britain is currently unnecessary, given the extremely low risk of acquiring rabies, the Minister keep the matter under review. (See paragraph 6.9.8. of the Full Report.)
Recommendation 40
40. The risk of importing rabies under the proposed new system could be reduced still further were rabies to be eradicated from the existing EU, and from the candidate countries of eastern Europe. We recommend that the Minister encourage the relevant Member States vigorously to promote the current programmes of vaccination of foxes in the EU, until rabies is eradicated. We recommend further that the Minister encourage the European Commission to lend support to countries adjacent to the EU to continue the process of eradicating rabies from their territories. (See paragraph 7.5.5. of the Full Report.)
Recommendation 41
41. In order to ensure that the new system operates smoothly after introduction, it will be necessary for animal owners to understand what the arrangements are, and what measures they have to take before bringing their animal to Great Britain, or before they return to Great Britain. Furthermore, it may well be necessary to reassure British residents that they are not being put at undue risk by changing from the current system to the new one. We recommend that the Minister mount an extensive campaign of education of the public in Great Britain and the qualifying countries about the new system and its requirements. (See paragraph 11.10.1. of the Full Report.)
GLOSSARY
The definitions given below apply to the usage of these words and phrases in our Report. They are not intended to provide an inclusive definition of all usages of the word or phrase concerned.
ADJUVANT
substance injected with antigen which enhances the immune response to that antigen.
AGRICULTURE DEPARTMENTS
in England, the relevant department is the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF), in Scotland, the Scottish Office Agriculture, Environment and Fisheries Department (SOAEFD), in Wales, the Welsh Office Agriculture Department (WOAD), and in Northern Ireland, the Department of Agriculture for Northern Ireland (DANI).
ANTIBODY
protein (immunoglobulin) produced in blood by the immune system which reacts specifically with the antigen that induced it.
ANTIBODY TITRE
a measure(ment) of the amount of antibody present. Usually expressed as the highest dilution of the material (serum) in which specific antibody was detected.
ANTIGEN
substance that elicits a specific immune response.
AUTHORISED CARRIER
a company or individual who is authorised by an Agriculture Department to transport animals to a quarantine premises.
CARNIVORA
a taxonomic grouping of related carnivorous mammals e.g. dogs, cats, bears, foxes and wolves.
CARRIER
an infected animal which shows no signs/symptoms of the disease.
CHIROPTERA
a taxonomic grouping that includes all species of bat.
ELECTRONIC IDENTIFICATION
a method of identifying an animal by inserting an electronic device that can subsequently be interrogated by the use of radio waves to give a unique identification number.
ENDEMIC
a disease that is established in a defined area.
ENZYME
protein which brings about the breakdown of a compound (substrate) and is not itself used up.
enzyme-linked imunosorbent assay : ELISA
a laboratory technique for detecting or quantifying specific antibody. Antibody present in the test serum is captured by a fixed antigen and its presence detected by a second antibody linked to an enzyme. The enzyme produces a reaction that can be measured to give a quantitative measure of the antibody present.
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AREA
comprises the Member States of the European Union, together with Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway.
EUROPEAN UNION
comprises Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Republic of Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom.
GENUS
a taxonomic grouping of living things comprising those species that are most closely related. Genera is the plural of genus.
IMMUNOLOGY
the study of the immune system.
INACTIVATED VACCINE
vaccine prepared by inactivating (rendering non-infectious) live rabies virus.
INCIDENCE
the number of new cases of disease within a given time period.
INCUBATION
the development of a pathogenic organism in the body of an animal before clinical signs appear.
INCUBATION PERIOD
the time between exposure to an infectious disease and the appearance of the first signs or symptoms.
INFECTION
the invasion of body tissue by micro-organisms.
INTERNATIONAL UNIT (IU)
(1) the unit of vaccine potency. One millilitre of the Second International Antigenic Reference Preparation was considered to represent one immunising human dose and to have an antigenic value of one. The unitary value of other vaccines can be determined by comparison with reference preparations.
(2) a measure of the amount of specific antibody in blood, usually derived from the titre of the serum when assayed in parallel with a reference serum containing a known number of international units.
LYSSAVIRUSES
viruses of the genus that includes rabies.
MICROCHIP
an electric device that transmits its information when activated by certain radio-waves.
MICROCHIP READER
an electronic device which activates, reads and displays the data encoded on the microchip.
OFFICIAL VETERINARIAN
veterinarian authorised by the authorities of the state concerned.
OFFICE INTERNATIONAL DES EPIZOOTIES
an international organisation which collates and disseminates information on epizootics of animal diseases of international importance.
ORDER
taxonomic grouping comprising related families.
PROPHYLACTIC
treatment designed to prevent disease before clinical signs develop.
REFERENCE SERUM
a serum of known antibody content included to control test to test variation and permit normalisation of the result with the unknown serum. Reference sera are available from the WHO and the OIE.
RISK
the likelihood of hazard occurring.
RISK ASSESSMENT
the calculation of the probability of a hazard occurring .
SEROLOGY
any technique which detects specific antibodies in serum.
SERUM
the straw coloured liquid component of blood left when blood clots.
SPECIES ADAPTATION
the process whereby the rabies virus, after repeated transfer in one species of animal develops and maintains characteristics that favour its transmission between members of that species.
VACCINATION
administration of attenuated live or inactivated virus to animals or humans in order to stimulate immunity to the virus.
VECTOR SPECIES
a species of animal which maintains an infection in Nature within the species and then is capable of passing infection to animals of other species or to humans.
VETERINARY HEALTH CERTIFICATE
a certificate of an animal's health status prepared by a veterinary surgeon.
VIRUS
a non-filterable micro-organism which can only replicate inside living cells.
WORLD HEALTH ORGANISATION
an organisation of the United Nations concerned with the promotion of human health.
Page last modified: 26 April 2007