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Newcastle Disease: Outbreak Management

Health and Safety and Staff Welfare

4.1. All staff in contact with diseased birds must follow the precautions detailed in the relevant risk assessment and are required to use personal protective equipment.

4.2. Information and guidance Adobe Acrobat icon (30 KB) for anyone who may be involved in working with poultry that may be affected with Newcastle Disease is available.

4.3. Non Defra personnel should also seek health and safety guidance from their employer or the Health Protection Agency.

Biosecurity Guidance

4.4. Anyone coming into contact with poultry or their manure/litter runs the risk of spreading animal diseases. Biosecurity is the prevention of disease causing agents entering or leaving a livestock premises. It involves a number of measures and protocols designed to prevent potential disease causing agents being spread from one premises to another.

4.5. Biosecurity guidance Adobe acrobat pdf file (267 KB) has been produced for all those who go onto farms. It applies to everyone who enters a farm or premises with farm animals or enters land used for grazing or keeping farm animals. It applies to all animal diseases covered and includes poultry. It deals with the precautions to be taken when entering or leaving any premises with farm animals in the absence of an outbreak of animal disease, after confirmation of an outbreak of an animal disease, and to premises under specific animal disease restrictions. All personnel implementing this contingency plan in the field must follow this guidance.

4.6. Poultry owners, (particularly those with backyard flocks), game and wild bird keepers should keep wild birds, dogs, cats, rodents and other livestock out of poultry buildings and feed stores. Owners are encouraged to have an active rodent and pest control system in place, and should be vigilant for evidence of vermin and monitor vermin activity by baiting and trapping.

4.7. Further advice for poultry keepers Adobe acrobat pdf file (86 KB) is available.

4.8. This advice, and the health and safety guidance set out in this Plan, will be reissued and brought to all poultry keepers’ attention in the event of an outbreak of ND. Defra Animal Disease Control Division will provide access to use existing poultry sector databases to mail the guidance and Press Releases. Any established networks that have been developed by Defra EDPC division with respect to Farm Health Planning Initiatives (under the Animal Health and Welfare Strategy) will be used as an additional communication channel with industry, veterinary bodies and other bodies to alert poultry keepers to available best practice advice.

Animal Welfare

General Welfare Responsibilities

4.9. There is a responsibility on all involved with the keeping of poultry to anticipate problems and to take steps to mitigate the effects. Guidance would be issued by Defra to poultry keepers in advance of, or in the early stages, of movement restrictions being put in place. If welfare problems arise which cannot be alleviated by management or husbandry practices, poultry keepers will be given the opportunity to move their birds under licence. Such movements may include movement to slaughter for the food chain or to more suitable land or buildings For example, broilers and spent hens in infected areas may be permitted to move to slaughter In circumstances where healthy birds are unable to be moved off farm, and welfare problems are likely to result, a welfare disposal scheme may operate.

4.10. In order to reduce the risk of exposure it may be necessary to house poultry. Free-range producers should ensure that adequate contingency arrangements are in place for providing for the welfare of free-range birds when they need to be kept housed.

4.11. In these circumstances a welfare disposal scheme could be introduced, following a declaration by a veterinary surgeon that the birds in question are suffering (or will suffer in the near future) welfare problems, which are directly attributable to the movement restrictions. Defra will arrange the killing and disposal of birds. The killing will take place on farms, not in slaughterhouses.

4.12. There would be no payment for birds slaughtered under a disposal scheme. This is in line with current Government policy.

4.13. The Head of Livestock Strategy Division, in consultation with the Heads of Animal Welfare Division, Animal Welfare Veterinary Division and EDPC Division will draw up a contingency plan for such measures and will consult stakeholders on it.

4.14. The following poultry enterprises maybe at greatest risk of welfare problems if disease control measures are introduced:

Point of Lay Birds

4.15. Point of lay birds will need to be moved from rearer to laying accommodation. If laying accommodation can be found within the same movement restriction zone then welfare issues will not arise. However if there is no laying accommodation available within the zone, and movement of birds cannot be licensed to any other suitable premises these birds may present a welfare issue.

Broilers

4.16. Broilers, hens and other poultry in Protection and Surveillance zones and under restrictions may also need to enter welfare disposal scheme when they cannot move to slaughter houses and instigation of on farm contingency plans do not adequately prevent welfare problems from developing.

Hatcheries

4.17. Hatcheries produce day old chicks, which are then delivered to rearing units. Current legislation only allows the hatcheries to deliver day old chicks to rearing units only if they are located in the same infected area. However it is not felt that a welfare disposal scheme would be required for this category of bird because hatcheries on the whole will be aware that there is no capacity on rearing farms and can destroy the chicks with the eggs humanely at the hatchery.

Operational Procedures

Vaccination

4.18. There are two types of ND vaccine available: inactivated vaccines, in which the viral component is killed, and live vaccines. Live vaccines can be delivered through spray, aerosolisation, drinking water or direct inoculation. This means that they can be delivered to a large number of birds relatively quickly and effectively. Inactivated vaccines may only be delivered by direct inoculation, which would be impractical on a large scale.

4.19. Current vaccines protect birds against clinical disease caused by NDV, but do not protect against infection. Infected vaccinated birds will excrete the virus, but in relatively small amount, and will remain apparently healthy.

Initial Investigation

4.20. For details on operational procedures to be followed at the initial investigation stage refer to the Defra ‘Overview of Emergency Preparedness’.

Valuation

4.21. Where appropriate poultry will be valued according to standard rate cards. This system is used for valuing poultry flocks being culled for salmonella control and the range of species and husbandry types for which cards are available has been extended in consultation with the industry. In addition specialist poultry valuers may be required for valuation of species not covered by the cards and for resolving disputes.

Compensation

4.22. Compensation is payable at 100% of the market value for birds that are not affected with disease at the time of slaughter. Compensation is not payable for diseased or dead birds. [As is the case for Avian Influenza]

Slaughter

4.23. In the event of ND being identified the slaughter of poultry would be considered as a control measure in order to eliminate disease. Depending on the scale and nature of the outbreak vaccination will also be considered as a control measure. See Defra website, Newcastle Disease factsheet for details on Disease Control Strategy and Disease Control (Slaughter) Protocol.

Disposal

4.24. In an outbreak of ND the disposal of carcases and other poultry products (e.g. eggs) by incineration would be implemented immediately. However, pyre burning will not be considered for the disposal of poultry. Refer to the Defra ‘Overview of Emergency Preparedness’. for current disposal options.

Cleansing and Disinfection of Affected Premises

4.25. Preliminary cleansing and disinfection of farm premises will remain the responsibility of Defra and will be undertaken and funded by Defra. Secondary disinfection of farm premises will remain the responsibility of the owner.

Surveillance Visits
The Protection Zone

4.26. On all poultry premises within the Protection Zone there will be regular clinical inspection and examination to look for evidence of ND. When 21 days have passed since the last confirmed case in the infected area, samples will be collected from poultry on all premises in the PZ and submitted for laboratory examination.

The Surveillance Zone

4.27. When 21 days have passed since the last confirmed case in the infected area a statistically significant number of poultry premises will be inspected for signs of disease and samples collected for submission to laboratories. Premises with waterfowl will be subject to targeted surveillance because clinical disease is not always apparent in infected waterfowl.

Wild Bird Population

4.28. If there is epidemiological evidence to suggest that wild birds may have a role in the local spread of the disease, this may be investigated further if practical. The investigation may involve collection of dead wild birds for laboratory investigation.

IP/DC

4.29. When the cleansing and disinfection of infected premises has been completed satisfactory, the premises will remain under the restrictions for at least 21 days. After this, sentinel poultry can be introduced to the premises, under licence. Sentinel poultry are healthy birds that are susceptible to ND infection. The purpose of introducing sentinel birds is to detect the presence of any remaining ND virus. It is assumed that if virus remains birds will become infected and display signs of disease.

4.30. The health of the sentinel poultry will be monitored over the next 21 days to detect signs of disease. The restrictions on the premises will be lifted if the sentinel poultry remain free from disease caused by ND over the next 21 day period. If the owner decides not to use sentinel poultry, the premises will remain under restrictions for 56 days from the date that cleansing and disinfection had been completed to the satisfaction of a veterinary inspector.

Area Restrictions / Zones

4.31. PZ controls will apply for at least 21 days after the preliminary cleansing and disinfection of all associated infected premises, after which time the PZ becomes part of the SZ. The SZ will remain in place until a minimum period of 30 days has passed from the completion of the preliminary cleansing and disinfection of the last IP.

Lifting of Restrictions on the Premises

4.32. The infected area will be lifted after all surveillance visits and laboratory tests have been reported as negative, indicating that no ND virus remains.

Serology

Surveillance

4.33. Serological surveillance may be carried out for a number of reasons, including epidemiology and declaring surveillance and protection zones to be free from disease. Serological surveillance in support of lifting restrictions should not commence until at least 21 days following preliminary cleansing and disinfection of an infected premises.

Diagnostic Testing

4.34. The Veterinary Laboratories Agency at Weybridge provides the diagnostic testing service for ND.

4.35. Personnel required to undertake blood sampling will be recruited and trained under the co-ordination of the Human Resources Services Division. Personnel could be drawn from veterinary/agricultural students and from local Job Centres.

Expert Group

4.36. A permanently operational expert group comprising of epidemiologists, veterinary scientists and virologists, has been established to maintain an expertise in order to assist the competent authority in ensuring preparedness against an outbreak of ND.

4.37. In the event of an outbreak of Newcastle disease, the ND Expert Group will be convened and its membership expanded to cover diseases of poultry and will be chaired by the CVO/DCVO.

4.38. The expert group will be a strategic/tactical level group of specialists whose role will be to provide advice to senior management on surveillance programmes, analyse information and advise on control strategies. They will report to the CVO and the NDCC.

National Emergencies Epidemiology Group

4.39. Sufficient training has been undertaken to provide enough trained personnel to mount several epidemiology groups in the event of an outbreak of ND. The intention is to have at least two veterinarians trained in epidemiology in each Region.

4.40. In the event of an outbreak, the group(s) will be alerted by the NDCC and mobilised in the field as soon as the disease is confirmed. The primary task of the team is to provide the National and Local Disease Control Centres with a report, which meets with relevant Commission guidelines. The team will also advise on sanitation and carcase disposal.

Detection of Notifiable Disease in Avian Quarantine

Authorised Under Commission Decision 2000/666

Quarantine is designed to contain disease so a quarantine incident does not constitute a disease outbreak unless and until there is evidence that disease has escaped.

Clinical or laboratory evidence of disease will be reported to Defra. The [CVO or DCVO] will be alerted and an urgent telephone conference will then be convened as soon as sufficient facts have been established.

On receipt of a positive or strongly suspicious laboratory result or clinical report, the [CVO or DCVO] will convene an urgent meeting of the NEEG to interpret the initial veterinary inquiry findings for ADPG. ADPG will then decide what action is appropriate with the devolved CVO taking a lead role if applicable. The SVS routinely collates key information on quarantine in order to support this process.

Strategic level decisions should not be required. Operational level decisions will be made by the local DVM. The AHDO should be able to provide sufficient resources to deal with a single incident.

Communications will follow the ‘amber’ model in the generic contingency plan as appropriate to the nature of the incident.

Public health risks will be managed in accordance with guidance provided in section 1.

Further detail is provided in Viper Chapter 21C.


Page last modified: 01 August 2005, 4:13 PM

Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs