Disease factsheet: Outbreak Management
Human Welfare
1. Refer to the Defra ‘Overview of Emergency Preparedness’.
Biosecurity Guidance
2. Anyone coming into contact with livestock or their waste, runs the risk of spreading animal diseases. Biosecurity is the prevention of disease causing agents entering or leaving a livestock premises. It involves a number of measures and protocols designed to prevent potential disease causing agents being spread from one premises to another.
3. Biosecurity
guidance 
(KB) to prevent the spread of animal diseases has been developed (in accordance
with legislation1). This guide, for anyone who comes into contact with
animals, refer to the Defra ‘Overview of Emergency Preparedness.
Animal Welfare
4. For all involved with the keeping of livestock, there is a responsibility to anticipate problems and to take steps to mitigate the effects. Guidance will be issued by Defra to farmers in advance of, or in the early stages of, movement restrictions being put in place. If welfare problems arise, which cannot be alleviated by management or husbandry practices, farmers will be given the opportunity to move their animals under licence. Such movements will include movement to slaughter for the food chain or to more suitable land or buildings. If it is more appropriate fodder may be taken to the stock and Defra may assist in facilitating access to fodder and bedding.
5. If it is considered appropriate and to prevent deterioration in welfare standards, Defra will arrange the slaughter and disposal of animals via a Livestock Welfare Disposal Scheme. Animals will be slaughtered in abattoirs or purpose built killing plants. On farm slaughter will only take place when animals cannot be licensed off the farm or when the animals cannot be transported e.g. heavily pregnant animals or piglets. Each case will be evaluated to ensure that welfare standards are maintained. There will be no payment made to farmers for animals slaughtered under the scheme. This is in line with the policy set out in the Government’s response to the FMD Inquiries (November 2002). This states that “experience has shown that payments to farmers under such schemes can provide a disincentive for them to take responsibility for looking after their animals, and may also create a false market”.
6. The Head of Sustainable Farming Businesses/ Livestock Products Division, in consultation with the Heads of Animal Welfare Division and Exotic Disease Prevention and Control Division will draw up a contingency plan for such measures and will consult stakeholders on it.
Operational Procedures
Vaccination
7. Current domestic policy on vaccination does not permit the use of routine vaccination as a measure of disease control. However, the vaccination of rare breeds and endangered species may be considered in certain circumstances.
8. There are two subunit marker vaccines licensed for use within the EU and a test has been approved by the EC that allows vaccinated animals to be distinguished from infected animals. However, these vaccines have limitations that would be likely to preclude their use in the UK, at present. The vaccines can take 2-3 weeks to provide protection against CSF. Although the response to immunisation can protect against disease, it does not protect against infection or prevent virus shedding; the response also does not protect against in utero transmission. It is also harder to detect antibodies to field virus in vaccinated animals that have been exposed to field virus (it can take up to 6 weeks for these antibodies to reach detectable levels following exposure). Furthermore, there are also a ‘C’ strain vaccine available. They can provide rapid and strong immunity but do not comply with DIVA (Differentiating infected from vaccinated animals). The C strain vaccine does not have a marketing authorisation for use in the UK and therefore only be used following emergency authorisation by the CVO.
9. Article 19 of EU Directive 2001/89/EC states that where there is epidemiological data to suggest that CSF is likely to spread emergency vaccination may be used as a measure of disease control. Under the terms of the Directive any member state wishing to undertake a vaccination programme for the control of CSF must submit an emergency vaccination plan to the EU.
10. If such a programme were to be undertaken it is likely that a strategy of suppressive vaccination (vaccinate to kill) would be adopted.. In a large scale outbreak such a measure may help to relieve pressure on oversubscribed slaughter and disposal facilities. While the use of ‘C’ strain vaccine would be more effective in an emergency vaccination campaign there are drawbacks in that it would have to be ‘vaccinate to kill’ as we cannot differentiate between a vaccinated pig and an infected pig. There may be issues with using products from such vaccinated pigs in the human food chain as the vaccine does not have a valid marketing authorisation from the Veterinary Medicines Directorate (VMD) or its European equivalent body.
11. Defra currently has no operational arrangements in place to carry out an emergency vaccination programme for CSF. Contractual arrangements would need to be put in place for a supplier of vaccination services.
Initial Investigation
12. Refer to the Defra ‘Overview of Emergency Preparedness’.
Valuation
13. SVS holds and maintains a list of approved valuers, which is subject to review on an annual basis. In the event of an outbreak all valuers on the list will be contacted to ensure they are still eligible for approval and to remind them of their responsibilities.
14. Operational instructions require all valuations of animals slaughtered for control of exotic disease only to be undertaken by a Valuer from the approved list.
15. In order to ensure consistency in delivery of valuation policy the Department has appointed four Monitor Valuers (these appointments are reviewed on a regular basis, at least every three years). Although initially based in London, the Monitor Valuers may visit LDCC’s as necessary, depending on the extent of the outbreak.
16. Defra is currently undertaking a review of animal disease valuation and compensation procedures with a view to rationalising and simplifying them. Part of this process will be to look at the case for compulsory standard valuations. This would remove the need for individual valuation by approved valuers in many cases. Such a system would help minimise the risk of disease spread by speeding up the slaughtering process and would improve the consistency of animal valuation.
Compensation
17. Where animals are slaughtered due to CSF, compensation is payable as described in schedule 3 of the Animal Health Act 1981. If a slaughtered animal is affected with swine fever, compensation will be paid at half the value of the pig were it not affected. For all other pigs slaughtered for the control of swine fever, payment is the full value of the pig immediately before slaughter.
Slaughter
18. Refer to the Defra ‘Overview of Emergency Preparedness’.
Disposal
19. Refer to the Defra ‘Overview of Emergency Preparedness’.
Cleansing and Disinfection of Affected Premises
20. Current policy on C & D is that all preliminary and secondary disinfection is currently undertaken and funded by Defra other than at markets and slaughterhouses.
21. In the future, government funding of secondary cleansing and disinfection on farm premises will be subject to review and separate consultation as part of the consideration of the future funding of disease control measures. When carrying out cleaning and disinfection, disinfectants used must be approved by Defra for use under general orders and must be used according to the manufacturers instructions.
Laboratory Diagnosis
22. Commission Decision 2002/106/EC states that a primary outbreak of classical swine fever can be confirmed if clinical signs and lesions have been detected in pigs and at least two antigen or genomic detection tests have given a positive result. The OIE diagnostic manual states that laboratory methods for diagnosis of CSF should be aimed at detection of the virus or viral antigens, or detection of specific antibodies.
Serology
23. Serological surveillance may be carried out for a number of reasons, including epidemiology and declaring surveillance and protection zones to be free from disease. Serological surveillance in support of lifting restrictions should not commence until at least 21 days following preliminary C & D of an infected premises.
24. In GB all official diagnostic samples for CSF must be sent to the Veterinary Laboratories Agency (VLA) at Weybridge. The VLA laboratory is the National Reference Laboratory for CSF and an OIE Reference Laboratory for CSF.
Eradication of Disease in Feral Pigs
25. A feral pig is defined as a pig which is not kept or bred on a holding, and is not in a slaughterhouse, knackers yard or means of transport.
26. Investigation must take place at suspicion stage. At confirmation stage an expert group must be established to advise on controls, an infected area, and eradication plan, and to monitor then effects of controls. Pig holdings in the area must also be put under official surveillance
27. If CSF is suspected in the feral pig population powers exist to establish a feral pig investigation zone, which would monitor the presence and distribution of infected pigs.
28. Subject to veterinary advice, if CSF is found in the feral pig population a plan for its control will be submitted to the EU within 21 days of disease having been confirmed.
Protection of Rare Breeds
29. In accordance with the provisions of the EU Classical Swine Fever Directive 2001/ 89/ EC (Article 5.2) Defra will in the event of an outbreak of CSF, undertake individual risk assessments to seek where possible to protect rare breeds of pigs in zoos, wildlife parks etc. The derogation in the Council Directive against killing does not apply to farms- it is restricted to specific types of premises including: laboratory, zoo, wildlife park, or fenced area where the pigs are kept for scientific purposes or purposes related to the conservation of species or rare breeds.
Transport
30. Transport of samples should be in accordance with transport regulations and be carried out in the appropriate environment to prevent deterioration of their quality.
National Emergencies Epidemiology Group
31. Sufficient training has been undertaken to provide enough trained personnel to mount several epidemiology groups in the event of an outbreak of classical swine fever. The intention is to have at least two veterinarians trained in epidemiology in each Region.
32. In the event of an outbreak, the group(s) will be alerted by the NDCC and mobilised in the field as soon as the disease is confirmed. The primary task of the team is to provide the National and Local Disease Control Centres with a report, which meets with relevant Commission guidelines. The team will also advise on sanitation and carcase disposal.
33. The composition of the groups may vary but it is envisaged that each will consist of at least:
- A senior veterinarian
- 1-2 veterinarians
- 1 member of staff from the diagnostic laboratory (Institute for Animal Health, Pirbright).
- Field staff with training in epidemiology and meteorology.
Expert Group
34. In the event of an outbreak of CSF, the FMD Expert Group will be convened and its membership expanded to cover diseases of pigs and will be chaired by the CVO/DCVO
35. The expert group will be a strategic/tactical level group of specialists, whose role will be to provide advice to senior management on surveillance programmes, analyse information and advise on control strategies. They will report to the CVO and the NDCC.
Page last modified:
August 28, 2008