Foot and Mouth Disease: Outbreak Management
Human Welfare
1. For guidance on health and safety and staff welfare refer to the Defra ‘Overview of Emergency Preparedness’.
Biosecurity Guidance
2. Anyone coming into contact with livestock or their waste runs the risk of spreading animal diseases. Biosecurity is the prevention of disease causing agents entering or leaving a livestock premises. It involves a number of measures and protocols designed to prevent potential disease causing agents being spread from one premises to another.
3. Biosecurity guidance
(267 KB) to prevent the spread of animal diseases has been developed (in
accordance with legislation 1) This guide, for anyone who comes into contact
with animals, can be found in the Defra ‘Overview of Emergency Preparedness’,
and on the Defra website at:
Animal Welfare
4. Farmers and others involved with the keeping of livestock have a duty of care to their animals. They should anticipate problems (including those associated with disease control measures) and make appropriate plans to mitigate the effects. This should form a routine part of their business planning processes. In the normal course of business, a farmer would expect to assume responsibility where it becomes necessary to cull stock for welfare reasons. The introduction of disease control measures does not alter this obligation and normal business planning should cover action necessary to protect the welfare of animals in the event of an emergency.
5. Farmers should therefore assume that there will be an initial period during any disease outbreak where all animal (of the type affected by the outbreak) movement is prohibited. This may give rise to the risk of welfare problems and farmers should have their own contingency plan for avoiding such problems through management or husbandry practices. These might include building temporary housing or taking additional fodder to the stock.
6. In an actual outbreak, Defra, the RSPCA and other organisations may be able to provide advice and practical assistance, for example, by facilitating access to fodder and bedding. Farmers may also, wherever practicable, be given the opportunity to move their animals under a general or specific licence. Such movements may include movement to slaughter for the food chain or to more suitable land or buildings. However, the issuing of licences will be dependent on the disease situation and cannot therefore be assumed or guaranteed.
7. If all other options are exhausted and welfare problems are still a risk, farmers should be prepared to undertake welfare killing on farm. This should only be carried out by appropriately trained and qualified personnel and where necessary advice should be sought from the farmer’s own veterinary adviser. Depending on the circumstances of the case and the particular outbreak, Defra will provide guidance on the most appropriate route for disposal of such carcasses and issue licences where appropriate.
8. Defra will only consider introducing a Livestock Welfare Disposal Scheme to facilitate killing and disposal of animals as an absolute last resort when all other options have been exhausted, and only if necessary to prevent an unacceptable deterioration in welfare standards. If introduced, a disposal scheme would only apply to animals that cannot be moved under licence to a slaughterhouse, abattoir or purpose built killing plant. No payment will be made to farmers for animals slaughtered / killed under such a scheme. This is in line with the policy set out in the Government’s response to the FMD Inquiries (November 2002). This states that “experience has shown that payments to farmers under such schemes can provide a disincentive for them to take responsibility for looking after their animals, and may also create a false market”.
9. Defra will encourage the preparation of industry sector guidance, by individual sector bodies, on the steps that can be taken to alleviate welfare problems resulting from movement restrictions imposed for disease control reasons. We will also encourage consideration of industry led welfare disposal contingency arrangements. This will be addressed in the context of the ongoing development of the Animal Health and Welfare Responsibility and Cost Sharing arrangements.
Conservation of “Farm Animal Genetic Resources”
10. Under the Animal Health Act 1981 (as amended by the Animal Health Act 1981 (Amendment) Regulations 2006 special measures can be applied for the conservation of “farm animal genetic resources” (rare breeds) on premises that are identified in advance, in the event of an FMD outbreak. There are agreed definitions for such groups of animals and a registration process has been developed, which is publicised on the Defra website. Providing the highest levels of biosecurity are implemented to prevent the spread of disease, premises holding the registered breeding nucleus may qualify for derogations from killing all susceptible animals if the premise becomes infected, and consideration will be given to the use of emergency vaccination if the premises falls within a vaccination zone, but did not meet the criteria for vaccination. The derogation from slaughter would only be applied for the rare breed animals and not for any “commercially” kept animals on the same premises. The use of any of the measures would only be available in exceptional cases and the message about the registration of animals is being carefully managed to ensure that producers have realistic expectations about the possibility of rare breed animals being spared from slaughter.
Conservation of Zoo Animals
Derogation for Zoos and Wildlife Parks
11. Species of animals susceptible to foot and mouth (FMD) are defined by the FMD (England) Order 2006 as a cow, bull, sheep, goat, deer, camel, llama, alpaca, guanaco, vicuna, any other ruminant, and any swine (that is, a member of the suborder Suina of the order Artiodactyla), elephants and rodents (excluding pet rodents).
12. An amendment to the AHA 1981 (under the Animal Health Act 1981 (Amendment)
Regulations 2005) allows for an exemption from the duty of slaughter on
infected premises (although still subject to a discretion to slaughter)
to be applied to certain types of premises where susceptible species are
present. These include zoos and wildlife parks in addition to laboratories
and certain premises where animals are kept for scientific purposes or
for the conservation of animals that are indispensable for the survival
of that species/breed. We would also consider the use of emergency vaccination.
13. As recommended by the Royal Society Report, individual zoos or owners
of rare breeds would be responsible for applying for permission to vaccinate
animals of susceptible species.
14. The decision to vaccinate would be informed by the legal requirements of the Animal Health Act 1981 (as amended) and the FMD (Control of Vaccination) (England) Regulations 2006, and considered in line with veterinary and epidemiological advice at the time of an outbreak. Such a decision would take into account biosecurity measures employed at the premises, including restriction of access.
15. The arrangements for the vaccination of zoo animals have yet to be finalised, however consideration is being given to the most appropriate personnel to undertake it.
16. There is no requirement for zoo animals to be pre-registered to enable them to qualify for special measures under the FMD legislation. However, the Royal Society Report recommended that a list of zoos be drawn up so that they can be easily located in the event of an outbreak. Defra’s Global Wildlife Division has developed a database for England and is currently populating this with information received from Local Authorities.
Operational Procedures
Initial Investigation
17. For details on operational procedures to be followed at the initial investigation stage refer to the Defra ‘Overview of Emergency Preparedness’.
Valuation
18. A list of valuers who are approved to undertake livestock valuation on behalf of Defra for exotic disease control is maintained by the SVS and reviewed annually. Each valuer has instructions for carrying out valuations. In the event of an outbreak of FMD, Defra will contact these valuers and confirm their eligibility and wish to remain on the list. They will also be provided with the latest version of the Instructions to Valuers.
19. Where livestock are required to be valued the Field Operations Team in the LDCC will contact a valuer from the list. If necessary, more than one valuer may be appointed if the nature of the stock is beyond the expertise of one valuer and to ensure valuation and hence slaughter is undertaken as rapidly as possible. Only valuers from the approved list may be used. If appropriate, clerical assistance to facilitate the rapid valuation may be available.
20. In the event of an animal disease outbreak, the Department will call upon the services of Monitor Valuers who have been appointed (these appointments will be reviewed regularly). Initially the Monitor Valuers will attend Defra offices in London to advise on further instruction and guidance to issue to valuers (reflecting species affected, area etc.) to ensure uniformity in valuations and fairness to both livestock owners and taxpayers. Depending on the extent of the outbreak the Monitor Valuers could be situated in London and in/near LDCCs.
Compensation
21. A review of all the animal disease compensation arrangements is being undertaken with a view to rationalisation and simplification. Part of this process will be to look at the case for compulsory standard valuation. This would remove the need for individual valuation in many or most cases. Such a system would help speed up the slaughtering process which is necessary to further reduce the risk of disease spread and would ensure a greater degree of uniformity in animal valuation.
Slaughter
22. The policy in the event of an outbreak of FMD is governed by the Foot and Mouth Disease (England) Order 2006 and is to slaughter susceptible animals on infected premises and those identified as dangerous contacts. See Defra website, FMD disease factsheet for further details on Disease Control Strategy and Disease Control Slaughter Protocol.
Disposal
23. Refer to the Defra ‘Overview of Emergency Preparedness’ for details on disposal options
Cleansing and Disinfection of Affected Premises
24. Preliminary C & D will remain the responsibility of Defra and will be undertaken and paid for by Defra. Government funding of secondary cleansing and disinfection on farm premises will be subject to review and separate consultation as part of the consideration of the future funding of disease control measures.
Restricted Zone
25. A restricted zone is an area where restrictions are imposed around protection and surveillance zones and which can extend to cover the whole of the country (and would do so at least in the early stages of an outbreak although it might subsequently be shrunk to cover only part of the country to allow regionalisation and freedom from control for areas that are free of disease).
Immediate Ban on Moving Livestock – Controlled Area
26. All livestock movements from any farm premises are prohibited once disease has been confirmed and a Declaratory Order made. Movements within farm premises (e.g. from field to field) may continue to take place. This will apply nationally if the disease is FMD.
27. These restrictions will apply until the extent of the disease has been assessed and the risk of further spread is minimised. The movement of infected livestock poses the greatest risk of a disease spread.
28. Livestock in transit at the time disease is confirmed will be allowed to continue to its destination or to return to the premises of departure. Stock at markets, collecting centres and assembly centres should remain there for up to 21 days, unless their owner or new owner wishes to send them to slaughter (once the abattoirs are operating) or back to the premises from which they were consigned. Premises which receive/take live animals (excluding abattoirs) in these circumstances would be subject to restrictions for at least 21 days.
29. As the disease situation becomes clearer, certain types of movements will be permitted subject to certain conditions. The first movement is likely to be movements of livestock to slaughterhouses. The condition applied will depend upon the type of restrictions the premises or area is under. It will be some time before movements of livestock to other farms will be permitted, especially if the recipient farm has resident livestock. Likewise it will be some time before movements of livestock to livestock markets or shows will be permitted.
30. In a few circumstances it may be necessary to move livestock in an emergency situation e.g. straying stock; livestock at risk of rising water levels; emergency veterinary treatment etc. These exceptional circumstances will be dealt with locally on a case by case basis taking into consideration the welfare of the livestock and the disease risk.
Surveillance
31. Those carrying out clinical examinations or serological sampling will do so in accordance with the FMD (England) Order 2006 in transposing the requirements of Annex III of Directive 2003/85/EC (which may be varied by decisions of the European Commission).
Serology
32. The Institute for Animal Health (IAH) Pirbright and the Veterinary Laboratories Agency at Weybridge provides the diagnostic testing service for FMD. It also carries out additional tests (i.e. VNT) on positive or inconclusive serology samples submitted by VLA.
33. IAH Pirbright offers an immediate serology capacity of up to 8,000 samples per week. Defra has an agreement with the VLA that they will provide serological testing capacity for FMD on a contingency basis of 120,000 samples per week at three laboratories. The first laboratory would be ready to start testing within three weeks of notification with an initial capacity of 7,000 tests per week, 20,000 tests in the second week and reaching full capacity of 40,000 in the third week. The second laboratory would be operational within 6 weeks and a third laboratory within 8 weeks with the same capacity build up. Full capacity of 120,000 tests per week would be reached by the tenth week.
34. Personnel required to undertake blood sampling will be recruited and trained under the co-ordination of Human Resources Services Division. Personnel could be drawn from veterinary/agricultural students and from local Job Centres.
35. In a vaccination zone surveillance will be carried out, after a minimum of 30 days have elapsed since vaccination was completed, to establish whether any vaccinated herd or flock has become infected with virus.
36. Diagnostic testing will be carried out in accordance with the requirements of Annex XIII of Directive 2003/85/EC (which may be varied by Decisions of the European Commission).
Transport of Samples
37. DVMs will ensure they have access to the best means of transporting blood samples during an animal disease outbreak as set out in SVS operational instructions.
Emergency Vaccination Arrangements
Accommodation
38. For vaccination, the contractor will provide 3 portable forward vaccination centres capable of being relocated to areas of the country where vaccination services are required, to enable a vaccination programme to commence on day 5 of an outbreak. Each forward vaccination centre comprises of:
- a transportable ‘office’ equipped to accommodate up to 12 staff to be involved with the control scheduling and reporting of vaccination activity and the provision of necessary supplies;
- a transportable ‘mess room’ providing basis facilities (rest room and canteen) for staff and for use for meetings. The Mess Room will also be the operational centre for a small team of reserve Vaccinators responsible for control, cleaning, disinfection and distribution of handling equipment;
- a secure equipment storage facility, consisting of hired containers;
- a secure location for clinical waste.
39. Additionally, a range of suitable sites are currently being investigated for use as vaccination centres. In doing so, consideration will be given to the following factors:
- good road access to the target area(s) and to any satellite centres - where possible, within the target area;
- appropriate security systems (day and night);
- parking;
- office accommodation for management and administrative staff;
- appropriate IT and telecoms facilities;
- secure refrigerated storage facilities for vaccine;
- storage facilities for equipment (vaccination kits, personal protection equipment, footbaths, buckets, tagging and inspection equipment, etc.;
- facilities for mixing, storage and safe disposal of disinfectant;
- suitable area for plunge disinfection of Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) and subsequent drying;
- suitable area for vaccination team dispatch.
Equipment
40. The Vaccination Contractor is required to supply, store and distribute the necessary equipment to support a vaccination programme and to replace items as they reach the end of their shelf life or have been found to deteriorate. The Contractor will appoint Stores Managers to maintain these stores - which will hold enough equipment to supply 50 vaccination teams and veterinary surgeons for at least the first 5 days of a vaccination programme - and will have in place contracts for the replenishment of those stocks within 48 hours.
41. Defra will remain responsible for the maintenance of call of contracts for disinfectant, ear tags and applicators, mobile handling facilities and vehicles to tow mobile facilities complete with disinfectant containers and power washers and call off contracts are currently being put in place for this purpose.
Personnel
42. The vaccination contractor is in a position of being operationally capable of vaccinating on day 5 following confirmation of disease. To arrive at this state of readiness sufficient vaccinators and support staff have been trained to provide 50 teams and some 60 vets have been recruited to support this first response team. Working under the overall control of the SVS, the role of these vets will be to conduct pre-vaccination farm visits, to check for any overt signs of disease, and also to be responsible for the veterinary direction of vaccination teams in the field. The vaccination contractor also has the capability to ramp up the number of vaccination teams to meet any reasonable disease scenario within 4/5 days of notification.
43. A Health and Safety Team will be established by the vaccination contractor as part of the management of operational aspects. This will consist of a Manager and 2 other trained H&S consultants. This team will produce risk assessments for pre-vaccination visits by vets, for farm vaccinators, on handling facilities and maintain the necessary documentation to accompany this. The vaccination contractor will comply with best practice and all relevant provisions whether statutory or otherwise, relating to health and safety at work and shall ensure that employees and sub-contractors also comply and shall produce evidence of such compliance if asked to do so.
44. All external contractors will be provided with, and will make themselves familiar with, Biosecurity Protocols.
45. To ensure that emergency vaccination could be implemented without delays in any future outbreak, the Veterinary Surgeons Act 1966 and the Medicines Act 1968 have been amended. This allows non-veterinary personnel to handle and administer FMD vaccine and in particular will allow vaccine to be supplied and administered by lay vaccinators who:
- Are 18 years of age or over
- Are acting under the direction of a veterinary surgeon, and
- Have obtained a certificate of competence from a veterinary surgeon
46. All casual staff recruited by the contractor must meet specified criteria, including no contact with susceptible livestock for 3 days prior to starting the programme, during the programme and for 3 days after completion. They must sign to say that they comply.
47. Defra will convey the scope and policy of the project to the vaccination contractor, and confirm the approach to be taken. This will involve providing vaccine delivery arrangements. Defra will also keep the vaccination contractor informed of all suspect and confirmed cases as they occur and will keep the vaccination contractor informed of current policy and changes which may affect field operations.
Vaccine Supplies and Emergency Vaccination Arrangements
48. The UK has its own stocks of 9 different strains of FMD antigen, adding up to over 20 million doses held on its behalf by a commercial supplier. In addition, the EU Vaccine Bank holds a wide range of antigens for emergency use. The number of doses available and strains is kept under review, including taking advice from IAH Pirbright on those strains of FMD which present the greatest risk to the UK. As soon as the FMD strain responsible for the outbreak is identified and it has been confirmed that one of the antigens held in the UK bank will afford protection, the supplier will be instructed to formulate vaccine. Vaccine formulation by the designated external contractor takes 4 days.
49. A call-off contract is in place with the external contractor for the delivery of vaccine (stored at the correct temperature) to the vaccination centre.
50. When an vaccination zone is set up, a vaccination surveillance zone of at least 10 km width surrounding the vaccination zone must be designated.
51. Upon establishment of the emergency vaccination zone, the vaccination contractor will then produce a complete list of holdings within selected parishes (or other agreed area to be targeted) in the Vaccination Control Zone and identify those with animals that require vaccination as advised by Defra. This information will be drawn together from the following sources, which Defra will provide access to, where appropriate:
- Defra Census Data,
- The Rural Payments Agency (RPA);
- Cattle Tracing System (CTS);
- Integrated Administration and Control (IACS) data;
- Defra’s Disease Control System (DCS) on Infected Premises and Dangerous Contacts;
- Contextual datasets, such as Ordnance Survey (OS), Boundary Line (to produce parish and county boundaries), and OS raster map products.
- List of holdings containing a breeding nucleus of animal genetic resources (rare breeds).
52. The vaccination contractor will then contact farmers to arrange visits (giving 3 days notice where possible) and check animal handling facilities.
53. Pre-vaccination visits by veterinary surgeons appointed by the vaccination contractor will be arranged to carry out inspections which will detect suspected FMD and to exclude these from the vaccination programme.
54. Teams will be withdrawn from farms where clinical signs of FMD have been discovered. In doing so, biosecurity protocols must be followed (i.e. remove traces of organic matter from clothing, equipment, disinfect and remove any protective clothing at gate, wash wellingtons, waterproofs and equipment (inc. vehicles) with an approved disinfectant, and place all items for disposal into a clinical waste bag, which should then be sealed for disposal. Teams would be redeployed after suitable biosecurity protocols have been followed and a 72 hour break.
55. Where FMD is not found, vaccination teams will be deployed to carry out vaccination, record animal numbers, collect and return records. Vaccinated animals will be ear-tagged in a manner outlined in the FMD (Control of Vaccination) (England) Regulations 2006 and advised by Defra. For identification purposes, vaccinated cattle will also have their details recorded on the cattle passport and, for all animals, on the Defra disease control database. However, in an outbreak situation where the disease has been rapidly brought under control it will not be necessary to administer booster doses.
56. Under the current UK Marketing Authorisation conditions, FMD vaccine is authorised for use as a multi dose vaccine i.e. the initial vaccine is followed by a second 3-4 weeks later, and a further booster after six months (or every 4 weeks after the initial vaccine is administered in the case of pigs.) However in an outbreak situation where the disease has been rapidly brought under control it will not be necessary to administer booster doses.
57. The vaccination contractor will also provide progress reports and ad hoc management information to NDCC at Page Street by 18.00 hours daily.
Timing
58. The vaccination contractor is required to be operationally capable of vaccinating on day 5 of an outbreak with at least 17 vets (although a reserve of over 60 vets has been recruited) and sufficient trained vaccinators and support staff for 50 teams. Working under the overall control of the SVS, the role of these vets will be to conduct pre-vaccination farm visits, to check for any overt signs of disease, and also to be responsible for the veterinary direction of vaccination teams in the field. As emergency vaccination is to be considered as an option from the start of any future FMD outbreak, the vaccination contractor will be placed on standby by the Contingency Planning Director as soon as disease is confirmed. The particular strain of the FMD virus would need to be identified and the vaccine would need to be formulated before vaccination could begin.
59. Veterinary advice to Ministers will be bases on epidemiological evidence and it is unlikely to be immediately available. It is probable that gathering epidemiological data, veterinary assessment of this epidemiological data, the use of the Decision Tree and the development of advice on the strategic deployment of vaccination made it unlikely that vaccination could begin until more than five days after the first confirmed case.
Expert Group
An FMD Expert Group has been established, to maintain an expertise in order to assist in ensuring preparedness against a disease outbreak.
60. The FMD Directive requires the establishment of a permanently operational expert group comprised of epidemiologists, veterinary scientists and virologists, to maintain an expertise in order to assist the competent authority in ensuring preparedness against an outbreak of FMD. The Directive also sets down the functions this group would be expected to fulfill if an outbreak occurred.
61. Pre-outbreak the FMD Expert Group will meet on at least a six monthly basis.
62. In the event of an outbreak, the FMD Expert Group in some form will meet on a daily basis.
The FMD Expert Group will comprise:
Chair: Defra CVO/DCVO
| FMD advice/consultation on clinical disease recognition | IAH Pirbright |
| FMD virologist/diagnosis | IAH Pirbright |
| FMD pathogenesis/pathology | IAH Pirbright |
| FMD Vaccination | IAH Pirbright |
| FMD Epidemiology | Defra’s Consultant Epidemiologist |
| Meteorologist | Met Office/IAH Pirbright |
| Serology | VLA |
| Observer/link to Science Advisory Council | Head of Veterinary Research Division, Defra |
| Epidemiologists | SVS (HQ) Vets and other staff responsible for field epidemiology |
| Modelling representatives | |
| Veterinary representatives of the devolved administrations |
63. The expert group will be a strategic/tactical level group of specialists
whose role will be to provide advice to senior management on surveillance
programmes, analyse information and advise on control strategies. They
will report to and be directed by the ADPG. In an outbreak the Expert
Group will also have close links with the NEEG, the NDCC and the SAC-ED
through its nominated member.
National Emergencies Epidemiology Group
64. A group of people will be established who have skills and technical knowledge of clinical science and epidemiology of FMD and the methods of prevention and eradication of an outbreak of the disease. In the event of an outbreak this group will become the national emergencies epidemiology group providing advice and information to the centre and to the policy group.
This group will comprise of five teams with expertise drawn from the AHWDG, SVS, VLA, IAH and Met office as appropriate. The teams will be responsible for:
- Descriptive epidemiology
- Analytical epidemiology to include data analysis, data release, GIS and involvement with surveillance strategy for disease and disease freedom
- Modelling to include interspread, development of models and liaison with other modelling groups
- Providing epidemiological information from the field (National Field Epidemiology Team)
- Risk assessment to update the existing risk assessments from the 2001 outbreak
Page last modified:
January 14, 2008