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FMD: Comparisons with the 1967 FMD outbreak

How the 2001 outbreak of Foot and Mouth differs from the 1967 outbreak.

1. Introduction

The last major foot-and-mouth epidemic in the UK occurred in 1967-8. Since the start of the current outbreak, the Government has looked at different aspects of the 1967-8 experience. This report summarises those comparisons.

In the thirteen years before the 1967-8 epidemic, there were only two years with no recorded outbreaks of foot-and-mouth. Most were rapidly contained, but in the early 1950s there was also a substantial epidemic. Periods of freedom from foot-and-mouth outbreaks before 1967 were measured in months not years. At the time the disease was endemic throughout Europe and as a consequence there was greater awareness of the clinical picture both in the UK and on the continent.

But since the adoption of the recommendations in the 1969 Northumberland Report, there had been only one outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease in the UK: in the Isle of Wight in 1981. The risk of infection in this area had been predicted and warnings issued. A case of foot-and-mouth in cattle was promptly reported by the owner to the authorities. Quick action isolated and then eradicated the disease. Further investigation confirmed that the primary outbreak was due to windborne infection from Brittany in northern France.

In the thirty-odd years since the last major outbreak in the UK, the nature of the British livestock industry has changed. This in part explains why there are substantial differences between the 1967-8 epidemic and the current outbreak. It is these differences, rather than the parallels, which help most in explaining why this epidemic occurred.

 

1In the fifty years before the 1967-8 epidemic, there were three official inquiries into foot-and-mouth epidemics and the Government's response, in 1922, 1923-4 and 1953.
2"The Report of the Committee of Inquiry on Foot-and-Mouth Disease", Parts 1 and 2, published 7 March 1969 and 3 November 1969, established by the then Minister for Agriculture Fredrick Peart, on 28 February 1968, commonly referred to as the Northumberland Report. The recommendations in the Northumberland Report form the basis of the Government's policy for keeping the disease out of the country, and of our contingency plans for fighting a foot-and-mouth epidemic. Other reports contributed to the lessons learnt from the 1967-8 epidemic, such as the "Origins of the 1967-8 Foot-and-Mouth Disease Epidemic", John Reid (Chief Veterinary Officer), 7 February 1968; and the "Report on the Foot-and-Mouth Outbreak 1967-8 in Western Command". But the Northumberland Report differs from these in the breath of its mandate, the depth of its investigation, and its status.

2. Origins of the outbreak

Both in 1967 and in 2001, the origins of the infection is crucial to understanding why the outbreak grew to epidemic proportions.

The most likely cause of the 1967-8 epidemic was infected Argentine lamb that had been legally imported and then, legally, entered the animal food chain. On Saturday 21 October 1967, the owner of Bryn Farm in Oswestry, Shropshire, noticed that one sow was lame. On Wednesday 25 October, veterinary advice was sought and the disease was diagnosed. 17 pigs on the farm were infected, but by then one cow had already been sent to the local market (another was stopped from reaching the market by the police). Because the cow did not show any signs of infection, a decision was taken to disperse all the other animals that had been at the market, rather than slaughter them. Subsequent inspection showed that none of these animals were infected from contact with animals from Bryn Farm.

However, a second outbreak of the disease occurred on Saturday 28 October, and a third was confirmed the next day. Nine outbreaks were confirmed on Monday 30 October, including three some distance from Bryn Farm. The next day there were 11 outbreaks. In the following week, another 105 were reported, rising to 222 the week after.

The subsequent investigation by the Chief Veterinary Officer concluded that in 24 outbreaks throughout the entire epidemic there was a possible link with frozen lamb from Establishment 1408 in Argentina. It was this multiplicity of primary outbreaks that made the control of the disease so difficult.

The precise origins of the current epidemic remain to be confirmed. But the uncontested facts are as follows. On Monday 19 February this year, a veterinary inspector at an abattoir in Brentwood, Essex, suspected foot-
and-mouth in pigs being held for slaughter. The particular virus was subsequently identified the next day as sub-type O PanAsiatic, a highly virulent strain. By Friday 23 February, there were six confirmed cases: four in Essex, near the Brentwood abattoir, and two in Northumberland.

A farm at Heddon on the Wall in Northumberland is considered to be the most likely source of the primary outbreak. From here the virus is believed to have spread by airborne plume to seven farms in Tyne and Wear and one of these sent infected sheep to Hexham market on 13 February. Some sheep from the 13 February Hexham market were sent via dealers to markets at Longtown (Cumbria) on 15 and 22 February and then further dispersed over the period 14-24 February. How the virus reached Heddon on the Wall farm is currently the subject of a court investigation.

In 1967, the multiple primary outbreaks of the disease from imported infected meat was one factor which led to the 1967 outbreak developing into an epidemic, although local spread in a densely stocked area also played a major role. Likewise in 2001, the nature of the outbreak helps explain why it became an epidemic. The ability to control an outbreak is directly proportional to the speed with which it is reported. The primary outbreak which triggered the current epidemic was never reported. It was only detected after pigs had been sent to an abattoir hundreds of miles away. By then, infection had already spread to other farms across the country.

3There are seven known major virus types: A, C, O, Asia1, Sat.1, Sat.2 and Sat.3. The strain responsible for the 1967 outbreak was identified by the Animal Virus Research Institute as sub-type O.
4 Foot-and-Mouth disease is much harder to detect in sheep than in pigs or cattle.

3. Spread of the disease

In 1967 as today, the outbreak spread to become an epidemic. However, there are two major differences. First, the disease never became a truly national epidemic in 1967. Second, it spread in very different ways.

In the 1967-8 outbreak, 94% of all the confirmed cases of foot-and-mouth - 2,228 in total - occurred in the North-West Midlands and North Wales. The next highest concentration of cases was in Derbyshire, where 52 cases were reported. Another 11 neighbouring counties were affected, but here the number of cases was small. It was in effect a regional epidemic, centred on the Cheshire Plain. This part of the country had one of the highest concentrations of livestock in the world at the time. It was this that favoured the rapid, mainly airborne, spread of the disease. At its peak in November 1967, there were nearly 80 cases being confirmed a day in this area. In less densely stocked areas such as Nottinghamshire, Lincolnshire and Northamptonshire there was little or no local spread of the disease.

In comparison, the current outbreak became a national epidemic. While the number of cases reported on any one day has never risen above 50, and is therefore significantly below the peaks in 1967, the geographical dispersal of the disease across the country before the first case was diagnosed had been much more widespread.

In the week after the disease was first diagnosed in Essex on 20 February, outbreaks were detected in Tyne and Wear on 23 February; in Devon on 25 February; in Wiltshire on 26 February; in Anglesey, County Durham, Herefordshire, Lancashire, and Northumberland on 27 February; and in Leicestershire, Warwickshire and Powys on 28 February.

The explanation for this lies in the different ways in which the disease spread during the two epidemics. The Ministry of Agriculture attributed nearly all the secondary outbreaks in the 1967-8 epidemic to local spread caused by wind, birds, rodents, and other fauna. Only one of the 2,364 confirmed cases was attributed to animal movements. That is significantly less than those put down to milk lorries (15) or vehicles transporting skimmed milk (9).

In stark contrast to 1967, MAFF believe that animal movements lie behind the wide geographical dispersion of the disease. Such movements caused at least 92 of the cases in the current outbreak (and in particular, the vast majority of the initial cases). Each of these acted as a primary focus for a major outbreak in different areas across the country, in a similar manner to the much more concentrated primary foci in 1967. Sheep movements were largely responsible. Of the 1,471 infected premises identified by 25 April, 1,215 had sheep, of which 236 were sheep-only premises.

In 1967, a ban on animal movements was put in place a few days after the first primary outbreaks from Argentine lamb, which partly explains why animal movements played only a negligible part in the spread of the disease. The 1967 epidemic was also mainly a cattle epidemic, and movements then were fewer and over shorter distances than now.

In the current outbreak, the Minister for Agriculture Nick Brown introduced a total ban on animal movements nationally at 5pm on 23 February, three days after the first confirmed case and as soon as it became evident that movements had been responsible for spreading the disease. If this first confirmed case had been the primary outbreak, then it is possible that animal movements would have played as small a part as they did in 1967; and indeed, that the outbreak would have been quickly brought under control.

But because the primary outbreak occurred hundreds of miles away and probably many days before, it had already spread to the sheep marketing network before it was detected. While we were still unaware of the disease, infected sheep were crossing the country in hundreds of separate movements, and coming in contact with other livestock.

From Longtown market, sheep were sent to markets at Carlisle on 16 February; Welshpool on 19 February; to dealers at Highampton in Devon, Lockerbie in Dumfries and Galloway, Dearham in Cumbria and Nantwich in Cheshire; and indirectly to markets at Hereford on 21 February, Northampton on 22 February and Ross-on-Wye on 23 February. These movements explain the dispersed pattern of cases after the Brentwood case on 20 February.

While tracing movements of pigs from Heddon-on-the-Wall has proved relatively straightforward, not least because of the restraints imposed on pig movements by the Pigs (Records, Identification and Movement) Order 1995, tracking movements of sheep has proved more difficult and in some cases impossible. This is partly due to unrecorded sales of sheep, which it seems took place around the edges of the various livestock markets.

But according to MAFF estimates, the overall number of sheep moved after the disease entered the country and before the ban on movement was imposed on 23 February may well have been over 2 million. Some 980,000 sheep were sent to abattoirs; the Meat Livestock Commission has records of 700,000 sheep moving through national markets (an underestimate of the real figure both because the MLC only covers 80% of the markets, and because of unrecorded multiple movements); 30,000 sheep were exported; private sales probably accounted for over 100,000 more movements; and some of the 4 million sheep on tack would have returned to their home farms

5 A region that included the counties of Cheshire, Denbighshire, Flintshire, Montgomeryshire, Shropshire and Staffordshire.
6 See maps in the Annex for further details.
7 Part 1 of the Report of the Committee of Inquiry on Foot-and-Mouth Disease, paragraphs 83-84.
8 However a number of secondary infections that could not be explained by meteorological conditions because of the distances involved were later found to have been caused by the movement of milk lorries and other transport.
9 See the epidemiological map in the Annex, showing the dispersal of infected animals across the country before the disease was detected on 20 February.

4. Changes in the livestock industry

The changes in the livestock industry since 1967 have also facilitated the rapid spread of the disease. These changes meant that any outbreak of infection would be transported further and more quickly than in 1967.

In 1967, the British livestock industry was made up of smaller farms, and the national herds were also significantly smaller. The nature of the livestock industry meant that there were fewer animal movements in 1967. Motorways were rare and lorries were smaller and slower. Stock still travelled by rail, more slowly still. Sheep and beef production was almost entirely extensive in the 1960s. Intensive beef rearing - feeding young bulls or heifers in sheds on cereals - was rare, although less so than in the pig industry. The movement of animals was still highly seasonal. Hill farmers would sell stock off the uplands for finishing by lowland farmers. The traditional production of fat cattle took up to three years from calving to the final sale, much longer than is the case today. New techniques were being introduced cutting the cycle down to 11-15 months, but again these were not widespread.

Today, the British livestock industry is much more intensive. Farm sizes and stock numbers have increased dramatically since 1967, and production cycles have been cut significantly. And the introduction of BSE controls has accelerated the switch from slow-maturing breeds reared over 30 months or more. Overall, the seasonality of production is much less marked and finishing times of 18-22 months are the norm.

Changes in farming practices have led to an increase in animal movements. But movements of pigs and cattle have not been a major cause of the spread of the disease during the current outbreak. Pigs are the most prolific producers of the foot-and-mouth virus, and therefore the most dangerous to other livestock. But in 1975, new legislation set a 21 day delay between pig movements. This legislation was introduced to combat Swine Vesicular Disease, but it was also an effective break on foot-and-mouth, giving time for clinical signs to develop and be reported before other premises were put at risk by the movement of store or breeding pigs. Likewise, cattle are individually identified and their movements closely controlled.

But similar movement restrictions do not apply to sheep. And changes since 1967 have made this trade the most mobile in the modern livestock industry. Lamb production was still very seasonal in the 1960s, reflecting the availability of grass. Few home-produced fat lambs were available in the first five months or so of the year but then marketing surged towards the late summer and autumn. Older lambs would come on to the market from Christmas to Easter, having finished on root crops over the winter. Lamb production was concentrated in the spring months.

Today, however, the season has lengthened to run from December to June. Sheep and lambs move frequently. Hill breeds can survive in the harsher uplands but do not produce commercial carcasses. They are therefore crossed and their progeny recrossed to produce marketable meet. This third generation will move according to availability of pasture and management decisions as to when the animals should go to market. Unlike cattle and pigs, sheep are not traded singly but in batches of up to a hundred or more. Sheep from different farms are mixed to create uniform batches, so vastly increasing the number of animal contacts. On a typical day in February, sheep would have been moving for the following reasons, among others:

1. The direct sale of lambs and ewes from a farm to an abattoir;

2. The sale of lambs and ewes from a farm through a live auction market;

3. The sale of lambs and ewes from farms to dealers;

4. The sale of lambs and ewes from dealers through a live auction market;

5. The sale of lambs from dealers to farms (usually "ewe" lambs, to be kept for breeding purposes rather than slaughter).

6. Ewes moved onto farms from neighbours and dealers to meet subsidy count declarations.

The same animal can therefore be moved several times in a few days. For example, the Hill farmer could sell his lamb to a dealer, who sells it to a lowland farmer for fattening. This farmer may then sell the lamb to another dealer after a few days. This dealer is likely to sell it on again quickly, possibly the same day, through a market or direct to an abattoir or farm.

The concentration of livestock markets and slaughterhouses in the last thirty years has also contributed to the increase in animal movements. Selling through the live auction market was still dominant in 1967. Over 800 such markets operated in the UK in the early 1960s. There are only 170 today. However direct delivery to the abattoir has become much more common for cattle and pigs: now less than 10% of pigs go through any kind of market. This reduces the number of intermediary contacts between farm and slaughter. On the other hand, the percentage of sheep sold through markets has stayed constant at around 65-70%, reflecting the dispersed nature of the industry and the practice of "batch" marketing and sale. As a result, sheep now travel further, are sold in larger markets, and come into contact with more animals in the process, than ever before.

The concentration of slaughterhouses has had a similar effect, and not just for sheep. There were over 3,000 slaughterhouses in the UK in 1967. Today there are only 520; the result of increased competition, rising hygiene standards following Britain's membership of the EEC and the growing importance of large national supermarket chains.

10 See charts in the Annex comparing holdings per farm and size of national herds in 1967 and 2001.
11 The latter age of 22 months is influenced by the minimum age at which farmers can claim a second beef premium payment on steers.
12 According to research, pigs infected with foot-and-mouth excrete 1000 times more virus than other livestock animals.
13 Commonly known as "Hoggets".
14 So-called "cull" ewes. About a fifth of the national herd reaches the end of their productive life every year and are sold for slaughter.
15 The role of dealers has increased over recent years, as farmers have scaled down their labour to cut costs and have found it easier to buy and sell animals through dealers than go to market themselves.
16 MAFF figures.

5. Tackling the outbreak

The speed at which resources were mobilised and the slaughter policy implemented in the current outbreak compares favourably to 1967.

By 2 May an additional 1,417 vets had been mobilised since the start of the outbreak, including from Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Sweden, the USA and other countries. In 1967, an additional 645 vets were mobilised in the whole of the 32 week epidemic, although the State Veterinary Service was twice as big then as now. In the current outbreak, MAFF had a greater civilian capacity available than in 1967, partly because of the improvements in techniques and technology, but also because they had kept up-to-date lists of relevant contractors (although there were more technical MAFF staff available in 1967 compared with 2001).

In 1967 the armed forces were called in after 12 days. This time contacts were established between MAFF and the MOD on the day the outbreak was detected, and close contact was maintained between officials to ensure that possible armed forces contributions were identified and explored. Since 1967 the size of the Royal Army Veterinary Service has reduced significantly. The military vets who could be made available were deployed on 12 March. By then it had also been agreed that military marksmen would be deployed for rapid culling of pigs in open fields, an essential contingency in view of the particular virulence of the disease in these animals. Army logistic experts were deployed to MAFF headquarters on 15 March. Logistic teams were deployed to MAFF regional headquarters early the following week.

The more careful preparation for military deployments ensured that many of the difficulties experienced in 1967, in integrating the military and civil response, were not repeated this time around. The scale of the military operation increased more smoothly than in 1967, the figure of 500 troops deployed during the 1967-8 outbreak being exceeded on this occasion by 26 March. The peak number this time around was more than 2,000, with more than 1,400 troops being deployed throughout April. Most importantly, the close integration of the civil and military responses had a more rapid impact on the spread of the disease. This helped ensure that the peak figures of new cases experienced in 1967-8 were not repeated, in spite of the significantly more complex nature of the outbreak.

The difference in the scale of the slaughter between the two epidemics was also of a different order of magnitude. This partly reflects the increase in farm size over the past 30 years as well as the measures needed to tackle the more dispersed current outbreak. In 1967-8, 434,000 animals were slaughtered in 32 weeks, at a rate of approximately 13,500 a week at its peak. In the current outbreak, 2,382,000 animals have been slaughtered in 11 weeks, at a rate of over half a million a week at its peak. For most of April, we were slaughtering more than five times as many animals per day as were slaughtered on average per week in 1967-8.

1967 200120
Vets mobilised 645 1,417
Army personnel deployed 500 Over 2000 (peak)

 

1967 200120

Sheep slaughtered

 108,835 1,855,000
Cows slaughtered 214,867 415,000
Pigs slaughtered 118,526 110,000
Goats slaughtered 57 2,000
Total animals slaughtered 442,285 2,382,000

In addition, 15,000 vehicles have been used in combating the current outbreak. The tonnage of carcasses moved each week is now greater than that of all the ammunition transported by the British armed services during the Gulf War. Up to 1,000 police officers - almost equivalent to a force the size of Warwickshire, Cumbria, or Suffolk - have been involved in general policing duties in support of the operation. The engineering effort has excavated burial sites equal to 200 Olympic size pools. The mass burial site in Throckmorton in Worcestershire alone has the capacity to accommodate over 430,000 sheep.

17 MAFF figures from the JCC overnight report to COBRA, 2 May 2001.
18 Part 2 of the Report of the Committee of Inquiry on Foot-and-Mouth Disease, para 40.
19 MAFF figures.
20 Figures as of 2 May 2001.

6. Conclusions

This short comparison of the two epidemics is by its nature cursory and incomplete. A comprehensive and more authoritative comparison will have to wait until the end of the current outbreak. But even at this stage, it is possible to identify some major differences:

1. In the 14 years before 1967 there were only two years without any foot-and-mouth outbreaks; in the 34 years before the current epidemic there was only one outbreak in the United Kingdom, in the Isle of Wight;

2. The dramatic improvement appears largely due to the decision to tighten import controls from countries with foot-and-mouth after 1967-8 and improved hygiene and animal health standards;

3. The 1967 outbreak was probably caused by legal imports of infected meat, legally introduced into the animal food chain. It is not yet established whether the cause of the current outbreak was due to illegal actions;

4. In 1967 the primary outbreak was reported before infected animals had left the farm, whereas the current outbreak was not reported until it reached a slaughterhouse;

5. Changes particularly in the sheep industry mean that more animals now enter the national marketing system earlier, and move more frequently, faster and further than they did in 1967;

6. Sheep movements therefore played a major role in the spread of the current outbreak, unlike1967, with over 2 million sheep movements alone in the 3 weeks before the 23 February movement ban;

7. As a result, the current outbreak is not geographically localised as in 1967 but national in character with a large number of dispersed cases;

8. This has required a much larger response to tackle the epidemic than in 1967: 2,382,000 animals have already been slaughtered in 11 weeks whereas in 1967 434,000 animals were culled in 32 weeks;

9. Accordingly, the logistic operation to tackle the current outbreak is of a different scale of magnitude than the 1967-8 operation, with for example over four times as many army personnel involved.

21 In particular, no attempt has been made to examine the impact of Britain's membership of the European Economic Community on both the livestock industry and the policy framework.

7. Annex of maps, charts and tables

 

Page last modified: 14 January, 2008

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